





The Better Way: Transit Service and Demand in Metropolitan Toronto, 1953-1990 
 



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 


























































The Better Way: Transit Service and Demand in Metropolitan Toronto, 1953-1990 
Jonathan J. English 
 
 This dissertation contends that the decision of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 
and the Toronto Transit Commission to introduce a grid of frequent, all-day bus service on arterial 
roads in newly built, low-density suburban neighbourhoods is responsible for Toronto’s unique 
ability to attract suburbanites to transit. Toronto’s approach is in stark contrast with the that 
followed in most North American urban regions, where auto-oriented suburban built form is 
considered to make transit unviable, and therefore transit service outside the urban core is typically 
very limited. The Ontario government’s establishment of metropolitan government in the Toronto 
region in 1953, at a time when transit remained a popular mode of transportation, encouraged and 
empowered suburban politicians to pressure the TTC to expand service to their constituencies. In 
response, the TTC developed a plan for suburban bus service that succeeded, in terms of ridership 
and financial performance, far beyond its expectations. This success, in turn, encouraged further 
service improvements and government support for transit, producing a virtuous spiral of service 
increases, ridership gains, and government funding increases, which stood in sharp contrast with 
the vicious spiral of ridership declines, service cuts, and fare hikes that plagued transit systems in 
most North American cities. This dissertation is the product of archival research in Canada and the 
United States, as well as a series of interviews with policymakers, planners, and activists who were 
engaged during the period.  The Toronto model offers valuable lessons for transportation planning 
across North America. It demonstrates that it is possible to achieve high transit mode share, even 
in areas that are not designed as explicitly transit-oriented communities. This means that it is 
 
 
possible to shift trips away from the automobile without needing to entirely rebuild the suburban 
neighbourhoods where most North Americans reside, an unachievable goal on the timeline 
required to avert catastrophic climate change. It also demonstrates that the benefits of large capital 
investments in rapid transit and rail projects will only be maximized when paired with operating 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
As veterans returned from the maelstrom of the Second World War, their 
governments vowed to ensure that the promises of “homes fit for heroes” from after the 
previous Great War were not seen to be broken again. Billions of federal dollars flowed 
over the following years—in the United States and in Canada—to innumerable programs 
that subsidized suburban housing and the highways needed to make it accessible. In the 
United States, racial prejudice ensured that the boon was not universal, but for millions 
of Americans and Canadians, it was possible, for the first time, to achieve the long-
cherished dream of a house with a yard. Public transportation was one of the most 
important casualties of this revolution: from 1950 to 1970, U.S. annual per capita transit 
ridership plummeted by more than two-thirds.1 Canadian cities underwent a similar 
physical transformation. They also built sprawling suburbs and urban expressways,2 and 
from 1952 to 1962, Toronto’s transit ridership declined by 37.6%—comparable to 38.8% 
in Chicago, 40.3% in Washington, and 41.0% in Philadelphia.3  
Almost uniquely, however, Toronto was able to reverse the trend, and the Toronto 
Transit Commission (TTC) was the only system in North America4 to increase ridership 
between 1946 and 1970.5 As ridership in American cities continued a precipitous decline, 
 
1 Paul Schimek, “Automobile and Public Transit Use in the United States and Canada: Comparison of Postwar 
Trends,” Transportation Research Record 1521, no. 1 (January 1996): 9. 
2 Craig Townsend and Margaret Ellis-Young, “Urban Population Density and Freeways in North America: A Re-
Assessment,” Journal of Transport Geography 73 (2018): 75–83. 
3 Simpson & Curtin Consultants and Joe R. Ong, “Economic Study of Bloor-Danforth Subway and Proposed 
Extensions” (The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, September 1963), 35. 
4 For the purposes of this study, “North America” will be used as shorthand for the United States and Canada. 
5 Michael J. Doucet, “Mass Transit and the Failure of Private Ownership: The Case of Toronto in the Early 
Twentieth Century,” Urban History Review 6, no. 3 (February 1, 1978): 380. 
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Toronto managed to slowly, and then rapidly, build ridership. More significantly, the 
gains were centred in the very auto-oriented suburbia that had ostensibly doomed transit. 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the turnaround occurred in 1962 and 1963. The key event in 
those years was not a subway expansion or other large capital project; it was an expansion 
of the TTC’s bus service, subsidized by the metropolitan government in a political 
compromise with suburban elected officials, to create a grid of routes along the old 
concession roads that had become the arterial backbone of the fast-growing new suburbs. 
Against predictions, the public took to the new services with alacrity. The upshot was a 
transit system that, to this day, maintains among the highest ridership per capita, at by 
far the lowest subsidy, of any transit system on the continent. More fundamentally, it has 
resulted in a city where even those who cannot afford a car or who are not able to drive 
nevertheless have access to the services and opportunities of their city. 
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While virtually every American city at the time was providing little or no transit 
service in those kinds of new neighbourhoods, people moving into new suburban houses 
in Metropolitan Toronto found a frequent bus down the block as soon as they arrived. 
This was far less impressive than the huge administrative and engineering achievements 
of San Francisco’s BART and Washington’s Metro, but in the end, it attracted more riders. 
How did this happen? It happened because Toronto had a metropolitan 
government in the 1950s, which was able to take over the transit system while it was still 
strong and popular, and while the downtown core was still the centre of civic life. In most 
American cities, transit remained in private hands in those years. Instead of subsidy being 
used to maintain a consistent system, they descended into spirals of fare hikes, ridership 
declines, and service cuts that drove riders away. Even in places, like New York, where 
transit was publicly owned, it remained limited to the slow-growing central city, and 
completely ignored the booming suburbs for decades. Worse, opposition to transit 
became inextricably linked in many American cities to outright racism, since it was seen 
as a way for black people living in historic central cities to travel to the segregated suburbs. 
Toronto’s transit success was, to some extent, a product of its particular 
circumstances: a strong provincial government, an economic base favouring urban 
centralization, and some strong individual leadership. Nevertheless, the ability of Toronto 
to attract large numbers of transit riders in otherwise unexceptional suburbs offers some 
important lessons to other parts of the continent. 
There are three objectives for this dissertation. Firstly, it seeks to examine a place 
where transit genuinely succeeded in postwar suburbia, and to determine how that 
situation came about. It is about challenging transit fatalism—the assumption that transit 
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cannot possibly be economically viable or attract substantial mode share in the 
neighbourhoods with single-family homes and two car garages that are home to the 
majority of the continent’s population. It is about finding ways to make transit function 
in the neighbourhoods that exist now, rather than waiting for them to be entirely rebuilt—
something that will take far longer than the time available to address the crisis of climate 
change in which auto dependence plays such a large role. 
This builds on the work of scholars like Paul Mees to address the problems of 
imbalance between capital and operating funding for transit. Generally, governments 
have placed emphasis on the former. It also addresses the frequently discussed last mile 
problem. It is impossible to build rail transit within walking distance of everyone (or even 
most people) in a metropolitan area. There has been much discussion of new technology 
solutions that may be able to address the last mile issue, but this is an example of a very 
proven and very successful solution to that problem.  
The dissertation places Toronto within a wider North American context through 
comparison with other successful transit systems, highlighting the particular success of 
simple investments in suburban buses, an area that is all too often dismissed as financially 
unviable. In so many regions, buses have low ridership, and that low ridership is in turn 
used to justify very limited service. This dissertation makes the case that that limited 
service may well be the primary cause of the low ridership. Because of its high ridership 
in the suburbs, Toronto has the lowest percentage subsidy of any transit system in North 
America. An agency seemingly maximizing its efficiency may in fact be hindering it by 
minimizing service, since running even an infrequent bus that is mostly empty is not very 
efficient. In Toronto, suburban buses that come every five minutes are still packed, since 
the service they offer is so attractive. It is only by changing the ideas of agency officials 
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and political leaders about how to run a transit system efficiently and equitably will transit 
be able to escape the trap of low service and low ridership. 
Secondly, this dissertation aims to challenge the conventional wisdom within the 
Toronto area about the history of the local transit system. For example, this will challenge 
the widely held beliefs that expansion to the suburbs was disastrous for the TTC, and that 
a fare policy that attracted suburban riders forced the TTC into a spiral of deficits—not to 
mention challenging the idea that subsidy for transit is inherently a negative given the 
ample subsidy for other modes of transportation. Most fundamentally it challenges the 
timing of Toronto's transit success, shifting it from the defeat of the Spadina expressway 
in the early 1970s to the early 1960s, following the expansion of suburban bus service, 
when the turnaround in ridership actually occurred.  It will place local bus service at the 
heart of the Toronto transit story, rather than in the marginal position that it has always 
held, as any examination of major planning documents will show. 
Thirdly, this dissertation aims to provide a genuine history of the postwar TTC 
within a North American context, highlighting its unique characteristics and their 
political and administrative genesis. 
 
Australian scholar Paul Mees has described a theory of transit planning, drawing 
in part on the Toronto model. He exalted the value of a grid of frequent transit service, 
enabling riders to transfer from one route to another so that they can travel to any part of 
the urban area—in stark contrast to the predominantly radial networks that exist in most 
North American cities. This “network effect,” as Mees describes it, is enabled by 
sufficiently high frequency of service that enables riders to transfer reliably and 
conveniently. The deterrent effect of infrequent service is multiplied when riders must 
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transfer: while they can time when they get on the first bus, an infrequent and poorly 
timed connection could leave them standing for a half-hour or more on a suburban street 
corner. Worse, if their first bus is delayed and they miss their connection, an infrequent 
route could force them to wait an unreasonably long time for the next trip. This requires 
riders to budget far more time than the actual travel time in order to ensure that they 
arrive punctually at their destination, badly hindering transit in competition with the 
automobile. As this dissertation will demonstrate, Toronto exemplifies Mees’ network 
approach to transit planning.6 
Mees describes other advantages of the network effect. For example, rather than 
forcing planners to predict where riders want to travel and then provide that service in 
advance, a comprehensive grid allows riders to vote with their feet, showing planners 
exactly where they want to go and therefore justifying further improvement to service 
where needed. Further conclusions can be drawn on the positive effects on multimodality: 
frequent bus service can connect to frequent rail service, enabling the latter to serve as a 
rapid, high-capacity backbone of a network while the former serves the “last mile” 
function of delivering riders to their homes. 
This stands in stark contrast with many North American metropolitan cities, where 
rapid transit networks operate almost in isolation from the remaining bus network, 
leaving it useful only to those within walking distance or who can drive to park-and-ride 
facilities. In too many cases, rather than as an access route to rail service, the buses 
function as a parallel system that is used primarily by those who cannot afford high rail 
 
6 Paul Mees, Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age (London: Routledge, 2009), 147–63. 
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fares. In Nassau County, a suburb of New York City, the busiest bus route runs directly 
parallel to the faster but much more expensive Long Island Rail Road. 
It is necessary to define the metrics by which the success or failure of public transit 
is measured. In transit research, outcomes have generally been expressed as “modal 
splits” (e.g., shares of trips by automobile), daily passenger miles or hours of travel, and 
daily vehicle trip rates.7 For the purpose of this dissertation, and for comparison of 
Toronto with peer cities, success will focus on ridership growth rates and transit mode 
share. 
By any measure, Toronto is no transit utopia. It does not have the regional transit 
ubiquity present in many Asian and European cities. Buses are often slow and unreliable, 
and even the busiest operate in mixed traffic and lack any kind of priority over cars. The 
TTC slipped badly in the 1990s, succumbing to the effects of a grievous recession and 
government funding cuts. These cuts put the agency into a spiral of fare hikes, service 
cuts, and ridership declines similar to those that had plagued transit operators across 
North America in the 1950s and 60s, but that the TTC had theretofore managed to avoid. 
Before then, however, the TTC had been seen as a model around the world. The Toronto 
model was studied by academics,8 and the TTC even offered consulting services that 
evangelized its model to transit agencies across North America.  
 
7 Reid Ewing and Robert Cervero, “Travel and the Built Environment: A Synthesis,” Transportation Research 
Record 1780, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 87–114. 
8 Paul Mees, A Very Public Solution: Transport in the Dispersed City (Carlton South, Vic: Melbourne University 
Press, 2000); Mees, Transport for Suburbia; Paul Mees, “Toronto: Paradigm Reexamined,” Urban Policy and 
Research 12, no. 3 (1994): 146–63; Robert Cervero, The Transit Metropolis: A Global Inquiry, 4th ed. (Washington, 
D.C: Island Press, 1998), 83–90; Jeff Kenworthy and Peter Newman, “Toronto—Paradigm Regained,” Australian 
Planner 31, no. 3 (January 1, 1994): 137–47; Peter W.G. Newman and Jeffrey R. Kenworthy, “The Land Use—
Transport Connection: An Overview,” Land Use Policy 13, no. 1 (January 1, 1996): 1–22. 
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There is no lack of explanations for Toronto’s unusual transit success. Renowned 
UC Berkeley transit scholar Robert Cervero largely puts it down to comprehensive land 
use planning enabled by a metropolitan government, which secured a strong central 
business district and concentrated development around subway stations. He also notes 
the power of the downtown-oriented urban reform movement, notably including Jane 
Jacobs, which stopped expressway construction in the city.9 
An article by Australian scholars Peter Newman and Jeff Kenworthy captures the 
conventional view of Toronto’s transit success, citing former mayor Art Eggleton:  
“The city authorities were very influenced by the author Jane 
Jacobs, whose wonderful book The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities stressed the need for people to go back to a more 
urban character and to rediscover the public spaces. She went to 
live in Toronto and was very influential in a movement there to 
stop the building of a major freeway called the Spadina 
Expressway (they built the Spadina subway line instead). From 
this experience a whole public, community-based move for a 
different kind of city sprang up. Once the freeway issue had 
defined the city's direction, the authorities decided to emphasize 
transit-oriented development in their planning priorities. Toronto 
changed in 20 years quite dramatically from a city that was 
becoming increasingly car based to one that is now substantially 
based around a transit network. As a result, it has been able to 
revitalize the downtown area and develop a series of transit-
centred sub-cities. In addition, Toronto has a strong 'Main Street' 
programme aimed at increasing the inner-city population and 
revitalizing light rail/tram streets by incorporating a large 
quantity of new shop-top housing and other infill residential 
development.”10 
 
There is certainly considerable validity to this explanation—the Stop Spadina 
movement, of which Jane Jacobs was a key member, played a tremendous role in 
 
9 Cervero, The Transit Metropolis, 83–90. 
10 Newman and Kenworthy, “The Land Use—Transport Connection,” 17. 
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changing the values of the city. Still, an examination of the timing of Toronto’s transit 
revival shows that it came much earlier, when Jane Jacobs was still ensconced in 
Greenwich Village. Toronto broke away from the North American pack not in the 1970s, 
after the cancellation of Spadina, but in the 1960s. More precisely, the turnaround can be 
pinpointed to 1962 and 1963, immediately after a radical and unprecedented expansion 
of suburban transit service that created a grid of frequent bus routes within reach of nearly 
every new single-family house on a cul-de-sac. 
The story of Toronto’s transit success is not truly an urban one. While Toronto’s 
choice to save its legacy downtown streetcar network was a powerful symbol and helped 
spark the revival of light rail as a modern transit mode across North America, transit in 
central Toronto isn’t particularly exceptional in a continental context. Scholars of transit 
and transit history Brian Doucet and Michael Doucet have divided Toronto into two 
sections: the “Streetcar City” built before the Second World War, consisting of classic 
streetcar suburbs11 made up of bustling shopping streets with intersecting residential 
streets of closely-packed houses; and the “Automobile City,” made up of postwar houses 
on large lots on meandering single-use streets.12 The Streetcar City has a transit mode 
share to work of 39.2%, a figure that is similar to Washington, D.C. at 38%, Boston at 
33%, and San Francisco at 33%. Central Toronto is a transit city, but not exceptionally 
so—it is no Paris, with a transit mode share of 59%.13 
 
11 For more on this type of urban form, see Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 
1870-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
12 Brian Doucet and Michael Doucet, Streetcars and the Changing Geography of Toronto (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, forthcoming). 
13 Yonah Freemark, “Travel Mode Shares in the U.S.,” The Transport Politic (blog), August 24, 2016, 
https://www.thetransportpolitic.com/databook/travel-mode-shares-in-the-u-s/; “La Ville de Paris,” Enquête Globale 
Transport: La Mobilité En Île-de-France (Direction régionale et interdépartementale de l’Équipement et de 
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Where Toronto truly stands out is in the postwar suburbs served by the Toronto 
Transit Commission: in Doucet and Doucet’s Automobile City, transit’s mode share for 
work trips is barely any lower: 35.5%. Such a figure across a broad suburban area is 
virtually unprecedented in North America. Toronto’s deserved reputation as a transit 
model does not rest on the charming streets of downtown, with bright red streetcars 
trundling past. Instead, it rests on the unusually high transit use in the rather 
conventional suburban neighbourhoods where most of the city’s residents live.  
And they are conventional: the auto-orientation of these suburbs is borne out in 
more mode share statistics. While 6% of Streetcar City residents cycle to work, and 16.5% 
walk, the figures are only 0.6% and 3.4% respectively in the Automobile City. While small 
interventions, like pedestrian paths that allow direct routes from winding cul-de-sacs out 
to bus stops on arterial roads, make it possible for people to walk to the bus stop, the 
urban design of these communities remains unquestionably auto-oriented. Still, a large 
percentage of the population—including many who could afford a car or even have one 
sitting in the driveway—ride the bus. 
 





Figure 2: Street View of Finch West14 
 
Figure 3: Street View of Finch West15 
 
14 Image Source: Google Earth 




Figure 4: Aerial View of a Portion of Finch West16 
 
The 36 Finch West, a bus route in the far northwest corner of the TTC’s service 
area, is an illustrative example. Though it serves a very suburban area with low-density 
and transit-unfriendly land use—predominantly strip malls and the backyard fences of 
houses, along with a few apartment buildings (see Figures 2, 3, and 4)—it carries 44,000 
riders per day.17 The service frequency of the route is better than every ten minutes, all 
day, and the route runs 24 hours per day. Only one bus route in New York City matches 
this ridership figure, but it is not atypical for a suburban route in Toronto—several carry 
 
16 Image Source: Google Earth 




even more riders.18 Finch West also requires a lower subsidy per rider than busy 
downtown streetcar routes: its operating cost is $1.79 per rider, compared with $2.46 on 
the 501 Queen streetcar.19 It isn’t even the busiest suburban route. While Toronto’s 
suburban bus routes are not particularly fast—Finch West averages about 15 km/h20—nor 
do they have meaningful transit priority, their high frequency and daily operation late 
into the night has resulted in extraordinarily high ridership, which has in turn justified 
further service improvements. 
The story of Toronto’s suburban transit success remains largely untold. There is no 
comprehensive history of the postwar TTC, let alone one focusing on its unique suburban 
transit achievement. This dissertation aims to fill that gap, and to make a broader case for 
the provision of frequent transit service even in areas where high ridership seems unlikely 
due to the prevailing built form, as well as for higher levels of government to provide 
operating funding, and not just capital support, for local transit. 
This dissertation is the product of archival research, principally at the City of 
Toronto Archives and the Archives of Ontario, as well as in several other archives. The 
document collections of both the Toronto Transit Commission and of the Chair of 
Metropolitan Toronto were consulted, in order to ascertain the internal discussion of 
policies in both the transit agency’s professional administration, and within the senior 
political levels of the metropolitan government. Furthermore, newspaper archies were 
 
18 “Average Weekday Bus Ridership” (MTA New York City Transit, n.d.), 
http://web.mta.info/nyct/facts/ridership/ridership_bus.htm. 
19 “Ridership and Cost Statistics for Bus and Streetcar Routes.” 




consulted extensively in order to understand the public discussion surrounding 
transportation policies, and to assess the level of public interest. 
In addition to archival research, a series of interviews were conducted with 
policymakers, activists, and professionals who played significant roles in Metropolitan 
Toronto transportation policymaking in the period in question. They were used to gain 
greater insight into discussions that did not appear in the documents or in the newspaper, 
and also to secure a better understanding of the personalities involved. Interviews and 
documents were used as checks on one another. 
Through this analysis of contemporary documents, it became increasingly clear 
that buses—and, in particular, improvements to conventional local bus service in the 
suburban parts of Metro—were the key to Metropolitan Toronto’s unique turnaround in 
the early 1960s. Comparison of transit policy initiatives and infrastructure improvements 
with the precise timing of ridership improvements clearly point to the bus improvements 
introduced in 1963 as the seminal moment—a moment even more important than the 
openings of major rail infrastructure. 
 
 
Cities have always been shaped by their transportation. From the small, crowded 
pre-industrial city where walking was the primary means of getting around, to the early 
suburbs that began to disperse the middle-class population along streetcar and railroad 
lines, to the sprawl of the contemporary auto-oriented suburb—all are defined and limited 
by the availability of transportation. For centuries, transportation has been used to reduce 
the population density of cities, and to allow those with the financial means to afford it to 
escape to more bucolic surroundings on the urban fringe. The advent of mass automobile 
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ownership enabled dreams of universal dispersal of population, emptying out the 
tenement houses where the poor crowded to live close to their workplaces, and shifting to 
a world in which everyone had their own house and a plot of land.21 
Architect Frank Lloyd Wright wrote of the concept of “Broadacre City” in 1932. 
Broadacre City was a misnomer, since it did not describe a city at all. Instead, it envisioned 
a United States in which each American family had their own one-acre plot of land, evenly 
distributed across the country. The booming automobile industry zealously embraced a 
diluted version of this vision, given its obvious pecuniary benefits to their businesses. It 
was popularized at the 1939 New York World’s Fair, where thousands of visitors rode a 
model created by designer Norman Bel Geddes. It is rare that one finds a past vision of 
the future that came true so precisely: its suburban houses on undulating streets, 
shopping centres, and expressway cloverleafs were to be the American landscape of the 
decades that followed.22 
Urban dispersal was an ideal with deep roots, partly stemming from fear of the 
urban mob in the French Revolution and countless tumults before it. Cities were also 
viewed as breeding grounds for vice and havens for immorality. As Thomas Jefferson said, 
“I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.”23 The 
atavism of the romantics led them, too, to pathologize the city.  “Remove them from big 
 
21 Warner, Streetcar Suburbs; Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, 
Revised ed. edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); Owen Gutfreund, Twentieth-Century Sprawl: 
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cities,” Rousseau wrote of young people. “Bring them back to their first abodes where 
rustic simplicity lets the passions of their age develop less rapidly.”24 Later romantics were 
appalled by the dismal conditions of the smoke-filled, disease-afflicted, and poverty-
ridden nineteenth century industrial city, and romantic nationalists furthermore 
associated the rural with the true soul of the nation. Writers like Thoreau, Hawthorne, 
and Emerson evangelized the rejection of the urban in the United States. 
As eloquently as these voices may have expressed their disdain, returning to a 
pastoral society was an impossible dream at a time when the inexorable force of the 
industrial economy, with its factories requiring concentrated hordes of workers, 
increasingly supplanted the agricultural economy, with the inherently centrifugal force of 
its need for ample land. The only feasible means to transport those workers between home 
and work were either their own two feet, or streetcars and trains that moved riders en 
masse.25 Wright saw the unique possibility presented by mass automobile ownership: 
each individual would, for the first time, have their own means of high-speed 
transportation that could take them to and from any places they pleased. 
Yet cities endured through the tumult of the automobile age. Wright’s vision of a 
diffuse American population never came to pass. The cities of the automobile era may 
have been less densely populated and less centralized than the Dickensian industrial 
metropolis, but an inexorably growing proportion of the national population still lived 
and worked in the sprawling agglomerations that we call “metropolitan areas.” There is a 
rich economics literature exploring the reasons why people continue to concentrate in 
 
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile: Or, Treatise on Education (New York: D. Appleton, 1892), 205. 
25 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 20–44. 
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cities: Alfred Marshall classified them as pooling of labour, sharing of inputs, and the 
spillover of knowledge.26 There are equally significant cultural reasons for the existence 
of cities. Even as their dismal nature and deleterious effects were lamented by legions of 
great writers, these authors nonetheless tended to stay near their fellow writers (not to 
mention publishers and critics) in the big cities. More prosaically, many people appreciate 
the wide circle of friends, the cultural diversity, and the relative anonymity available in 
cities. 
Without the availability of efficient means of transportation, however, the great 
city becomes an impossibility. From the invention of the train and streetcar, the city began 
to spread beyond walking distance. This transportation revolution brought tremendous 
benefits—for one, many people were no longer forced to crowd into tenements five-to-a-
room to be within walking distance of their employment—but it also brought more 
problems: how could equitable access to transportation be guaranteed to all citizens? 
Economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum have propounded the 
Capability Approach, which argues that capabilities—what people are able to do and to 
be—are fundamental to their quality of life. As Sen describes, “The capability approach to 
a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in terms of his or her actual ability 
to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living.”27 
 
26 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920); For a review of the literature, see 
Stuart S. Rosenthal and William C. Strange, “Evidence on the Nature and Sources of Agglomeration Economies,” in 
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and Geography (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), 2119–71; See also Paul Krugman, “Increasing Returns and Economic 
Geography,” Journal of Political Economy 99, no. 3 (June 1, 1991): 483–99; Edward L. Glaeser et al., “Growth in 
Cities,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no. 6 (December 1, 1992): 1126–52. 
27 Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice,” Feminist Economics 9, 
no. 2–3 (January 1, 2003): 33–59; Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well‐Being,” in The Quality of Life, by Amartya 
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In an urban civilization, the vast majority of these essential “functionings” are 
found outside the home—whether they be food, employment, health care, culture, or 
education. In a large city, especially one built during the era of the automobile, most of 
those will be located well beyond walking distance for most people. As Schaeffer and Sclar 
have described, this leaves those unable to drive or to afford an automobile severely 
limited in their access to services and opportunities. While mobility may be increased by 
widespread automobile use, it may just result in driving further to reach the same services 
and opportunities, while those without cars are left out entirely.28  
The focus on needs beyond employment is equally essential. Many transit services, 
such as most North American commuter rail systems, are geared entirely to white collar 
workers, and encourage—if not require—car ownership due to their park-and-ride-
oriented networks. This type of service is basically unusable for the many types of trips 
that do not operate on a 9-to-5 schedule—e.g., shift work, caring for children and relatives, 
visiting friends, shopping, or obtaining health care. Transit with little or no off-peak 
service does little for a person trying to get to a 1 pm doctor’s appointment. 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls outlined the “original position,” a situation in 
which people choose the values and institutions that they prefer for their society from 
behind a “veil of ignorance,” which prevents them from knowing their own characteristics, 
such as race, gender, class, or ability. Without knowing whether one is to be advantaged 
in those respects, one would naturally choose a system that provides justice as universally 
as possible.29 A similar original position can be applied to urban transportation. A person 
 
28 K.H. Schaeffer and Elliott Sclar, Access for All: Transportation and Urban Growth (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980); Elliott D. Sclar, Måns Lönnroth, and Christian Wolmar, Urban Access for the 21st Century: 
Finance and Governance Models for Transport Infrastructure (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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who does not know their socioeconomic characteristics, whether they will be able to drive, 
or, crucially, whether they will live or work in the dense city centre or a more dispersed 
suburb, will not choose the most “efficient” public transit system—one only providing 
good service to a small proportion of the population in the densest part of the city that 
can be served at the lowest possible cost. They will choose a system that provides universal 
coverage. This is of vital importance because, increasingly, location within the 
metropolitan area is not a choice that is available to the individual. Dense prewar 
neighbourhoods are increasingly unaffordable, while jobs in many sectors may only be 
located in low-density suburban areas. 
An emerging group of scholars, aligned with the “Right to the City” movement, has 
argued that public transportation itself must be recognized as a universal right.30 Kafui 
Attoh used the case of California’s East Bay, where a movement has arisen to demand that 
right, and argues that such a demand requires the recognition of its multifaceted aspects. 
It is a civil right, including for protection against discrimination, and also a welfare right, 
necessitating an approach to government transportation finance that emphasizes public 
over private transportation.31 
The severe limitations of transit in many parts of the United States, particularly 
those built after the age of the automobile, force even the poorest residents to spend their 
scarce resources on buying, operating, and maintaining a car. In 2001, three quarters of 
households with an income below $20,000 per year owned a car; the figure for all 
 
30 Kafui Ablode Attoh, Rights in Transit: Public Transportation and the Right to the City in California’s East Bay 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2019); Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson, and Angel O. Torres, 
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households was over 91%.32 There is a growing literature on the increasing 
suburbanization of poverty, as gentrification prices low-income residents out of dense 
prewar neighbourhoods.33 This process only exacerbates the socioeconomic consequences 
of limited suburban transit. King et al and Manville et al have found that a lack of access 
to an automobile closely correlates with economic disadvantage and unemployment.34 
Participation in the economy requires reliable transportation, and that can only be 
provided by the automobile in all-too-many parts of the United States—especially in 
suburbs that are outside the service area of the central city transit authority. It is therefore 
unsurprising that a growing number of low-income Americans are overextending 
themselves financially to purchase cars that they cannot afford.35 
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Others are turning to private solutions, like ride-hailing, which is adding to 
automobile traffic in many cities,36 or to private jitneys, which supplement inadequate or 
unsuitable transit service in many immigrant communities.37 These growing modes could 
generate another spiral of declining ridership, declining service, and increasing fares if 
transit service does not improve to compete. 
The social and economic effects of automobility are compounded by the 
environmental and health effects. In many major cities, vehicle emissions are the 
predominant source of air pollutants, including volatile organic compounds, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulate matter, which are the key contributors to unhealthy air quality.38 
In the United States, cars and light trucks are responsible for 17.1% of total greenhouse 
gas emissions, or 4.79 metric tonnes per capita.39 In Canada, they are only responsible for 
13.1% of emissions, or 2.57 tons per capita.40 More extensive use of public transportation 
in major Canadian metropolitan areas is likely responsible for a significant proportion of 
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that divergence. Air pollution is only one of the many deleterious effects on health of an 
automobile-dependent transportation system.41 
A variety of studies have sought to quantitatively assess the determinants of transit 
ridership, and all have found that service is a key determinant, albeit to varying degrees. 
The quality of transit service is affected by several distinct variables. The most obvious is 
frequency—how frequently a vehicle arrives at a stop. Other factors include span of service 
(i.e., the number of hours of the day with service) and the geographic coverage of routes 
(i.e., the percentage of the population within walking distance of a bus stop). 
Studies have generally used vehicle-miles or vehicle revenue hours to measure 
service.42 This choice of metric is likely driven by its ease of collection—all transit systems 
publish data on vehicle-miles or revenue hours of service. Though it is a valid and easily 
comparable proxy for service, it has some limitations. For example, system-wide data 
does not capture variations in service at the route level; it also does not capture variations 
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in service over the course of a day, such as a route with high levels of rush-hour service 
but a limited span of service. Some other studies have also used fleet size, which is a less 
reliable proxy, since some systems may use their vehicles far less intensively than 
others.43 
Currie and Wallis conducted a metanalysis of effective ways to grow urban bus 
markets. They drew on research that was primarily conducted in Australia, Europe, and 
the United Kingdom—all places with a higher typical level of transit service than the 
United States. They grouped the three main methods of attracting ridership as fares, 
service levels, and in-vehicle time (or average speed of service), and estimated short-term 
elasticities. At 0.40, the elasticity for fare reductions was the highest, though potential 
ridership gains were inherently limited to 40% since fares cannot drop below zero. Service 
levels and in-vehicle time were not far behind at 0.35 and 0.30, respectively, and the 
former had far higher potential for growth—over 200%, they suggested. Long-run 
elasticities were roughly double, an unsurprising finding since ridership is likely to build 
slowly as people discover the service, choose not to replace their cars, delay obtaining a 
driver’s license as they come of age at a time of more usable transit service, et cetera.44 
Balcombe et al found the elasticity of bus demand with respect to vehicle-
kilometres to be approximately 0.4 in the short run and 0.7 in the long run.45 Boisjoly et 
al found that a 10% increase in VRK is associated with an 8.27% increase in ridership.46 
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The difference may be attributed to the focus of Currie and Wallis and Balcombe et al on 
non-North American locations, where the base level of transit service is higher and 
improvements have reached the point of diminishing returns. 
A 2000 survey of international bus planning experts found that they viewed 
frequency as by far the most important way to grow bus ridership, with transit priority 
measures to improve reliability coming second. Other factors, like increased coverage, 
reduced fares, and network integration were all cited far less frequently as a top priority.47 
Other studies have also emphasized the importance of reliability—a factor that is 
compounded by low scheduled frequency.48 By contrast, Currie and Wallis found that the 
improvements to on-board comfort that are so popular among transit administrators and 
political leaders, such as the USB chargers introduced at the behest of New York governor 
Andrew Cuomo on some New York City buses, are likely to affect ridership by only about 
three to four percent.49 Chen et al also found that gas prices, often cited in popular press 
as an important factor of driving people to or from transit riding, have only a marginal 
effect.50 
Quantitative analyses based on vehicle-miles travelled do not capture the effects of 
service improvements at various step changes, such as when a route shifts to a clock-face 
schedule, when a service improvement enables smooth connections between routes, or 
when a route shifts from rush-hour-only to all-day service. Nor can they capture the effect 
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on public perception of transit that well-publicized service improvements can obtain. For 
example, the King Street Pilot program in Toronto gave priority to streetcars on a 
downtown segment of a busy streetcar route, receiving widespread publicity in part owing 
to opposition from local businesses fearing loss of parking. Despite relatively modest 
improvements to travel time and reliability, daily weekday ridership grew by 16% in a 
year.51 Only a detailed qualitative analysis of an urban region where such service 
improvements have taken place can reveal these effects. 
Other scholars have deemphasized the importance of service as a determinant of 
ridership. Taylor et al found that “external” factors, such as density, region of the country, 
income, population characteristics, and automobile ownership are more determinative of 
transit ridership than service. Even so, Taylor found that about 26% of variance in per 
capita ridership is explained by service frequency and fare levels.52 Economist Ian Savage 
conducted a quantitative historical study of transit, determining that American transit 
systems could improve social welfare by reducing frequency and using the savings to 
lower fares.53 The example of Toronto belies this purported tradeoff, however. Boarnet et 
al conducted a quantitative analysis arguing that improving “last mile” access to transit 
stations is more important than transit service headways, although the study does not 
address the concept of local transit service providing the last mile access.54 
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Critics of high modernist approaches to urban planning have increasingly 
recognized the virtues of dense, walkable, mixed-use communities resembling those of 
the prewar era. Ranging from Lewis Mumford, who criticized the consequences of 
exclusive reliance on automobiles, to Jane Jacobs, who rejected modernist planning 
altogether,55 they challenged the dispersed suburban vision of Wright and Bel Geddes, 
which had been codified in and enabled by a postwar approach to planning that sought 
simply to predict travel demand and provide sufficient capacity to meet it.56 Designers 
like Peter Calthorpe, Andres Duany, and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk wrote of the need to 
develop new walkable communities with higher densities and traditional grid street 
layouts, which would enable residents and workers to walk easily to and from the transit 
station.57 Michael Bernick and Robert Cervero refined this into proposals for "transit 
villages" around stations.58 
Land use has increasingly become an important area of transportation planning 
research. As Ewing and Cervero put it, “The potential to moderate travel demand by 
changing the built environment is the most heavily researched subject in urban 
planning.”59 In their review of research on travel and the built environment, they found 
that studies indicated that vehicle miles travelled were lower and transit mode share was 
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higher in higher-density, mixed-use, traditional-style neighbourhoods than in postwar 
neighbourhoods with lower density and separation of uses. They concluded that “[m]ode 
choices depend on both the built environment and socioeconomics (although they 
probably depend more on the latter).”60 Cervero and Kockelman, in one study of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, found that there were modest to moderate effects on trip rates and 
non-auto mode share from density, mixed land uses, and traditional street grid layout.61 
Boarnet and Crane were more equivocal about the relationship between built form and 
land use,62 while Leck’s meta-analysis found that residential density affected travel 
behaviour but street layout did not.63 
Cervero and Radisch used the “matched pairs” method to contrast Rockridge, a 
neo-traditional neighbourhood in the Bay Area, with Lafayette, a nearby conventional 
suburb that otherwise had similar socioeconomic characteristics and transportation 
infrastructure. They found that Rockridge residents averaged about a 10-percentage-
point higher share of non-work trips by non-automobile modes than Lafayette, even 
controlling for income and other factors. The divergence was highest for shopping trips. 
Mode-share among work trips was more similar, likely owing to the high quality of transit 
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service available for work commutes to San Francisco and Berkeley from the BART rail 
stations in both communities.64 
Boris Pushkarev and Jeffrey Zupan wrote the most comprehensive quantitative 
analysis of the relationship between population density and transit use in 1977. The 
authors focus on the relationship between density and transit use, but recognize that 
density throughout a region is not necessarily as important as density at certain points, 
particularly the central business district. They established the concept of appropriate 
density levels for types of transit service. 65 
Cervero and Guerra, in a highly influential article, have argued that density around 
stations is the essential determinant for the success of suburban rail transit.66 Their 
analysis assumes a catchment area of a half-mile around stations; other authors favour 
figures varying from a quarter-mile67 to two-fifths of a mile,68 while O’Sullivan and 
Morral69 conducted a meta-analysis of transit agency guidelines that ranged from 300 to 
900 metres. All of these assume that riders will walk to the rail stations, rather than taking 
a connecting bus, and that the rail transit infrastructure will therefore operate largely in 
isolation from the rest of the transit network. 
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The academic research on the determinants of transit mode share or ridership is 
nuanced, suggesting that there are many elements at play, including land use, population 
density, street design, cultural factors, as well as transit service and fare. When this has 
been translated into standards and practices, however, it has all-too-often been reduced 
to a blunt density determinism. 
A 2012 Ontario Ministry of Transportation report, intended to guide planning and 
the location of transit investment, defines a minimum density needed to sustain various 
modes of transit. 50 jobs and residents, or 22 dwelling units, per hectare is deemed the 
minimum required for a “basic” bus service every 20 to 30 minutes.70 A similar figure of 
20 units per hectare was cited in a document by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Administration as necessary to support a “minimal” bus service.71 Similar figures have 
been used by academic researchers in the Toronto area.72 The standard is well above the 
density of parts of Toronto that are currently served by buses on headways of less than 
five minutes—including Finch West—which are among the busiest bus routes in North 
America. The conventional density of the city’s postwar suburbs was only about 16 units 
per hectare.73 The guidelines set a minimum of 90 units (or 200 residents and jobs) per 
hectare for a subway. That is far above the density at nearly all suburban Toronto subway 
stations, even though many of them are busier than all but a handful of subway stations 
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in dense Brooklyn, and even most stations in Manhattan. The standards only consider the 
density within walking distance of stations. In Toronto, however, most transit riders reach 
suburban stations on the frequent bus grid network developed in the 1960s. If such 
standards had been followed in the 1960s, the suburban bus service would never have 
been introduced, and the subway would never have been built outside the downtown core. 
As there has been ample research on the effect of land use on transit, there has also 
been substantial examination of the effect of transit on land use and property 
development. This research, however, is overwhelmingly focused on higher-order 
transit—particularly rail,74 although bus rapid transit has also been considered in some 
studies.75 Most of the studies conclude that there is some effect on development, but many 
found that the effect was either small, depended on the region being studied, or that more 
research would be required to determine the scale of the effect. There is very little 
research, by contrast, examining the effects of frequent local bus service on development. 
Filion et al argued that more dense development has occurred in Toronto than in 
most North American cities, but that much of Toronto’s population density is “wasted” 
from a transit perspective, since it is located at considerable distance from rail stations. 
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While this is certainly an important observation, it is also worthwhile to note that some 
of the density that is distant from the rail network may have been facilitated by the 
availability of frequent local bus service. In their paper, the authors state that “‘quality’ 
public transit refers to services that are competitive with the automobile in terms of speed 
and comfort. They are generally services with frequent headways, using their own right of 
way. In Toronto the subway and the Scarborough rail transit correspond most closely to 
this definition.” While Toronto’s buses do not have their own right of way, they are very 
frequent and indeed as well-used as many rapid transit routes in other cities. Many of 
Toronto’s important clusters of apartment buildings are located at the intersection of 
frequent bus routes. Filion et al’s article includes a map that describes areas of high 
density and high transit use, as well as areas of high density and low transit use. Most of 
the latter are located in areas outside the TTC service area or exceptionally distant from 
the subway, while the former include several areas that are served only by frequent bus 
routes.76 
The transit planning literature’s focus on the planning of higher-order transit—
particularly rail—and its relationship to land use is perhaps unsurprising since such large 
capital projects form such a predominant part of higher-level government spending on 
transit.77 Still, there is a growing literature that has focused on the importance of basic 
local transit service at a usable frequency and span. 
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As early as 1972, economist Herbert Mohring argued that an increase in transit 
frequency would produce an increase in demand, since it would shorten waiting time for 
passengers. While transit generally experiences constant economies of scale, at least for 
buses, since a single operator is required to drive a bus no matter how large the fleet, 
Mohring argued that users’ waiting time must also be taken into account as a cost. That 
means that transit is subject to increasing returns to scale since greater demand means 
more frequency, and therefore shorter waiting time.78 
Curiously, while Toronto’s position in the North American literature on transit 
planning is marginal, it plays an important role in the Australian literature. The “Toronto 
model” has become a topic of significant debate in Australia, where it has been used as an 
object of comparison for cities in that country. While many Australian cities have 
extensive regional rail networks, the frequency of the service is often limited, and 
connections between rail and bus modes are often poor.79 
Partly using Toronto as a case, Paul Mees’ Transport for Suburbia offers a strong 
critique of the dominant theory of transit planning and provides a theoretical framework 
for this dissertation. In his conception of the network effect, “a network of routes is 
provided, allowing passengers to travel between all parts of a city by transferring from 
one route, or line, to another, just as motorists navigate a road system by turning at 
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intersections.”80 The essential element is a system that is sufficiently comprehensive and 
that offers sufficiently high frequency and/or reliable timed transfers so that people do 
not fear being marooned at a roadside bus stop for an hour if they miss their connection. 
Mees persuasively makes the case that such systems succeed in attracting substantial 
mode share while less comprehensive systems do not. 
Even before Mees, the Toronto transit model was a subject of vigorous debate in 
Australia, given the socioeconomic and physical similarities between North American and 
Australian cities. Jeff Kenworthy, like other researchers on Toronto, focused on the 
success of land use and transit integration.81 Ray Brindle differed, noting that Toronto 
has an extensive car infrastructure, that its land use and transit are not always very well 
aligned, that its population density is not exceptional, and that Torontonians are also 
forced to commute long distances since jobs and homes have not been balanced within 
communities. He also noted that, contrary to the rail emphasis of the Toronto model’s 
Australian proponents, bus transportation plays an outsize role in the city’s public 
transit.82 Kenworthy and Peter Newman retorted that Toronto’s transit ridership is 
higher, and per capita car use lower, than all US and Australian cities. They agreed that 
local buses are an important component of the transit system, but argued that they 
functioned best in concert with a rail network.83 
More recently, others have added to the literature on the need for improvements 
to local bus service, which they argue is often marginalized by debates over higher order 
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transit. Stephen Higashide, in Better Buses, Better Cities, argues for an increased focus 
on bus transit, and outlines a series of examples of cities and regions that have improved 
aspects of their transit system like frequency, reliability, and walkability to generate 
meaningful increases in ridership.84 
Transit consultant Jarrett Walker has also written a book, Human Transit, that 
focuses on planning bus networks. Like Mees, he has argued for the importance of reliable 
transit service, including considerations of  frequency and span of service, coining the 
phrase “frequency is freedom.” He emphasizes the need to design transit routes that are 
quicker and easier to serve. He decries the many meandering suburban routes in 
American suburbs that take riders far out of their way.85 
While Australian scholars, inspired by Paul Mees, have focused on Toronto’s 
suburban transit success, and other international scholars have focused on transit-
oriented development, centralized planning, and social activism, most local Torontonian 
scholars have either fit into the latter category or rejected the idea of Toronto as a transit 
model at all. 
Two articles in the 1970s debated the causes of Toronto’s relative transit success. 
Michael Doucet claimed that the early municipalization of the city’s transit system in 1921 
kept the system in good physical and financial condition to maintain its service in the 
early postwar years.86 Davis, in contrast with Doucet, credits the pre-municipalization 
Toronto Railway Company’s refusal to serve any new, lower-density neighbourhoods that 
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left the system in a strong financial position to maintain itself through the difficult 
postwar years.87  
York University political scientist Frances Frisken, in several studies, offers an 
institutional argument that the establishment of metropolitan government enabled the 
expansion of high-level transit service throughout the urban region.88 Unlike most North 
American cities, the provincial government imposed a metropolitan government on the 
Toronto area in 1953. It encompassed the entire urbanized area at the time, as well as 
considerable swathes of farmland slated for future suburban expansion. The metropolitan 
government was given charge of many aspects of planning, infrastructure, and services, 
including public transportation. 
Richard Soberman, a professor of civil engineering at the University of Toronto, 
was Toronto’s most prominent transit consultant, and was largely responsible for 
numerous planning studies and reports from the 1960s through the 1990s. In a 
comparison of the Canadian urban transportation experience with that of the United 
States, he argued that Canadians were more receptive to metropolitan government, had 
somewhat higher population density owing to the lack of mortgage interest tax 
deductibility, had somewhat less generous subsidy for highway construction, and had 
stronger provincial support for transit.89 
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More fundamentally, he and Zachary Taylor have both argued that the 
Westminster parliamentary system of government in Canada at the federal and provincial 
levels centralizes decision-making, especially around budgetary matters, and has given 
government officials a freer hand to implement policy.90 
Those more focused on large capital projects have been more critical of Toronto’s 
performance. Ed Levy, another respected long-time transit consultant, has lamented the 
failure to implement most of the elements of decades of ambitious transit infrastructure 
plans since the 1960s.91 Subway projects since the 1970s have also come under criticism 
for their comparative lack of transit-oriented development—particularly the Spadina 
subway route’s location in an expressway median, which, while heavily patronized by 
North American standards, is far from the new urbanist vision of transit.92 
Others have dismissed the idea of postwar Toronto as a transit model altogether, 
notably some members of the urban activist community that defeated the Spadina 
Expressway project in 1971, and their intellectual heirs. John Sewell is emblematic of such 
attitudes. One of the city’s most prominent writers on urban issues, he was a close 
associate of Jane Jacobs, and a prominent member of the progressive “reform” slate 
elected to form a majority of the City of Toronto’s council in 1972. He briefly served as 
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mayor of the City of Toronto from 1978 to 1980. In 1978, he predicted that trying to 
provide transit to suburbanites would “ultimately destroy” the TTC.93 
In 2009, Sewell still lamented the choice to expand transit to the suburbs. “While 
the TTC had seen its function in the 1950s and 1960s as providing a strong transit service 
for the people who lived in Toronto, it slid into a system that placed much more attention 
and emphasis on serving low-density communities in the distant suburbs beyond Metro 
Toronto at the expense of city riders as suburban development increased.”94 
He and others reject the idea that Toronto was a postwar transit model, and in 
particular that expanding transit service to suburban areas was a good idea. Instead, they 
argue that transit service to suburban areas was both financially unviable and came at the 
detriment to service in the downtown core. They consider Toronto to be a sprawling city 
little different from other North American cities of the period. 
Lawrence Solomon’s book Toronto Sprawls is even more vehement in its 
denunciation of the TTC’s suburban expansion. Solomon considered the suburban routes 
added in the 1960s to be “uneconomic,” and decried the politicization of the system after 
the metropolitan government took over the TTC from the City of Toronto. “Before Metro 
degraded the economics of transit service,” Solomon writes, “the TTC was a going 
concern, generating the profits needed to maintain the existing system and to expand the 
system by investing in subways and surface routes. All city lines made money. After the 
system became fully politicized, it became unable to pay its own way, first for new 
expansions, then for its own maintenance. Service suffered, rates rose, ridership fell, and 
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new subway routes were shelved. Today, virtually all routes, whether in the city or the 
newly absorbed suburbs, lose money.”95 
The assumption in these critiques is that it would have been possible to retain a 
strong transit system in a prewar city that would somehow be hermetically sealed from 
the remainder of the urban area, so that no city-suburban trips would be required, or that 
one of the fastest growing cities on the continent would have somehow been able to avoid 
any suburban development in the postwar decades. 
As the rest of North American transit fell into a spiral of decline, Toronto pursued 
a distinct path: one of providing transit service in the suburbs that matched what was 
already provided in the prewar city. While the differences were small in the 1950s, the 
divergence grew until Toronto’s transit system of the 1970s was in an entirely different 
category from that of most North American cities. There is no single cause of Toronto’s 
distinct approach, but the small decisions made in the 1950s, through the process of path 
dependency, led the city to its exceptional transit model. As Paul Pierson has described, 
“path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further 
movement in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of increasing returns. In an 
increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases 
with each move down that path. This is because the relative benefits of the current activity 
compared with other possible options increase over time.”96 
An understanding of these processes requires both serious attention to change over 
time, and the analysis of how institutions and processes combined to produce particular 
 
95 Lawrence Solomon, Toronto Sprawls: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 16. 
96 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 252. 
39 
 
effects.97 Historical institutionalist scholarship is centred on the idea that institutions 
evolve over time, and that they in turn shape society. These institutions can be explicitly 
governmental, bureaucratic, private, or other types of organizations, but they can also be 
in the form of ideas. 
As John Maynard Keynes pithily observed, “The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than 
is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves 
of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling 
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”98 Peter Hall traced the 
rapid spread of Keynesian ideas, for example, as they radically reshaped economic 
discourse and subsequently policy across Western Europe and North America.99 
Keynes’ words can be adapted to the urban planning context, as well. The ideas of 
writers on urban issues shaped, consciously or unconsciously, the objectives and 
approaches pursued by the “practical men,” whether politicians, bureaucratic leaders, or 
real estate developers. The ideas of people like Wright, Bel Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, 
and Le Corbusier determined the ideal of the great city—just as Paris’ École des Beaux-
Arts and its American imitators like Daniel Burnham had done a generation earlier. While 
political orientation may have determined the means of achieving these ideals, the 
objectives of urban dispersal, separation of uses, reduced population density, and 
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increased green space were remarkably consistent around the world. Robert Moses, the 
quintessential “practical man,” disdainful of philosophical approaches to urban planning, 
nevertheless built parkways, public housing projects, and recreation areas that embodied 
all of these ideas,100 as did more philosophical reformers like Clarence Stein and Rexford 
Tugwell.101 These objectives were even shared by communist planners of the period in the 
Soviet Union, although the methods and final form differed greatly.102 They prevailed 
until a new generation of ideas, which rejected the goals of urban dispersal and master 
planning, transformed urban thought.103 
Toronto’s political and civic leaders, as well as its urban planners, were no less 
shaped by these ideas. But, as we shall see, some notably early dissent from the modernist 
paradigm of automobile-enabled dispersal on the part of well-placed individuals, as well 
as peculiar governmental institutions, enabled Toronto to proceed down its unique path. 
The development of Toronto’s suburban local transit grid was not a result of 
comprehensive planning. Elaborate comprehensive planning efforts conducted 
throughout the 1960s paid little heed to local bus service, focusing instead on large capital 
projects such as subways and expressways. They were models of the rational, “predict and 
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provide” planning approach outlined by Alan Black in his examination of the Chicago 
Area Transportation Study.104 
As Edward Banfield initially laid out the approach, it involves initially listing all of 
the available opportunities for action, identifying the consequences of adoption of each 
action, and selecting the action that would result in the preferred consequences.105 Black 
described ten sequential steps followed by the Chicago Area planners, building on the 
rational model: data collection, analysis of data, forecasting the future context, 
establishing goals, design of alternatives, testing the alternatives, evaluation of 
alternatives, selection of one alternative, implementation, and monitoring. Their plan 
incorporated a network of highways and transit, deemed to best balance costs with traffic 
throughput. Although Metropolitan Toronto, like most municipal governments, 
increasingly incorporated forms of public participation in planning, and its plans 
sometimes paid more attention to the broader consequences of widespread automobile 
use, its large planning studies nevertheless largely hewed to the rational model.106 
However, the studies had relatively minimal impact, as few of the large subway or 
expressway projects they studied were ever implemented. Toronto instead built its 
unusually high transit ridership through an approach of successive limited comparisons, 
or “muddling through,” as defined by Charles Lindblom. As he describes it, the selection 
of goals and the empirical analysis of the necessary action are closely intertwined, and 
means and ends are not distinct. “The test of a ‘good’ policy,” he suggests, “is typically that 
 
104 Black, “The Chicago Area Transportation Study.” 
105 Edward C. Banfield, “Ends and Means In Planning,” International Social Science Journal 11, no. 3 (1959): 361–
68. 




various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that 
it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective.” Many potential alternatives are 
ignored, as is, for the most part, theoretical analysis.107 
In Toronto, as we shall see, many of the key decisions that shaped its transit system 
were made without rational analysis of alternatives. There was no comprehensive plan for 
developing a suburban bus network; most comprehensive planning efforts dismissed the 
financial feasibility of frequent suburban service. Instead, decisions were made on an ad 
hoc basis, with service added incrementally in response to political and community 
demands, and in order to assist the TTC in meeting its institutional goals of securing 
financial resources from Metro Council while maximizing its institutional independence. 
Through the process of path dependence, this led to the continued investment in transit, 
even as American cities pursued a different path, which led to a vicious spiral of transit 
decline. 
Toronto offers a valuable model for suburban public transit. Even in areas of the 
city with a seemingly transit-unsupportive built form and relatively low density, transit 
enjoys very high ridership and requires comparatively little subsidy. This was achieved by 
providing high levels of local transit service regardless of built form. Though Toronto has 
historically been praised for its success at transit-oriented development, that success is 
largely limited to the original Yonge Subway, opened in 1954, with the clusters centred on 
its stations.108 More recent subway projects have faced lamentation about the lack of 
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surrounding density.109 Nearly no suburban areas in the United States meet the 
catchment area population of 45 people per acre that Cervero and Guerra suggest is a 
minimum for heavy rail investment; the same holds true for the immediate environs of 
many busy subway stations in suburban Toronto.  
Pace Sewell and others, suburban transit expansion did not come at the cost of city 
riders. Transit is viable only when it takes people to and from where they want to go. With 
the increasing suburbanization of housing, employment, and other destinations, it was 
increasingly impossible for even downtown residents and workers to function without 
ever leaving the prewar city. Without the decision to provide significant suburban transit 
in the early 1960s, and to subsidize it when necessary, Toronto would likely have followed 
a path similar to that of nearly all its North American counterparts: increasing automobile 
ownership and use, even in relatively transit-friendly areas, since an automobile would be 
essential to reach regional destinations outside the downtown core. In addition to 
automobility’s environmental costs and the deleterious effects of traffic congestion on 
quality of life, such an outcome leaves those unable to drive or to afford an automobile 
grievously limited in their access to services and opportunities. This problem is 
compounded by the increasing suburbanization of poverty. Without a conscious, long-
term plan, Toronto’s transit officials pursued an experiment in expanding high-quality 
transit to areas that were not ordinarily considered suited to transit. The outcome was far 
more successful than they could have hoped, and offers a tonic for fatalism about the 
prospects of suburban transit across the continent. 
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Toronto’s transit outcomes were the result of a confluence of interrelated factors, 
some of which set the city apart from most of its North American counterparts. Firstly, 
the strong constitutional power of the provincial government enabled it to establish, over 
the objections of many municipal government leaders, a strong metropolitan government 
that was given control of both planning and public transit. This meant that, while the local 
transit system was still strong, its service area was expanded from the historic city to 
encompass the entire developed urban region. Because of Toronto’s homogeneity in the 
1950s, it was also not plagued by the intense racial conflicts that divided historic American 
cities from their suburbs, and that have resulted in the marginalization of numerous 
urban public services. The strong province and metropolitan government, coupled with 
an urban planning community that drew more directly on British and European 
experience, led to the embrace of higher density, the dispersal of affordable housing, and 
investment in public transit. 
All of these elements were necessary, but not sufficient without the assistance of 
certain individuals in positions of political leadership, particularly Frederick Gardiner, 
the first Metro chairman, who embraced, far earlier than comparable figures in other 
North American cities, the idea of public transit expansion as a necessary supplement to 
then-fashionable urban expressways. He and other political leaders, particularly in 
suburban areas, made a set of policy decisions that led to the provision of a grid of 
frequent local transit throughout Metropolitan Toronto’s suburbs. Against all 
expectations, these transit routes succeeded in attracting large numbers of riders while 
performing well financially. 
The Toronto model of public transit begins with a frequent grid of local buses that 
are all within walking distance of virtually the entire population—whether those living in 
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dense clusters of high-rises or in single-family homes with two-car garages. Though the 
buses may not be fast, they take their passengers to subway stations, which they usually 
access via a bus terminal attached to the station—obviating the need for riders to even 
pass through a turnstile, let alone pay an additional fare. The subway then enables riders 
to travel across the city quickly. If necessary, they can transfer to another frequent local 
bus to complete their journey. As Mees has pointed out, frequency is especially important 
when transferring: such a trip with multiple transfers would be entirely untenable if buses 
came only every half-hour. 
The Toronto model is a potential beacon for transit planning across North 
American suburbia. It is almost unimaginable to transit policymakers in many cities that 
buses every 10 minutes or better, all day, every day, could be financially viable in 
suburban, auto-oriented neighbourhoods. And yet, the TTC has the lowest subsidy of any 
transit system on the continent. While Jarrett Walker sets up a dichotomy between 
“ridership” routes and “coverage” routes, meaning that a transit system will unavoidably 
have to choose between maximizing service on routes in areas with high potential 
ridership and providing universal coverage to the entire metropolitan area, Toronto has 
provided roughly equal service across the city regardless of built form. Figure 4 highlights 
routes that meet a basic full-service standard—half-hourly until midnight, seven days per 
week—in Toronto and several comparable North American cities. The greater coverage of 
Toronto’s full-service routes, nearly all of which offer a far higher level of service than that 








While some element of prioritization is necessary, this approach, as it has been 
applied in cities like Edmonton, can lead to a reduction in the usefulness of the transit 
system even in areas with high frequency. As many jobs and services are located in low-
density suburban areas, a frequent bus past a person’s house in a higher-density area may 
not be useful if it can’t actually take them to work. Furthermore, given the 
suburbanization of low-income populations, many transit-dependent people may be 
located in areas deemed to be low-priority for frequent transit.  
The Toronto model also maximizes the value of expensive rail infrastructure. It will 
never be possible to cover an entire region with rail, so any system that relies 
predominantly on walk-in traffic will necessarily exclude most of the regional population. 
In Toronto, most suburban transit riders take the bus to the subway station, meaning that 
the catchment area may stretch many kilometres and therefore that stations located amid 
seemingly transit-unsupportive land use can nevertheless be well-used. The Toronto 
model points to a means of finding a better balance between operating and capital subsidy 
for transit, since it demonstrates that better operations magnify the benefits of capital 
investment. Most fundamentally, the Toronto example shows that providing better 
service can deliver gains in ridership, even in suburbia. 
Toronto, uniquely in North America, was able to turn around its transit 
performance at the very time that its residents were crowding into automobile showrooms 
and buying houses with two-car garages. The system’s ridership was declining steadily in 
the years following the creation of Metro, despite the opening of the first subway. As it 
fought to maintain its financial self-sustainability—and therefore its institutional 
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autonomy—the TTC risked slipping into the same vicious spiral of fare increases and 
declining ridership that plagued transit systems at the time across the United States. Most 
of its ridership and infrastructure was located in prewar districts that were declining in 
population and employment as a percentage of the metropolitan population and even in 
absolute terms. Impelled not by its conventional technocratic planning progress, but 
rather by an institutional need to placate suburban members of Metro Council that 
threatened its autonomy, the TTC implemented a grid of frequent, all-day bus service 
across the fast-growing new suburbs. 
The new services succeeded well beyond the expectations of all concerned. 
Suburbanites shocked observers by leaving their cars in the driveway and taking the bus 
not only to work and shopping downtown, but even to dispersed suburban locations as 
well. The grid enabled what Paul Mees has described as the “network effect”: a sufficiently 
frequent grid of routes enable riders to travel even between dispersed origins and 
destinations, meaning that transit need not only be viable for radial routes with the 
densest traffic.111 
This success would not have been possible without the province’s imposition of 
metropolitan government, and the decision to expand the TTC’s jurisdiction to 
encompass the entire new metropolitan area. But while metropolitan government was 
necessary, it was far from sufficient. The key was timing: the TTC was metropolitanized 
early enough that transit still had a positive public image, even among suburbanites. 
Residents of suburban municipalities like North York, and the politicians who 
represented them, viewed the TTC as a desirable public service. If the boundary expansion 
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had happened a decade later, after years of declining ridership, declining service, and 
spiralling deficits, the suburbanites would undoubtedly had followed their American 
counterparts and sought to wash their hands of the financial burden of transit. Instead, 
the TTC was still financially self-sustaining, and suburban politicians pressured the 
commission to use its financial resources—topped up with modest subsidy—to add service 
to their fast-growing constituencies. After years of these demands, coupled with threats 
to its autonomy, the TTC relented and reluctantly abandoned its previous conservatism 
about service expansion. 
Even in regions like Greater Washington and the San Francisco Bay Area, where 
citizens embraced highly ambitious and expensive programs to build rapid transit 
networks, these investments came too late. By the late 1960s when the new tracks spread 
through the suburbs, the local bus service, which had atrophied under private ownership, 
was in a pitiful state. Instead of being embedded into a network of frequent local bus 
service that had built a strong ridership base, as the suburban extensions of the TTC 
subway were, the new suburban stations of the Washington Metro and Bay Area Rapid 
Transit had minimal connecting transit service and were accessed primarily by car. While 
Toronto’s suburbanites are able to use transit for all trips, their service is primarily useful 
for commuting to the central business district. The upshot was a pair of transit systems 
that, into the twenty-first century, has far lower ridership per mile than the TTC subway, 
and therefore a far poorer return on invested funds.  
Toronto’s success was not a result of the decades of comprehensive transportation 
planning studies undertaken by Metro, most of which recommended strategies much like 
those adopted in Washington and the Bay Area. Instead, the success came because of 
political pressure that led to an entirely unexpected success. Toronto added frequent local 
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transit to areas where nobody thought it would be successful—the types of areas where 
successful transit is assumed to be infeasible today—and it was wildly successful not only 
as a commuter service, but also as means for residents of all parts of the city to make any 
trips that they choose. The upshot was a virtuous cycle of increasing ridership, increasing 
revenue, increasing service, and increasing political support that would last for over a 
quarter century. 
Postwar Toronto offers a model that retains tremendous salience in the twenty-
first century. The need to address the climate crisis cannot wait for the many decades that 
would be required to rebuild all of the continent’s existing suburbs into walkable, transit-
oriented communities.   That is compounded by the embodied energy that would be lost 
in the demolition of countless existing structures and current infrastructure.  The Toronto 
model suggests a different approach: making transit work in the kinds of suburban 
communities that already exist. Given the urgency and short time horizon of needed 
action, it offers the most viable means of making transit a genuinely viable means of 
transportation for all North Americans.
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Chapter 2: Toronto the Good 
The City of Toronto in the first half of the twentieth century was a prosperous and fast-
growing, but sedate and provincial city—the second city of the second country of North America. 
Its aspirations were largely for it to be counted in the same breath as its Midwestern American 
neighbours like Cleveland and Buffalo. It paled in comparison with Detroit, the Arsenal of 
Democracy that lay a four-hour train ride away. Its citizens took pride in its appellation of “Toronto 
the Good,” and they were among the most vigorous enforcers of blue laws banning nearly every 
imaginable activity on Sunday. Among the most spirited political battles in the city’s history was 
one romantically portrayed as being between evil—as exemplified by the city’s street railway 
company, which wanted to introduce Sunday streetcar service—and good—the stern citizens 
outraged by the thought of a company profiting at the expense of the city’s moral degradation.1 
The city had changed over those fifty years. It had become the country’s major financial 
centre, and it had a higher proportion of immigrants on the eve of the Second World War than any 
other city in North America. But they were immigrants with an asterisk: the vast majority came 
from the British Isles, and were not even immigrants in the legal sense—all Canadians at the time 
were still British subjects. Their effect on the culture of the city was rather less marked than the 
postwar waves of immigrants from Southern Europe and, later, from around the world. Instead, 
the many immigrants from the United Kingdom—especially Northern Ireland—served to reinforce 
the city’s established political order—an Orange order. American cities like New York and Boston 
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were firmly in the grasp of an Irish-dominated political machine at the time, as was Toronto, but 
with a difference—Toronto’s dominant Irish were Protestant. 
The Grand Orange Lodge in Toronto was a machine for patronage and a breeding ground 
for politicians. Though the violence that surrounded it in the nineteenth century had died down, 
the annual parade commemorating the Battle of the Boyne was the biggest event on the city’s 
calendar. In the “Belfast of Canada,” it was virtually impossible to rise in the city’s administration 
without Orange support, and the Orangemen enforced a dour, sometimes puritanical atmosphere 
on the city. Catholics faced systematic discrimination, as sometimes did even the English and 
Scots.2 Municipal workers dutifully padlocked the city’s parks and playgrounds to ensure that no 
miscreant youths used them to play a ball game on the Lord’s Day, until the policy was narrowly—
and unexpectedly—overturned by a plebiscite in 1950. 
As described by legendary critic Northrop Frye, “Toronto's spiritual life began on Saturday 
evening, where many down-town corners had a preaching evangelist, and continued through Sun-
day, a day of rest of a type I have never seen paralleled except in Israeli Sabbaths. One could then 
learn from a celebrated preacher that God was in his heaven and that the only events that bothered 
him were produced by the machinations of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The Orange Order kept 
a firm grip on municipal government,” and “[o]utside Toronto there was a good deal of ridicule of 
‘Hogtown's’ somnolence and sexual prudery.”3 
Toronto’s conservatism, institutionalized by the Orange machine, made it the bastion of 
the province’s Conservative Party. “Tory Toronto,” another of its nicknames, consistently returned 
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Conservative members to the provincial and federal parliament. While this often placed Toronto 
in opposition at the federal level, where the Liberals with their impregnable Quebec fortress were 
the dominant party for much of the century, the city was the stronghold of Ontario’s Conservative 
Party (later Progressive Conservative), which was equally dominant at the provincial level. With 
the exception of a brief populist insurgency in 1919, which elected the United Farmers of Ontario 
to power for a single term, and Liberal Mitch Hepburn's two terms in the wake of the Depression, 
the Tories governed the province, usually with overwhelming Toronto support, from 1905 to 1985. 
The Conservative Party was not always ideologically conservative, however. Its support ran 
largely on ethnic lines and often across class lines—British Protestants generally voted 
Conservative, while others voted Liberal.4 As a result, the party encompassed a wide variety of 
policy preferences, including some, as their changed name suggested, that could be considered 
quite progressive. 
After the end of the Second World War, the Orange wall began to crack. The Liberal federal 
government began admitting a growing tide of immigrants from outside Britain, including many 
Roman Catholics. The 1954 defeat of Mayor Leslie Saunders, a particularly bellicose Orangeman,5 
by Nathan Phillips—who as an amiable Jewish Conservative Mason was singularly well suited to 
earning his sobriquet “Mayor of all the people”—was noted even at the time as marking a seismic 
shift in the city’s political culture.6 Later, in the 1960s, the introduction of an immigration system 
without any type of national quotas resulted in the complete transformation of the city into, as its 
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leaders frequently boast, the “most diverse city in the world,” with an official motto of “Diversity 
Our Strength”—a city where the July 12th Orange parade is so forgotten as to have ceased to be 
even a historical curiosity. In the early 1950s, however, the old networks remained strong, and 
change appeared slow to come. 
In its physical form, Toronto resembled many of its North American counterparts. It grew 
roughly symmetrically in three directions outward from its waterfront—much like many Great 
Lakes cities, including Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland. Unlike New York or San Francisco, it had 
few geographic impediments to its outward growth, with only a few river valleys interrupting a 
broad, mostly featureless plain.  The city did not develop as a result of a great harbour or any other 
unique geographical feature. Instead, York—the city’s former name—was founded in 1793 by 
John Graves Simcoe, the governor of the new colony of Upper Canada, as a compromise with his 
superior, Lord Dorchester, who preferred a location for the colony’s capital closer to his own 
quarters in Quebec City. On land purchased from the Mississauga of the New Credit First Nation, 
it was laid out in a stark gridiron, typical of British settlements. Beyond the city, a much wider 
grid of concession roads, roughly one mile apart, was laid out to enable settlement of the 
surrounding region. These roads would become the basis of the region’s arterial road network 
centuries later, and would play a major role in the city’s transportation network.7 
 
Transit in the Early Years 
In the later nineteenth century, Toronto's growth and ongoing industrialization mirrored that of 
most North American cities. As elsewhere, they were inextricably linked with the rise of mass 
transportation. The City of Toronto granted a 30-year concession to a horse car operator in 1861, 
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followed by a 30-year concession in 1891 to railway tycoons Donald Ross and William Mackenzie, 
who promised to electrify the system.8 As the possibilities of electric traction made daily 
commuting to the business district from outlying areas feasible, the city developed the type of 
“streetcar suburbs” best described, in their Boston incarnation, by Sam Bass Warner.9 Toronto’s 
middle class began to live in almost exclusively residential districts, in townhouses and semi-
detached houses. However, this process of outward expansion was arrested, or at least restrained, 
by the policies of Toronto’s traction company, which fiercely fought the City’s entreaties to extend 
its service into the areas annexed by the city after 1891. Instead, it wanted to limit its service to 
the densest, and therefore most profitable, parts of the city. For that, and many other reasons, the 
Toronto Railway Company (TRC) was the recipient of perpetual political opprobrium—something 
it had in common with traction companies in cities across the continent.10 
The municipal government tried to compel the company to extend its lines beyond the 
city’s 1891 limits, but a 1910 decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London 
(then the country’s highest court of appeal) fell in the company’s favour. Instead, the City 
established the Toronto Civic Railway, which built separate streetcar routes in outlying areas. 
Riders were forced to transfer to a TRC car at the 1891 city limit, meaning long queues in 
Toronto’s often-inclement weather. It was a situation bound to produce a political backlash. 11 
Mayor Tommy Church was the type of firebrand who could both express and excite the 
passions of the citizenry. Toronto’s version of New York’s Mayor John Hylan, a populist who led 
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the creation of a separate public subway system to compete with the private companies, he 
described the TRC as “nefarious,” and made action against the traction interests a centrepiece of 
his political program. He also seemed to bear a personal grudge against the powerful businessmen 
who led the company. Most ostentatiously, after a legal quirk resulted in the early termination of 
the concession on a few hundred feet of streetcar track, he made a celebration out of tearing up the 
tracks—even though it would then force riders to walk those several hundred feet to make their 
transfer.12 
The TRC’s conservative approach to expansion was likely founded, at least in part, on the 
saga of the Belt Line railway. Premised on the principle that had guided rail development in New 
York13 and other cities, the Toronto Belt Land Company built a railway into its undeveloped 
suburban land with the hope that the new infrastructure would allow them to profit on real estate 
development. Largely owing to an economic recession in 1899, the scheme failed, and the outcome 
was to permanently chasten many Toronto transit officials about the perils of extension into 
greenfield areas.14 
Owing to the overcrowding and limitations of the streetcar service, particularly in outlying 
areas, numerous private jitneys began operating in 1914 and 1915, part of a widespread 
phenomenon in North America enabled by rising private automobile ownership.15 The municipal 
government responded with very strict regulation, over the opposition of much of the local press. 
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When the jitney operators tried to start up a private bus service, the City refused them, in an effort 
to protect the financial viability of transit through monopoly.16 
With the City already operating its own separate streetcar network in its outlying 
neighbourhoods, the municipal takeover of the Toronto Street Railway when its concession 
expired was somewhat inevitable. On January 1st, 1918, a municipal plebiscite was held in which 
citizens voted—by a ratio of eleven to one—to take over the transit company when its thirty-year 
franchise expired in 1921.17 By that time, wartime inflation, combined with the city’s 
unwillingness to accept significant fare increases, had pushed the company into the red. Many 
American traction companies were struggling mightily in the economic downturn and rapid 
inflation of the early postwar years—a Presidential Commission appointed at the time to study the 
problem declared the industry as a whole to be “virtually bankrupt.”18 Nevertheless, in comparison 
with many American operations, the TRC was in comparatively strong financial condition. When 
the municipal government inherited its operations, the City was keen to ensure that its strong 
financial performance was not imperiled by demands for improved service or low fares. It therefore 
placed the system in the control of an independent Toronto Transportation Commission (TTC). 
Even before the municipal takeover, many of Toronto’s transit debates were centred on fares, a 
situation that was not uncommon in cities across North America. Like in New York City, where 
the maintenance of a five-cent subway fare held totemic importance for decades in that city’s 
municipal politics, Toronto municipal politicians campaigned on the need to keep fares low. This 
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was especially true in the outlying areas, where the cost of operation was high due to low 
population density, and where most riders paid a double fare.19 
The new TTC was to be an early example of a public authority of the type that became 
ubiquitous in the United States for the management of public infrastructure. At the time, the 
virtually universal view of transit was that it must be self-sustaining. As the Presidential 
Commission recommended, "A private industry should not be subsidized by public funds unless 
it is imperatively necessary for the preservation of an essential service, and then only as an 
emergency measure." Even a publicly owned system should have "sufficient revenues to pay the 
entire cost of the service rendered, including the necessary cost of both capital and labor."20 Transit 
had long been a profit-making business. Though it was frequently developed through non-market 
means like the granting of monopoly franchises by municipal governments with public objectives, 
the idea of providing operating subsidies or even, in many cases, capital subventions in order to 
advance the public interest was quite out of the question. Beyond this philosophy, the City of 
Toronto was also taking over the operation of the transit system at a time of rapid inflation and 
amidst a grave postwar recession, which had imperiled the city’s own finances even after taxes 
had risen dramatically during the war.21 As a result, municipal leaders made financial self-
sustainability one of the core principles on which the TTC was founded. The city established the 
commission with a mandate to provide "an adequate and efficient service, and that only such rates 
of fares shall be charged as will secure this, and will, at the same time, make the system self-
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sustaining – including the maintenance of the property in good condition, and due provision for 
renewals, depreciation, and debt charges."22  
Beyond fear of exacerbating the city’s temporary financial incapacity, the conservative 
Orangemen who ran the city had no ideological attraction to public control of the means of 
production. The TTC was to be governed by a three-member commission, comprised of local 
businessmen, which was intended to insulate it from political influence. This purportedly apolitical 
public authority model was increasingly emergent across North America.23 Jameson W. Doig, in 
his history of the Port of New York Authority, which was created in the very same year, describes 
it as an example of how “the passion for greater efficiency in transportation and for rapid economic 
growth” led political leaders “to drop their democratic guard and yield responsibility for an 
important part of their destiny to an agency insulated from direct popular control.”24 
The newly established commission was given tremendous independence to carry out its 
responsibilities. It retained full control over its operations, including routes, schedules, vehicles, 
and the timing of expansion. In exchange, it was required to be fiscally self-sustaining and to 
ensure that it never drew on the city’s taxpayers for its operations. The commission carried out the 
mandate quite ruthlessly, routinely refusing service expansion to areas where provision was 
deemed uneconomic. They rapidly replaced cars requiring two operators with ones requiring only 
one, over the vociferous objections of both the union and members of the public, who cited 
concerns about both jobs and safety.25 The Spartan approach to service provision functioned fairly 
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well at a time when car ownership was still relatively low and, as a result, transit was a partial 
monopoly. 
The values of fiscal restraint and fiercely defended independence from political control 
would become the hallmarks of the TTC to the present day. The agency, and its political 
supporters, consistently fought to maintain these two principles, over the objection of many 
political leaders who sought improved service. They even objected, on many occasions, to public 
subsidy on the grounds that it would limit the commission’s independence and bring political 
control that would weaken transit in the long term.26 
The new TTC nevertheless significantly and rapidly upgraded its operations, including 
replacing hundreds of streetcars with newer models, rebuilding over a third of the system’s 
trackage, and extending service to the newly annexed territories through new lines and the 
connection of the existing Civic Railway lines to the city system. The Commission also introduced 
feeder buses to connect the most lightly populated outlying areas to the rail system, setting a 
precedent that would be maintained to the time of writing.27 These expansions were repeatedly 
endorsed by municipal plebiscites; the citizens approved virtually every expenditure on transit that 
came to a vote, with the exception of a subway plan that was defeated in 1912.28 Transit enjoyed 
substantial popular support, but such an ambitious plan was a bridge too far for a relatively small, 
conservative city. 
Once it controlled the system, the municipal government essentially embraced the Toronto 
Railway Company’s arguments against extending service to newly developed areas. Before the 
First World War, the geographic area and population of the City of Toronto grew rapidly through 
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annexation. New suburban districts were repeatedly added to the municipality, at which point the 
districts demanded that their public services be improved to the city’s standard—including transit. 
After the Toronto Railway Company refused to serve them, the City started its own public provider 
to pick up the slack. The cost of all these services was large: the municipal government contended 
that for each $1 paid by the taxpayers in annexed areas to improve their services, $2 was paid by 
taxpayers in the pre-existing city. A particularly extensive series of annexations from 1909 to 1912 
added over 8,000 acres—two-fifths of the city’s total land area after the expansion—and the cost 
had become too great for City taxpayers to accept. Opposition to annexation generally came from 
the suburbs rather than from the city in most places, though Toronto was not the only central city 
to reject the incorporation of its suburbs; Pittsburgh and St. Louis followed the same path at about 
the same time. Toronto’s moratorium on annexations would stand for four decades.29 
Many continue to cling to the opposition to serving newly developed areas that shaped the TTC. 
Progressive activist, author, and former mayor of Toronto, John Sewell, has long opposed the 
TTC’s expansion to suburban areas, describing  suburbanites as “a market that will ultimately 
destroy the TTC” because of the need for subsidy that routes to serve them would require.30 This 
view echoes that of TTC officials since the commission’s inception. 
Long-time TTC Chairman William C. McBrien would come to personify the organization 
for decades after taking control in the depths of the Depression in 1931. Under his leadership, the 
TTC maintained a firm front against annexation and the perils it would bring to the vision of self-
sustaining transit. As outlined in the TTC's 1938 Annual Statement: 
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 If the city’s boundaries were greatly extended it is clear that much greater 
gross revenues would be required to meet the cost of furnishing transportation 
in such enlarged area. Experience elsewhere indicates that it is unlikely that 
any increase in a universal fare would provide revenues sufficient to keep 
such a system solvent. But in any case, such a step would be an injustice to 
the citizens of the present Toronto area on whose credit their transportation 
system has been established, and it would equally be unjust to the users of the 
present City System, who now, by their fares, are providing the full cost of 
such system.31 
 
McBrien remained chairman for nearly a quarter century until his death in 1954, and scholars 
of the period universally hail him as a key individual responsible for the TTC’s success in the 
period, as did his contemporaries. McBrien was well-connected through the same Orange networks 
as much of the political leadership, and he had good relationships with the city’s three major 
newspapers, which enabled him to advocate effectively on the organization’s behalf. He was 
widely respected within the organization both for his effectiveness and for his reverence toward 
professional expertise. The TTC was remarkably free of controversy during the years he managed 
the organization, and he was a tireless evangelist for transit, in particular for the long-sought 
construction of a subway.32 
The TTC’s reputation under his leadership was considerable. The Bureau of Municipal 
Research, a good government group, wrote in 1951 that “Most citizens will agree that the T.T.C.'s 
record of the years is a very creditable one. Efficient transportation has been provided at reasonable 
cost; the original debenture debt has been practically wiped out; earnings turned back into the 
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system have gone to improve the rolling stock and other capital equipment; [...] Indeed, the T.T.C. 
is quite properly held up to outsiders as a notable instance of successful public management."33  
A report by a consultant hired by council to evaluate the commission in 1957 concurred:  
The findings of the study confirm fully the high regard which other transit 
organizations hold for its accomplishments. The Commission’s 
organizational arrangements and procedures are in line with those used by the 
more successful commercial and industrial concerns. The duties and 
responsibilities of the various units of the organization are generally well 
defined, properly delegated and competently carried out. The calibre of the 
supervisory staff is high and the level of morale appears excellent.34 
 
The credibility established by the TTC as an efficient, well-run organization facilitated public and 
political support for transit. 
In a paper for the Urban History Review, Michael Doucet made the case that the public 
takeover is the reason for the long-term success of the system. Recognizing that most American 
systems by the time of his writing (1978) were under municipal ownership and were far from 
thriving, he cites the timing of the takeover as being critical to the TTC’s more favourable 
situation: by taking over the system in 1921, when transit was still in a very strong position, the 
City was able to invest extensively in upgrading the system. The value of the investment, he 
argued, made it impossible for the City to accept the decline of transit and abandon much of the 
system a few decades later.35  
Donald Davis, in a response to Doucet published the following year, argued that it was 
instead the policies limiting the service area of the TTC and its private predecessor that led to the 
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comparative postwar success of transit in Toronto. Davis argued that the density of the City of 
Toronto, in comparison to most of its American peers, allowed its streetcar routes to remain 
economically viable into the 1950s. The higher density in turn resulted from the private Toronto 
Railway Company’s refusal to extend its service outside the 1881 city limits, constraining the 
city’s geographic outward expansion. The urban routes’ economic viability led to transit being 
viewed as an asset rather than a liability. Suburbanites became accustomed to fighting for access 
to the City’s transit farebox revenue to fund services in their own areas, rather than fighting to 
avoid subsidizing the city’s transit losses.  
While Doucet suggested that the large municipal investment in transit made its 
abandonment infeasible, Davis pointed out that Toronto’s closest American major city, Detroit, 
also took its system into municipal ownership in the early 1920s, and also invested a substantial 
sum—$40 million—in acquiring and upgrading the system. Detroit’s ridership declined steadily 
from the mid-1920s, but was still relatively strong in 1955. After that, its transportation department 
began reducing service in order to make up its deficit. These service reductions further repelled 
riders, producing the vicious spiral that came to plague many American transit systems. By 1962, 
Detroit’s buses were carrying 115 million passengers, down from 490 million in the 1940s, and 
compared with 288 million on the TTC (in a city a third smaller).36 Detroit’s subsequent population 
collapse, largely due to racial segregation and white flight,37 made it an inconceivable candidate 
for Toronto-style transit revival, but the quick decline while the city was still thriving demonstrates 
the effect of cutting transit service when a municipality decides that covering a deficit is best 
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accomplished by cuts rather than subsidy. There are numerous other examples of cities’ 
willingness to abandon or drastically reduce transit service despite large recent investments.  
The story of Cleveland in the early postwar years bore striking resemblance to that of 
Toronto. The City of Cleveland had municipalized its transit system in 1942, and, flush with a 
surplus from the busy war years, it embarked on a major modernization program. It included a 
brand-new subway, which opened in 1955. From that point, the two cities’ paths diverged. In 
Cleveland, transit remained dependent entirely on the farebox for revenue through the 1950s and 
60s, and therefore service was repeatedly cut as deficits mounted. By the time the system was 
regionalized in 1974, it was a husk of its former self: ridership had plummeted from 493 million 
riders per year in 1946 to 78 million in 1974. Voters approved a sales tax to fund the new regional 
agency, which enabled improved service and suburban expansion. Ridership performance turned 
around quickly, increasing 76% by 1980. However, a Reagan-era decline in federal support along 
with a recession-induced drop in sales tax revenue once again forced a spiral of increasing fares, 
reduced service, and declining ridership.38 
Regardless, Doucet’s point is well-taken: transit that was taken into public ownership 
before its precipitous decline tended to survive better, given that it opened up the realistic 
possibility of operating subsidies to keep the system intact—something that would have been 
virtually inconceivable while transit systems remained privately owned. Public ownership was 
necessary, but not sufficient for Toronto’s transit success. 
Davis argued that the TTC had remained viable by constraining its service to areas with 
high population density, but following the rise of the automobile, such an approach could not be 
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sustained for long.  Henry Ford began production of his Model T just across the border in Detroit 
in 1908. Canadian entrepreneurs, usually in partnership with the major American carmakers, were 
increasingly churning out automobiles on the Canadian side of the Great Lakes. Canadian industry 
rapidly ramped up to meet the demands of the First World War, and after the Armistice, many of 
the plants retooled to produce cars. Canada quickly became the second-largest automobile 
producer in the world. This flood of vehicles began crowding the country’s streets; Toronto’s 
automobile ownership rate, though lower than the American average, was higher than those of 
New York, Chicago, or Boston.39  
The TTC continued to play an important role in the city’s transportation in the interwar 
years, but as Canadians increasingly bought cars, the streetcars no longer had a monopoly on urban 
transportation. No longer could the transit agency dictate the boundaries of the city by where they 
chose to run their rails. If someone wanted a home outside the service area, they could simply drive 
to work—and many did. 
 
The War and its Aftermath 
The Second World War would go a long way to reshaping Toronto, as it did cities across North 
America. In both the United States and Canada, the Depression had done much to discredit the 
laissez-faire consensus. In its place was a newfound interest in the idea of planning. A conflict in 
which the victory was entirely organized by governments, who mobilized the population and the 
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economy on a total war footing, lent further credence to the idea of government planning. 40  The 
Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom, released in 1942 under a Conservative prime minister 
(albeit in a national unity coalition government), enshrined the ideal of a government role in social 
relief, and, notably for this case, of a national government role in solving urban problems. The 
nascent American federal government interventions in the urban housing sector, which would 
grow to titanic proportions in both the United States and Canada after the war ended, further set 
the stage for a government role in cities. 
In the 1943 Ontario election, George Drew’s Conservatives were almost defeated by the 
insurgent socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation—a harbinger of the shock defeat of 
Winston Churchill’s Conservatives by Labour under Clement Attlee two years later and a clear 
indication of the increased appetite for government to expand its role in addressing social ills. The 
ever-pragmatic Ontario Conservatives saw the way the political winds were blowing. Government 
planning was winning the war, and the public wanted it to win the peace thereafter. The betrayal 
of promises of “homes fit for heroes” after the First World War was not to be repeated. Drew’s 
government passed the Planning Act in 1946, a year before Attlee’s Labour government passed 
the Town and Country Planning Act. The new legislation gave municipalities the power to create 
binding official plans, and also enabled the creation of joint planning boards encompassing more 
than one municipality, the most important of which was the Toronto and Suburban Planning Board. 
This was the first organization that included both the City of Toronto and its growing suburbs. 41 
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Canadian cities anticipated their expanded role, even before the war was over. In 1942, 
Toronto appointed its first official planning board, which created an ambitious "Master Plan for 
the City of Toronto and Environs" that was the first to advance beyond City Beautiful attempts at 
aesthetic improvements in the downtown, to examine issues of housing, land use, and 
transportation.42 Written largely by Eugene Faludi, a Jewish-Italian architect who had fled Europe 
at the outbreak of war,43 it planned for 30 years of development that would expand the city’s built 
area by 50% to 100 square miles (this would prove to be a considerable underestimate, as 
development would cover close to 200 square miles in 197444). Though it recognized the TTC’s 
plans for two subway lines to replace its busiest streetcar routes, planning was about adapting cities 
to modernity, so “transportation” mostly meant highways—the focal point of the study was a 
comprehensive network of expressways. Transit didn’t even make the showpiece map that was 
presented to the public.45 
Nevertheless, the war years had been a boon for public transit. With the rationing of 
gasoline and automobile plants retooled for the production of armaments, transit operators across 
North America briefly found themselves back in the monopoly environment of the turn of the 
century. Most people had little choice but to climb on the streetcars that they had previously 
abandoned for the relative comfort of their private cars. The wartime streetcars did not tend to 
leave a favourable impression. They were overcrowded and, owing to Depression-era 
underinvestment, often dilapidated. Toronto was in a somewhat more propitious position than most 
 
42 “The Master Plan for the City of Toronto and Environs” (Planning Board of Toronto, December 31, 1943); 
Colton, Big Daddy, 58. 
43 Richard White, Planning Toronto : The Planners, the Plans, Their Legacies, 1940-80 (Toronto: UBC Press, 
2016), 27–42. 
44 Lemon, Toronto Since 1918: An Illustrated History, 104. 
45 “The Master Plan for the City of Toronto and Environs.” 
69 
 
cities. The TTC’s purchase of new, streamlined President’s Conference Committee (PCC) 
streetcars in 1938 greatly assisted the system’s ability to handle wartime loads. The purchase was 
fortuitous, according to Davis, and was enabled by the organization’s relatively strong financial 
position and its choice to avoid replacing its old cars while it waited for the new design to become 
available.46 Unlike most systems, which emerged from the war with their aged and overworked 
streetcars barely able to limp from the carhouse, the TTC’s system was in relatively good 
condition. 
The commission’s financial position was equally strong. It took full advantage of the brief 
monopoly to accumulate a $25 million surplus.47 The TTC was not alone in this position; 
Washington’s Capital Transit had also emerged with a substantial $7 million reserve.48 New York 
City’s subway system was less fortunate, with the city having expended a fortune—$326 million, 
nearly the cost of the entire Independent Subway System—buying out the privately owned lines, 
only to find them plagued by deferred maintenance. 49 Nevertheless, the transit industry generally 
emerged from the war with an ample financial cushion—one that would be desperately needed. 
Even before the Axis powers surrendered, McBrien and the TTC were lobbying City 
Council to permit the TTC to use its surplus to build a 4.6-mile north-south subway line on Yonge 
Street and a perpendicular streetcar tunnel on Queen Street to replace its most overcrowded 
streetcar routes. Pitched as a “central city traffic relief project,”50 it was the type of cautious, 
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incremental project that the TTC would long recommend. There was no real talk of a 
comprehensive network, only the construction of a relatively small project to replace two crowded 
surface routes. The combination of the surplus and the possibility of federal reconstruction funding 
meant that Torontonians could get a subway system effectively for free. Unsurprisingly, they voted 
overwhelmingly in favour in a referendum held on January 1st, 1946, and shovels hit the ground 
three years later.51 
When the federal money failed to materialize, the Queen Street component was abandoned, 
and the $42.3 million project was reduced to a single line with a planned cost of $28.9 million plus 
$3.5 million for rolling stock. In the end, the project cost a total of $58.5 million, an increase owing 
in part to Korean War–generated inflation, and was paid for out of a combination of the TTC’s 
accumulated surplus and the City’s borrowing against future farebox revenues. 52 
This was a stark contrast with the privately owned and publicly traded Capital Transit. The 
product of a merger of the region’s private transit companies in 1933, its $7 million wartime 
surplus made it an enticing target for financial pillage. In 1946, the federal government, enforcing 
a 1935 anti-trust law, forced the North American Company, also owner of the local electric utility, 
to sell the transit business. Louis Wolfson, a speculator and later pioneer of the leveraged buyout, 
bought it in partnership with his three brothers. They had rather less interest in operating a 
sustainable transit system than in getting their hands on the surplus. By 1955, they had reduced the 
company’s reserve to only $2.7 million through large dividends. Eventually, after a grinding labour 
strike, the federal government repealed the company’s charter. Nevertheless, DC’s commissioners 
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retained their faith in free enterprise transit and issued a new twenty-year franchise to a different 
entrepreneur, O. Roy Chalk. They had little interest in expanding the system; their only important 
condition was the replacement of streetcars with buses. Washington had also had strong public 
support for the construction of subways throughout the 1930s, including enthusiastic endorsement 
from the major newspapers.53 However the $7 million surplus was scarcely adequate for the 
construction of significant new transit infrastructure so long as the government, federal and local 
in DC’s case, continued to view transit as an arena for private profit rather than public service. 
During the Second World War, Canada had once again been a major supplier of materiel 
to the war effort and had become a major industrial power—the fourth largest supplier of military 
equipment to the allies. From virtually no aircraft production in 1939, the country was producing 
4,000 military aircraft per year by the end of the war. Britain started the war with 80,000 military 
vehicles, and by the time the conflict was over, Canada had produced over 800,000—including 
more trucks than all the Axis powers combined.54 This enormous build-up of industrial capacity 
was overwhelmingly concentrated in Central Canada—southern Ontario and Quebec—and 
Toronto was one of the most important sites. Eighty-seven large plants and countless smaller plants 
served the war effort, transforming the city almost overnight from the industrial tumbleweed 
forests of the Depression. Much of the industry was retooled for civilian production after the war 
years, not incidentally setting the stage for another dramatic escalation in automobile production.55  
These new wartime plants had an additional effect on the city’s urban fabric: unlike their industrial 
predecessors, they were largely located on farmland outside the city limits, setting the template for 
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industrial growth to come. Though the TTC extended its streetcar service to many of the new 
plants—wartime rationing made most automobile commuting infeasible—it was the first step in 
the city’s decentralization. Migrants seeking work poured from rural areas into the big production 
centres, like Toronto, and many settled in the new suburbs.56 
Somewhat unexpectedly, rapid economic growth continued after the war ended. There was 
no severe postwar recession as armament plants ramped down, as there had been after the First 
World War. Instead, the Canadian economy continued to expand rapidly, with plants now meeting 
the pent-up postwar demand for consumer goods, as well as providing supplies for European 
reconstruction.57 The Canadian population was growing rapidly, both through the baby boom and 
the opening of the country’s gates to hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Of approximately 2.7 
million immigrants who arrived in Canada between the end of the war and the mid-1960s, over a 
quarter settled in Toronto.58 They either went directly to the suburbs, or they filled older urban 
housing that had been abandoned by their previous residents for the allure of suburbia. The TTC’s 
service area of the City of Toronto was fully developed by the war, and annexation was still out of 
the question. New growth would instead be located in the surrounding municipalities—some tiny 
villages and others geographically much more expansive, having once been large rural townships 
but now host to sprawling square miles of cul-de-sacs and driveways. From 1946 to 1950, the City 
of Toronto’s population declined by nearly 30,000 people, or 4.2%, while the suburbs grew by 
over 100,000, or 48%.59 
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This was aided in no small part by lavish federal support for housing, mirroring the policies 
south of the border. As in the United States, the low quality and limited availability of housing in 
Canadian cities was considered a national crisis. During the Depression and war, there had been 
little production of new housing, and the quality of the aging housing stock was often dismal. At 
the end of 1947, in Toronto alone there were 7,000 families living in emergency housing provided 
by the City.60 
The reform-minded Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King passed a 
National Housing Act in 1944, which created the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation to 
implement its policies. Its programs closely mirrored the policies to the south, focusing particularly 
on facilitating homeownership, including construction of new housing, generous grants for 
returning veterans, and a program of mortgage insurance to enable low-cost mortgages for 
homebuyers.61 The policies led to a boom of new housing, and some of them explicitly favoured 
suburbanization. The Veterans Land Act, for example, required recipients of its grants to settle 
outside major cities.62 
By the 1950s, the benefits of the clement environment for transit bequeathed by the 
stinginess of the Toronto Railway Company had run their course, and the TTC was, like all of its 
North American peers, running a deficit.63 It was at that point that all the past investments became 
irrelevant, as policymakers were well aware of the sunk cost fallacy. They had a choice of whether 
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to continue the TTC’s tradition of financial self-sustainability, and to cut service to bring outlays 
in line with revenues, or to make a different, more radical choice—to begin subsidizing the system. 
More ominously for transit, Ontario embraced the expressway early and with alacrity. The 
Queen Elizabeth Way, connecting Toronto to the industrial city of Hamilton and then to the 
American border at Niagara Falls, was opened by the royal couple during their visit in 1939. It 
was one of the earliest expressways in the world, and was a considerable source of civic and 
provincial pride.64 At the same time as Torontonians voted to approve the subway in 1946, they 
also voted to approve a new urban highway in the Don River valley connecting the downtown to 
the northeast.65  
While transit was a monopoly, the anti-annexation policy effectively served the role of 
planning—ensuring a tightly bounded, compact city. Once people could drive, a different, more 
explicit approach to planning urban growth was needed. 
Private enterprise also increasingly took on a planning role. Enormous developments on 
the edge of the city were planned by financiers who bought farmland on the city’s fringes—some 
well outside of the urban area—and then planned large suburban mixed-use developments. These 
private plans were not quite the same as their American equivalents. Their roads were winding 
cul-de-sacs, and their ranch-style housing had much in common with American models. But 
inspired by the British new towns of the same era, they were intended to be self-contained 
communities, including office, industrial, retail, and residential development. In practice, they 
became both bedroom communities and destinations for commuters from other areas. 
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Conspicuously absent in these private plans, not unlike their public counterparts, was transit 
infrastructure.66 
 
Toward Metropolitan Governance 
By the late 1940s, the tables had somewhat turned on the idea of annexation. Suburban 
municipalities had recognized that they needed a commercial tax base to fund their improvement, 
and “new town” developments like Don Mills, designed to have as many jobs as residents, were 
beginning to provide it.67 Meanwhile, the assessed value of land in the city had been steadily 
declining.68 Given their rapid growth, the city was beginning to see the new suburbs less as 
parasitic appendages and more as vital parts of the city’s economy, while the absence of overall 
governance made the provision of regional infrastructure and the direction of growth very difficult.  
The situation led the city government to reconsider the idea of annexation, and in 1950, the 
City of Toronto applied to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), a quasi-judicial body that 
supervised all municipal decisions, to annex its twelve neighbouring suburban municipalities.69 
Though Toronto’s relative homogeneity meant that there was not the same racist motivation that 
had poisoned the idea of annexation in postwar American cities,70 the American distaste for 
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suburban annexation had spread north. The proposal was met with what the reeve71 of the tiny but 
very affluent village of Forest Hill, Frederick Gardiner, described as “the same violent and vitriolic 
opposition from some of the suburban municipalities as similar attempts to establish 
comprehensive plans have met in the United States.”72 
Historian Jon Teaford examined the long struggle over municipal annexation and 
metropolitan government. He found that many of the strongest supporters of metropolitan 
government were elite businessmen with businesses in the central city and homes in the suburbs.73 
This pattern was certainly present in Toronto, and this elite was a core base of support of the 
provincial government. 
Gardiner was an example of many members of the city elite who had come to question the 
region’s governance. As early as 1945, the Bureau of Municipal Research, the membership of 
which included many prominent businesses and professional groups, published a white paper 
calling for regional planning and amalgamation of all the region’s municipalities—or, at least, a 
metropolitan federation. "There seems no good reason," the BOMR wrote in its white paper, "why 
the greater Toronto area needs more than one Local Government. If the various municipalities in 
the area had had independent existence for 200 or 300 years, the objection to unification might be 
understood. [...] A second best solution, [...] that of a borough system, would be better than no 
solution at all." The fragmented governance of the region was seen as detrimental to its economic 
and social progress.74 
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“For decades they had gone on attacking their mutual problems in thirteen different ways,” 
as Gardiner later described the independent municipalities, “providing archaic living patterns; 
duplicating each other’s answers with no sound overall plan for the provision of those services 
which are metropolitan in nature and should be supplied on a metropolitan basis.” 75 
Though the OMB was ostensibly apolitical, its chairman Lorne Cumming in reality worked 
in close, albeit secret, collaboration with Premier Leslie Frost and the provincial cabinet. The 
premier was very anxious about the vehement opposition to amalgamation among many of the 
suburban municipalities. The most frenzied demonstration was surely from the tempestuous reeve 
Oliver Crockford of Scarborough, who demonstrated that Richard Hofstadter’s “Paranoid Style in 
American Politics” also existed north of the Great Lakes. He wrote to the premier warning that 
“Unification would ultimately become the first step in the formation of a dictatorship which would 
exercise control over the Toronto area,” serving as a precedent for the establishment of 
authoritarian socialism all over Canada.76 
Frost’s anxiety over the political consequences of amalgamation, coupled with genuine 
concern about diminished political representation for small communities, led to the development 
of a compromise proposal. Three years after the City of Toronto’s application, Cumming produced 
a report calling for a federal approach. The existing thirteen separate municipalities would be 
retained, but a new Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto would be created to be responsible for 
services best provided on a regional basis. Frost’s government immediately introduced legislation 
based on the report’s recommendations, which was duly passed in April 1953.  
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The key areas of activity for the new metropolitan government were in water and sewage, 
education, and transportation. Many new suburban homes were relying on dangerous and polluting 
septic systems, while the city’s water and sewage systems lacked capacity for rapid new growth. 
Education, theretofore highly unequal, with the wealthiest suburbs like Forest Hill able to provide 
lavish facilities and poorer municipalities struggling to meet basic standards, would be equalized 
through a flat per-pupil payment from the metropolitan government to each municipality’s school 
board. Metro, as the new metropolitan came to be known, was also allowed to plan land use, both 
in its own territory and in the ring of rural townships and towns that surrounded it. Finally, as had 
been recommended by Toronto’s transportation guru, consultant Norman Wilson, Metro would 
take it upon itself to build a new network of expressways and arterial roads, and to manage the 
expansion of the Toronto Transportation Commission (renamed to the Toronto Transit 
Commission) to serve the whole metropolitan area.77 
Furthermore, the new TTC would be granted a monopoly on transit provision in its newly 
expanded service area—now 240 square miles, up from 35. From day one, Metro would acquire 
all the existing private bus operations in the suburban municipalities, with compensation 
determined by the OMB, and would merge them into the TTC network.78 These had previously 
received municipal subsidies, but now the TTC would be responsible for their costs.79 Cumming, 
in his OMB report, even called for the establishment of subsidies to maintain and expand the 
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system, but that did not make it into the legislation.80 Old visions of transit as a self-sustaining 
business died hard. 
The TTC’s increasingly precarious financial state put it into a quandary. By 1955, it was 
running an annual deficit. Furthermore, the reformed commission began with a debt to the 
Metropolitan government of $66.6 million, comprising $13 million borrowed to buy the suburban 
bus lines and $53.6 million for the subway. 81  
It had instituted a zone fare system, encompassing five zones, geared to ensure that City 
riders did not subsidize the higher-cost suburban services, but it was still insufficient. One way to 
cover the deficits was to cut services, but McBrien credibly feared that this would result in a vicious 
spiral of declining ridership and ever-expanding deficits. An obvious alternative was to press the 
Metro government for operating subsidies, but this would have imperilled the TTC’s fiercely 
guarded independence.  
Instead, McBrien’s preferred approach was to seek increased capital funding for further 
subway construction, and he had been lobbying the city to that end since the war.82 He believed 
that the subways would be financially self-sustaining and would attract additional riders, as the 
Yonge Subway had, and the ensuing revenues would support the rest of the system. It was, from 
the TTC’s standpoint, an appealing compromise. McBrien’s sudden and untimely death in 1954, 
however, put everything into question. His replacement, Alan Lamport, a flamboyant former 
mayor of Toronto, struggled to carry on the balancing act. 
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After Toronto’s Metropolitan government was created, it inspired interest in its emulation 
on the part of many Americans. Its chairman was invited to deliver many addresses to 
organizations such as the American Planning and Civic Association, the annual board meeting of 
the Federal City Council, the American Bar Association Convention, and the Metropolitan 
Housing and Planning Council of Chicago,83 to explain how Toronto had established and sustained 
a metropolitan government—a seemingly impossible project in most American cities.  
What made the creation of metropolitan government possible in Toronto? Firstly, it must 
be considered that, while desire for autonomy and local control in Canadian cities was 
unquestionably fierce, that desire did not have the same vitriolic racist element that it had in 
American cities, especially in later years. Secondly, the powerful constitutional position of 
Canadian provincial governments vis-à-vis their constituent municipal governments was unusual 
in a North American context, although not entirely unique. Combined with the extraordinary power 
of a leader with a majority government in a parliamentary system—party discipline makes it 
virtually impossible for individual members of the legislature to oppose the leader’s priorities—
Leslie Frost was able to impose the metropolitan vision with few effective avenues for opposition. 
Finally, credit for the establishment and endurance of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 
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Chapter 3: Frederick G. Gardiner and the Embrace of Transit 
Historical scholarship has long emphasized the role of social forces over that of individuals 
in shaping events. Emphasizing the contingent power of a single individual is viewed as both 
outmoded and reductive. The critics were writing in opposition to the views of philosophers like 
Thomas Carlyle and later Sidney Hook, whose Great Man School of history ignored the 
tremendous social and political constraints that face even the most dominant individual historical 
actors. 
However, the scholars’ views were sometimes caricatured. Hook himself took a somewhat 
more nuanced position, arguing in 1943 that the active presence of an individual can, “where a 
genuine alternative exists,” have a decisive presence on a historical period.1 Historian Margaret 
MacMillan has more recently averred that “At certain moments [...] it really does matter who is in 
the driver's seat or who is making the plans.”2 In the sphere of public administration, Charles 
Goodsell has stated that biography can provide a “key to unraveling causality” in the process of 
developing government policies.3 Robert Caro’s tome, The Power Broker, exhaustively elucidated 
the immense power that could be accumulated by an able bureaucratic tactician with a reputation 
for competence and effectiveness, in an era that revered rational planning and dispassionate 
expertise. Toronto had its own counterpart to Robert Moses, a comparison that was drawn even at 
the time, but his effect on transit was very different from Moses’.  
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Frederick Gardiner was born as the second son into a dour Methodist family on January 
21, 1895. His father, David, had arrived penniless from Ireland but had risen to become a prison 
guard and small landlord, on whose properties young Frederick worked in most of his spare time. 
His mother, Victoria, was quite learned and worldly for the time and for her station, and she 
harboured burning ambitions for her sons. Frederick was a somewhat rambunctious young man. 
His lifelong keenness on gambling and, for many years, alcohol was perhaps a result of chafing 
under the austerity of his upbringing. He nevertheless excelled as a student after some early 
hiccoughs, eventually gaining entrance into the University of Toronto. Following service as a 
flying officer in the First World War, he entered Osgoode Hall Law School. He graduated first in 
his class, which he credited to hard work and extraordinary diligence. It was, he often averred, the 
proudest moment in his life, as he had surpassed many young men with far less humble origins. 
He worked assiduously toward his stated life goal of becoming a millionaire. He became 
one of the most prominent trial lawyers in the province, helped by his diligence, outgoing 
personality, and booming voice. He also entered into an array of businesses. His best financial 
judgment was selling nearly all of his stocks in early 1929, and, following the crash, investing all 
of his resources into stock of the Bank of Toronto. Gardiner typified the successful Conservative 
businessman. 
Gardiner’s father had been active in both the Conservative Party and the Orange Lodge, 
and had introduced his son to them at a young age. Frederick worked on a number of campaigns 
and stayed active in the party machinery. These connections proved to be a launching pad for a 
successful campaign in 1935 for deputy reeve of Forest Hill. This small village of about 12,000 
was one of the wealthiest residential neighbourhoods in the country. It was home to much of the 
city’s elite—as well as its aspiring elite, among whom Fred Gardiner could be counted. Though 
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the campaign was tumultuous, Gardiner was able to glean the support of the less affluent North 
End, against an opponent who was running on a platform of maintaining the exclusivity of the 
village. Forest Hill was to be the base for Gardiner’s political rise. 
Gardiner had long resisted entering electoral politics, beyond his small, part-time role as 
deputy reeve, and later reeve, of Forest Hill. “There is nothing you can do in politics that makes 
the cash register ring,” he said.4 However, he quickly emerged as a prominent participant in the 
Conservative Party’s back rooms. A renowned barnstorming orator, Gardiner was in demand from 
party organizers across the province. In 1948, after refusing entreaties to run for the provincial 
Conservative leadership, Gardiner supported Leslie Frost, who ascended to the role and, therefore, 
to the provincial premiership. Their relationship proved to be important both for Gardiner and for 
Toronto. Frost was, like Gardiner, a conservative protestant, but his mild, tempered personality 
and rural origins stood him in marked contrast. Nevertheless, they became close allies. Gardiner 
was a close friend, and partner in the party machinery, of Frost’s brother Cecil, who died at age 49 
in 1947. Following the loss, Gardiner and Leslie Frost grew closer, and after the latter rose to the 
premiership in 1949, Gardiner became one of his closest advisors and confidants.5 
Both Gardiner and Frost were firmly ensconced in the progressive wing of the party. 
Despite his pro-business persona, Gardiner had also been a prominent leader in pressing the 
Conservatives to adopt a progressive policy on organized labour, and even helped lead the 
lobbying for changing the party’s name to the somewhat oxymoronic Progressive Conservative.6 
As his biographer Timothy Colton described, Gardiner recognized “that the party could survive as 
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a political force only by fusing its traditional commitment to free enterprise with a new willingness 
to enlarge the social and economic role of government in favour of the weak and disadvantaged.”7  
Frost was third in an unbroken series of six Conservative premiers who governed the 
province from 1943 to 1985. They were conservative more in style and ethnic origin—invariably 
British protestant—than they were in policy. In the same vein as their American liberal Republican 
and European Christian Democratic contemporaries, they radically grew the government and 
transformed the province’s physical and social infrastructure. This included expanding the 
province’s public electricity system, building numerous public universities and colleges, 
constructing a provincial network of expressways, and, following tremendous pressure from the 
Liberal federal government, reluctantly introducing universal public health insurance. Their 
approach to municipal governance was no less progressive.  
Gardiner began with a hostile attitude toward regional government, as one might expect 
given his parochial political origins in the Village of Forest Hill, a community with the highest 
assessments of any municipality in Canada and one fiercely determined to maintain its 
independence. As late as 1944, he was still referring to the idea of metropolitan government as 
“poison.”8 Two years later, however, he was appointed by the provincial government to the newly 
established Toronto and Suburban Planning Board, of which he was soon elected vice chair and 
then chair.9 This role gave him a taste for large-scale planning. It made him viscerally aware of 
the desperately inadequate infrastructure in the fast-growing region and the obstacles presented by 
the patchwork of municipal jurisdictions. He was also growing disillusioned with the chaotic 
governance and limited powers of York County, on the council of which he served ex officio as 
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reeve of Forest Hill.10 His growing passion for government involvement in social and physical 
infrastructure placed him well within the mainstream in the wake of World War II, and his 
involvement in regional planning began to change his mind on the importance of regional 
governance.11 
This newfound passion did not exclude transit; as early as 1947, Gardiner agitated for the 
Planning Board to include a unified public transit network in its plans. At the same time, he had 
developed a strong passion for road construction—especially modern expressways, which were 
seen as the paragon of modernity at the time—a passion that would do much more to shape the 
popular historical perception of the man than his work on transit.  
Gardiner’s impulse to remedy the parlous and fragmented state of the region’s 
infrastructure meant that within three meetings of his election as chair of the planning board in 
1949, the board, at his initiative, voted a resolution calling for a unified municipality for the 
metropolitan region. Later that year, he decided against reoffering as a candidate for reeve of Forest 
Hill. His new interest in regional planning and big infrastructure had replaced his more 
circumscribed interests in his small village—just as he knew that his choice to support 
amalgamation would put him in danger of defeat in Forest Hill. Gardiner relished the new wider 
role, and quickly threw himself into campaigning for amalgamation, just as he had previously 
campaigned for the Conservative Party, and he was once again among its most effective and 
persuasive advocates.12 
When the provincial government, in the guise of the quasi-judicial OMB, instead 
recommended the creation of a Metropolitan level of government, Gardiner’s old friend and ally 
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Leslie Frost decided to appoint him to be the first chairman.13 Though the role and powers of the 
chairman were somewhat amorphous in the legislation establishing the new government, Gardiner 
swiftly and assiduously worked to amass power, both through his personality combining charm 
with irascibility, and through his absolute mastery of the files before council.14  
Gardiner’s close ties to the provincial government, and, in particular, his personal 
relationship with Premier Frost, were key to his power. “There was not a minister in the cabinet 
who had as much influence as Ted Gardiner,” averred Harry Price, Frost’s main fundraiser and 
one of his closest political advisers.15 “I always endeavour to meet your point of view,” Frost 
himself wrote to Gardiner.16 In Canada, all municipalities are commonly dubbed “creatures of the 
provinces,” created and disestablished just as easily with a bill in the legislature. Even if Gardiner 
did not always prevail in negotiations with the province, his relationships ensured that his position 
got a fair hearing—a powerful asset for an Ontario municipal leader.  
Soon, the Metro Council was little more than a rubber stamp for the plans and policies 
emerging from Gardiner’s small office. These perceptions crystallized when he went on a vacation 
to Jamaica and the council seemed paralyzed, incapable of taking a decision—a situation widely 
satirized by newspaper cartoonists. They portrayed Gardiner variously as a “Supermayor” flying 
with cape trailing behind, or, in a style redolent of the era, as an eastern despot. A contemporaneous 
magazine writer described Gardiner as “chairman, father image, mentor, sergeant-major and 
advisor” to the members of the council. “Gardiner, whose features are so craggy that he makes 
men like Admiral Bull Halsey look effete,” he wrote, “is loved, disliked, feared and respected by 
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his flock.”17 Phil Givens, then a Toronto alderman and later the city’s mayor, described Gardiner 
as “a benevolent dictator.” The chairman’s opinion generally determined that of council: “I feel 
nothing of any consequence turns without his approval,” Givens said.18 Gardiner’s popular 
nickname of “Big Daddy,” derived from the patriarch of the Tennessee Williams play Cat on a 
Hot Tin Roof, which had been turned into a film in 1958, effectively captured his role and image.19 
Joseph Cornish, another Toronto alderman and a wartime army officer, was equally 
intimidated. “It was with a great deal of reluctance that you would get up in council to disagree 
with Mr. Gardiner,” he explained. “Here was this big impressive man who had spent all those years 
in Forest Hill and in the county, who was a friend of the [provincial] government and was well 
steeped in the ways of Bay Street, who was familiar with every tree and stone and service station 
in the area we were talking about. He seemed to know everything about everything. There weren’t 
many who were prepared to dispute a major point with him. It was like putting your nose in a meat 
grinder.”20 Facilitated by the amiable but usually ineffectual personality of his only conceivable 
rival in power on Metro Council, Toronto mayor Nathan Phillips, Gardiner’s absolute primacy on 
the council was beyond dispute.  
 
Gardiner’s Style  
Gardiner’s biographer, Timothy Colton, described his administrative style as “active-positive,” 
according to the matrix developed by James Barber. Colton described Gardiner as “highly active 
and possessed of a strong affection for his work, someone who makes large investments in 
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undertakings that afforded tangible payoffs for himself and the causes he made his own.”21 
Gardiner’s physical size and booming voice gave him a powerful presence, which, combined with 
his perspicacity and knowledge, enabled him to dominate nearly any situation. He was agile in 
debate, and a master of the cutting remark, but was equally quick to apologize if he exceeded the 
mark.22 Gardiner had little patience for lengthy analysis, and was generally quite sceptical of 
professional planners, let alone academics. He saw himself as a practical man of business, who 
prized action above all else.  
Shortly after taking the helm of Metro, he travelled to visit Robert Moses, a man with 
similar views on planners, and the man of whom Gardiner is often remembered to be Toronto’s 
equivalent. As prominent planner and scholar Hans Blumenfeld remembered, “I came to greatly 
admire [Gardiner]: I used to say that he had all of the good characteristics of Robert Moses and 
only a few of the bad ones; in particular, he was able to admit and correct a mistake.”23 At their 
meeting, the two power brokers discussed their shared distaste for “high-minded advisers.” When 
asked by Moses about his goals, Gardiner responded, with a comparison that is astounding for a 
Conservative in 1953, that he planned to be like Stalin, meaning that he would develop a five-year 
plan and implement it ruthlessly.24 
Gardiner’s views were often unorthodox for the time, and occasionally paradoxical. He 
was raised as a member of the Orange Lodge and could thank its networks for much of his rise, 
but he was not a fierce sectarian; in later life, his involvement with the Orange Lodge was limited, 
and one of his earliest political supporters was Ben Sadowski, a prominent local Jewish 
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businessman whom, when they were schoolboys, Gardiner had fought to defend from a mob of 
anti-Semitic youths.25 He was an arch-modernist believing in the inevitability of growth and 
progress, and indeed celebrating both. In his address to the Canadian Club of Toronto, titled “How 
Big Will Toronto Grow?” he exalted the numerous megaprojects underway in Canada at the 
time—foremost among them the St. Lawrence Seaway, which he (incorrectly, as it turned out) 
believed would bring about a boom in Toronto’s port and related industries. While he spoke of the 
investments that would be needed to achieve the growth, the need for such growth and investment 
was never questioned.26 But in contrast to the ostensibly scientific methods that define modernism, 
and in keeping with his contempt for “high-minded advisers,” he had little use for the notion of 
depoliticized planning. The planning profession and civic improvement groups had long sought to 
remove politics from the process of urban planning. Their greatest legacy in that respect was the 
creation of ostensibly apolitical public authorities, like the TTC, which were placed in charge of 
much infrastructure planning and development at the time.27 
The Metropolitan Toronto Act had called for the establishment of an independent planning 
board, in keeping with this tradition. Gardiner saw the body differently, as a group of advisers 
providing technical information to the political leadership, who would make the ultimate decisions. 
Though the board was intended to be independent of the Metro Council, he manoeuvred to give 
the Metro chairman a seat ex officio. From that moment, he largely dominated its deliberations.28 
For Gardiner, binding plans held little appeal. Though his planning board produced a draft 
plan for the city in 1959, he made no effort to have it passed in legislation as an official plan, 
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leaving it to be more of a vision than a binding policy. His stated preference was for a laissez-faire 
approach. “I am a believer in natural growth,” he said. “Generally it is wisest to let a city grow 
naturally without a lot of artificial limitations.”29 He preferred to provide an infrastructure skeleton 
while leaving the development of the city largely in the hands of private enterprise.  
His actions, however, sometimes belied his stated philosophy. In an interview he described 
his own position in nuanced terms. “Let natural growth be the dictator of what can be built as long 
as it is reasonable,” he said. “But what is reasonable? You cannot decide this in terms of principle. 
It gets you into personal feelings and public opinion and it gets you into politics.”30 Gardiner 
fiercely fought for the construction of public housing, especially in the suburbs. One of his 
proudest and most hard-fought achievements was the large Lawrence Heights public housing 
development in the affluent suburb of North York—not far from his own bailiwick of Forest Hill.31 
The battle led to an outburst of anger against a citizen making a deputation at Metro Council 
against the project. “I have not shown much annoyance to date,” he thundered, “but frankly it 
seems these people are more interested in objecting to this proposal than in submitting any sound 
grounds as to why it should not be built.” He wouldn’t accept the streets being cut off from the 
surrounding grid, either. “There is no room for bamboo or iron curtains in this country. [Residents 
of subsidized housing] do not want to be isolated as if they were infidels.”32 As a result of the 
policy he established—very much in contrast to most American cities—public housing is spread 
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roughly equally throughout the city and its suburbs.33 This enabled, and was enabled by, Metro’s 
progressive transit policies.  
While ostensibly favouring laissez-faire, Gardiner used the powers provided to the 
Planning Board by the province to plan the surrounding region well beyond Metro’s boundaries—
seeking further assistance from his friends in the provincial government when necessary—to block 
the most sprawling “leapfrog” types of developments beyond the urban periphery that were 
commonplace in the Eastern United States. He did so on the appropriately conservative grounds 
of the cost of providing such far-flung developments with urban services. He led Metro to ensure 
that the urban area of Toronto was largely contiguous, without large tracts of undeveloped land 
between suburbs.34 Both of these policies had important consequences for public transit. 
Though Gardiner was dismissive of planning and viewed himself as a politician, in practice 
Metro functioned much like a wide-ranging public authority. Members of Metro Council were 
indirectly elected, being seated ex officio based on their elected roles in the boroughs. Harold 
Kaplan argues that the electorate mostly evaluated them on local issues relating to their borough 
offices, and they were therefore largely able to operate freely on Metro Council with limited 
political accountability. Gardiner himself was a step further removed from politics, having been 
initially appointed by the province to the post of Chairman and subsequently re-elected by Metro 
Council. Though Gardiner viewed himself as a politician, and acted as such on Metro Council, he 
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clearly relished the ability to act on a grand scale that his insulation from day-to-day electoral 
politics afforded him.35 
When Gardiner met with Robert Moses, he proudly dubbed himself “a bulldozer.”36 He 
continually boasted of his desire to get things done without excessive deliberation or concern about 
obstacles, and he had a characteristically 1950s reverence for the ideal of progress. Yet he 
surprisingly did not always support the de rigeur mass-demolition of old residential 
neighbourhoods, instead favouring, at least occasionally, heritage preservation and rehabilitation. 
When one purportedly blighted area was slated for demolition, he fought the plans. Instead, he 
proposed settling a hundred new immigrants in the area. “They would clean it up in two years and 
you would have white picket fences and flower beds all over the place,” he said.37  
His views on transportation were equally unorthodox. Gardiner was the champion of 
expressways—including one along the lakeshore that eventually bore his name and, most 
infamously, the Spadina Expressway that was ultimately stopped in 1971 by a citizens’ movement 
that reshaped the city’s politics for decades to come. His first role in regional planning was on the 
Toronto and York Roads Commission, and the difficulty of getting what he viewed as essential 
new highways built played an important role in his decision to champion amalgamation and, later, 
metropolitan government.38 The “bulldozer” had no qualms about surmounting any obstacle to 
build highways, and he saw himself as the man “with the courage to say where we should have a 
street and then plow through the houses and make it long enough.”39 None of these views would 
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seem out of place for a municipal leader in the 1950s, and certainly such phrases could easily have 
been spoken by the likes of Robert Moses. But Gardiner’s views on transportation became 
increasingly nuanced as his time in office proceeded. After a few years at the helm of Metro, he 
was no longer a single-minded champion of new urban expressways. 
Though his early inaugural addresses to the Metropolitan council gave relatively short 
shrift to transit—in 1955, it was not even mentioned40—by 1956, there was a change. Gardiner 
spoke at length about the many arterial road and expressway construction projects that his 
government had underway. But he concluded the litany by saying “A disturbing factor with respect 
to the provision of these four arterial highways is that we must immediately give consideration to 
additional rapid transit if our rapidly increasing population is to be moved with anything 
approaching economy and efficiency.” He pointed south with scepticism at the cities that had 
theretofore been models of modernity. “It is the experience of every large city in America,” he 
declared,  
that a succession of new expressways is not the answer to efficient and 
economical movement of traffic. Each successive one is filled the day it 
is opened. The irresistible fact is that you simply cannot provide 
sufficient highways and parking space to accommodate every person who 
desires to drive his motor vehicle downtown and back each day.41 
 
Like its American counterparts, the provincial government was not so progressive in its 
transportation policies. Gardiner refused to be tempted by the availability of provincial highway 
funding if it meant building highways where transit would better do the job. “It is a snare and a 
delusion,” he said, “to keep on spending tens of millions of dollars on highways because the 
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province will subsidize them 50% when we know that beyond a certain stage that $1 spent on rapid 
transit is worth $5 spent on more arterial highways and parking facilities.”42 
“The most difficult problem facing Canadian cities is traffic congestion,” Gardiner claimed 
in a 1958 address to the Canadian Transit Association. This view would have found him firmly 
ensconced in the mainstream view of transportation and urban policy in the 1950s. It was only in 
his prescribed solutions that he differed from many of his peers. Certainly, he believed in the 
importance of building a substantial urban expressway network, even when at the cost of 
demolishing homes and businesses in established neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, he said that “It 
is now painfully obvious that building a succession of expressways each of which will be filled 
the day it is opened with the traffic it will generate will not solve the traffic and transportation 
problems of any community. What will solve the problem is a practical and effective combination 
of expressways and rapid transit.”43 
He was not merely pandering to his audience. Even when speaking to a body as seemingly 
transit-unfriendly as the “Ontario Good Roads Association” in 1956, the year the Interstate 
Highway Act was passed in the United States, Gardiner spoke extensively about the need for 
investment in public transit.  Quoting at length from such a speech is valuable, since his willingness 
to extoll the importance of transit even to such an audience clearly conveys his commitment to the 
issue.  
Standing before the Ontario Good Roads Association, he certainly boasted that “[o]ur 
highways in Ontario have no superior in this country and compare very favourably with the best 
in America,” and recognized that “there is nothing which gives a man such a feeling of importance 
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as driving down main street in a two-toned automobile plentifully splashed with chrome, even if 
he had to borrow the down payment from the small loan company and will be married to the 
finance company for the next thirty months.” But even to the Good Roads Association, he pointed 
out the problems. Though Los Angeles was, in the 1950s, the model city for much of the world, 
Gardiner recognized that after immense highway investment in that city, the parking problem had 
become insoluble. “A man hitched a trailer to his car,” he joked, “and when asked what the trailer 
was for he said he had to have somewhere to live while he was looking for a place to park.” Most 
importantly, Gardiner recognized the importance of transit service quality to attracting automobile 
drivers. “If you happen to be one of those who makes his living out of public transit,” he intoned, 
“you can argue until you are blue in the fare box but you will still find that you can’t derrick the 
automobile rider out of his car and into the street car or subway. The only way you can get him 
there is to coax him with a more convenient and more economical mode of travel with rapid and 
regular service.”  
He went further, though his audience must have been somewhat displeased with what they 
no doubt hoped would be an encomium on the glories of the automobile. “The day has arrived 
when our transportation problems can no longer be solved by building a succession of arterial 
highways,” he declared. “After a basic system of arterial highways has been completed, rapid 
transit will cost infinitely less and will do the job infinitely better.” 44 
Unlike most conservatives, he firmly believed in the public provision of transit service—
very different from the dominant view in many American cities, where transit was still viewed as 
a private monopoly with which government needed to frequently do battle. “A transit system 
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operating within a reasonable fare structure is just as important a municipal service as water supply, 
sewage disposal, arterial highways and education,” he declared in his 1956 Inaugural Address. 
Gardiner was anxious that rising fares would produce the same vicious spiral that caused transit 
ridership to evaporate in most American cities. Given the cost of subway construction, expanded 
suburban service, and acquiring the former private suburban bus lines, the TTC was no longer 
turning a profit. The debt for the Yonge subway line had been borrowed against future revenues 
from the TTC’s farebox, but such a funding source would be impossible for any future project, not 
least because the bond market was no longer buying securities issued by the declining transit 
industry.45 Gardiner saw the only viable alternative to be subsidy. He refused to consider raising 
fares since, he argued, “in all American cities [fare increases] had resulted in a loss of passenger 
traffic.” Instead, he believed that subsidies would be needed for what he claimed would be a 
“transition period from a purely city operation in a confined and lucrative area to a metropolitan 
operation in an immensely expanded area where there were bound to be many deficit areas.”46 
Gardiner mounted a long campaign for transit subsidies from higher levels of government, 
a theme that would recur in Toronto transit for decades to come. “The cost of rapid transit should 
be contributed to by both the Dominion and by the Province,” he said. “The Province would be 
wise in its own interest to subsidize rapid transit in lieu of additional highways and expressways 
which will only confuse the situation and compound the problem.” At a time when the Interstate 
Highway Act was moving through the American Congress, he questioned the domination of the 
automobile. “We do not hesitate to spend public money on roads, expressways, and parkways for 
the convenience of motor vehicles or to subsidize air travel by the building of airports, but for 
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some reason we shy away from the subsidization of public transit […] As millions are spent for 
the convenience of the motor vehicle, either for its commercial or domestic use, we will likely find 
that some more millions will have to be spent to subsidize the public transit system. You must 
move people as well as motor cars.”47 
Gardiner had not entirely abandoned the automobile. He certainly still maintained his 
commitment to completing the network of highways he had supported since his days on the 
Planning Board, calling for spending $100 million on four new urban expressways. But at the same 
time, he called for $150 million to be spent on two new subway lines. He favoured a “balanced” 
system of both highways and transit—a position that was at least rhetorically in keeping with many 
plans across North America.48 
He couched his radical position in traditional conservative concern for spending and 
taxation. “Granted a six-lane expressway will do a job a two-lane city street can’t do, but the 
$64,000 question is—are we equal to the monumental task and cost of providing the macaroni 
maze of freeways, cloverleafs and parkways which will be necessary to relieve the present 
congestion let alone provide for future growth. Traffic engineers say they can do it if they are given 
the money. As a matter fact [sic] that is the engineer’s standard answer to everything. Give us the 
money and we can do anything, even build a stairway to the stars. But the ghost which always 
haunts us is—can we afford the money?—and the answer is no!”49 
Unlike in many American cities, these words were not coming from an idealistic urban 
planner or a transit activist. They were coming from a Conservative businessman and powerful 
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politician known as Toronto’s answer to Robert Moses. A Torontonian Caesar, hand-selected by 
the provincial government, Gardiner bestrode the new Metropolitan government like a colossus. 
If he believed that transit was a better use of government funds than highways, he had the power—
to borrow from Caro’s conception of Moses—to change the policy. Despite all his power and 
connections, it would prove to be neither easy nor quick, but in the end Gardiner almost 
singlehandedly reshaped provincial policy toward transit so that transit would receive equal or 
greater funding than roads, and, critically, he did so before the prewar transit legacy had 
disintegrated. This set the stage for the city’s multi-decade role as a transit model. 
 
Gardiner in Context 
Before examining his actions, it is important to understand just how unorthodox Gardiner’s views 
were for a man like him in the 1950s. Certainly there were many critics of sole reliance on 
highways, even in those heady days for expressway construction. Intellectuals and planners were 
among the first to notice the perils of total automobile dependence. Gardiner himself quoted 
Chicago planner Walter Blucher: “I am willing to stake my reputation on the forecast that building 
of expressways will not solve the traffic and transportation problems of any community. They will 
increase the traffic problem and the parking problem and will in a number of communities 
encourage decentralization of the central areas.”50 
Even most planners, however, largely embraced the ideology of progress and the 
inevitability of automobility in the 1950s. From the prognostications of H.G. Wells, to Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s Broadacre City vision of proto-suburbia, to the vision of a future of highways and 
 
50 Frederick G. Gardiner, “Combination of Arterial Highways and Rapid Transit Facilities,” Roads and Engineering 
Construction, May 1956. 
99 
 
universal automobility presented to millions of visitors at Norman Bel Geddes’ Futurama exhibit 
for General Motors in the 1939 New York World’s Fair, the automobile had captured the 
imagination of North Americans—their political leaders included.51 President Eisenhower, 
inspired by these visions and his own experiences—both as a young colonel leading an army 
convoy on a gruelling trip across the country on highways snaking through crowded towns, and as 
an occupation commander marvelling at the modernity and efficiency of Germany’s 
Autobahnen—led Congress to pass an Interstate Highway Act in 1956 that provided 90% federal 
funding for a national network of expressways. Though funding was ostensibly intended for long-
distance trips, state and local politicians soon clamoured for funding of urban expressway projects 
too.  
Canada was not so different. Though the federal government was less keen on funding 
roads beyond a national Trans-Canada Highway, provincial governments have essentially the same 
fiscal capacity as the federal government, and they were much more eager to enter the game. In 
Ontario, for example, urban highway projects were given 50% funding from the province, and 
many local expressway projects were built as provincial highways and therefore were funded 
entirely by Queen’s Park. 52 
Harland Bartholomew was the chief planner of Washington, DC, and was a prominent 
national figure. By the 1950s, he was already in his sixties and had shaped the capital for decades. 
Though Bartholomew was sympathetic to transit, he was far less so than Gardiner. In 1950, a 
regional plan on which he served as chief consultant dismissed the idea of rapid transit: “‘Neither 
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the existing nor the probable future population pattern’ would provide the densities needed to make 
rapid transit economically sensible.”53 At the time, however, Washington’s population density was 
11,738 per square mile, compared with 7,057 in Toronto, where a new subway was then 
underway.54 In 1955, he was charged with creating a transportation plan for the region. The plan 
was to be as technocratic as possible, with minimal community consultation and political 
involvement, and was led by planners, engineers, and managers under Bartholomew’s aegis.55 
Historian of the Washington Metro Zachary Schrag describes the process as a tug-of-war 
between different factions—including rail, bus, and highway advocates among the planners and 
engineers—but he makes clear that the dominance of highways was never in doubt. All of the 
proposed scenarios in the 1959 plan included massive highway expansion, not least because much 
of the study’s funding came from federal highway money. Though it included a sop to transit 
advocates—most prominently, eight express bus routes along the new highways without even the 
benefit of their own lanes, and, unusually for the time, two rail routes—it is clear that the planners 
and engineers saw Greater Washington’s transportation future as predominantly carried on 
asphalt.56 
The Chicago Area Transportation Study in the late 1950s and early 1960s was a landmark 
of the "predict and provide" rational approach to transportation planning, and it served as a model 
for numerous other transportation plans across the United States. Though it recommended a 
modest expansion of the rail transit system, alongside a massive highway construction program 
that would produce a “gridiron” of urban expressways, it made no mention of the broader transit 
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network of buses, which was the only transit available in much of the conurbation. The capital-
project-focused transportation planning process model established by studies like CATS, which 
was well suited for highway planning since all that was required was to provide the infrastructure 
so drivers could use the road in their own cars, was conversely very ill-suited to transit planning, 
where operations are at least as important as capital projects. Gardiner, by contrast, spent much 
time dealing with expansions to suburban bus routes.57 
Gardiner’s ostensible model, Robert Moses, was even more dismissive of public 
transportation. While Moses, as immortalized by Caro, refused to include rail on his bridges or on 
the Van Wyck Expressway to Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy) Airport, Gardiner was denouncing 
the failure to include transit corridors on new highways as a “fatal mistake.”58 In remarks at a 
luncheon of the National Highway Users Conference on May 9, 1962, Moses discussed commuter 
rail at length. Rather than proposing a visionary solution comparable to his approach to road 
transportation, he merely criticized the private management of the railways and warned 
governments about the hazards of subsidizing them. His sympathy toward the automobile was 
evident when he said, “We are becoming hysterical and prodigal about aid to ailing commuter 
railroads, and tend to exaggerate the advantages of mass transportation.”59 
It would not be until the late 1960s when New York governor Nelson Rockefeller created 
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which included the suburban commuter railroads, that 
New York made even desultory efforts to improve transit in the new suburbs. Even within the five 
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boroughs, transit funds were devoured by the bottomless pit of deferred maintenance left by the 
long-insolvent private subway operators.60 
The first stirrings of opposition to urban highway projects came as early as the 1950s, from 
community groups repulsed by the idea that a concrete scar would bisect their neighbourhood. 
Those groups representing affluent, politically influential areas like Georgetown in Washington 
DC sometimes managed to have the highway projects quietly shelved. Toronto’s Crosstown 
Expressway through the elite Rosedale neighbourhood was another example, as was the successful 
campaign to pressure Robert Moses to select a less destructive path for the Brooklyn-Queens 
Expressway around prosperous Brooklyn Heights. Other communities—especially poor and 
minority communities—were usually not so fortunate. The successful campaigns were generally 
not against highways per se, but rather only against the local consequences of individual projects. 
Some of Gardiner’s speeches sound like they could have come straight from Lewis 
Mumford, who wrote his article "The Highway and the City" in 1958. That article was lamenting 
"the religion of the motorcar" that stood "outside the realm of rational criticism." Mumford 
favoured a “balanced” transportation system of the type that Gardiner advocated. "The fatal 
mistake we have been making is to sacrifice every other form of transportation to the private 
motorcar," he wrote. "We need a better transportation system, not just more highways."61 He later 
expanded on these themes, but it took several years for the criticism of an intellectual like Mumford 
to begin to shape the opinions of most government officials. Gardiner was making the same points 
as Mumford at exactly the same time.  
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Opposition from local community activists and intellectuals, however, was often easily 
dismissed by the powerful advocates of highway construction, including suburban communities, 
business groups, the automobile industry, and those who simply felt the car was a much more 
pleasant way to get around than the streetcars and trains that they had been forced to crowd onto 
by wartime rationing. This is where Gardiner was so unusual. He was not a radical activist, he was 
not a neighbourhood leader acting to preserve his own home—he was a conservative machine 
politician and prominent businessman who had the credibility with such groups to get support for 
even, for his day, highly radical ideas. Gardiner had the conservative credibility to get the kinds of 
people that would have been powerful opponents of transit in other cities to line up behind its 
expansion in Toronto.  
Gardiner was not so far ahead of his time as one might imagine, however. Already by 1962, 
US president John F. Kennedy had begun to heed intellectuals like Mumford, and to notice that 
promises of decongested cities made by expressway proponents had come to naught. He called for 
federal assistance to local public transit projects, in line with highway assistance that had been 
legislated six years earlier. “Our national welfare,” he said, “requires the provision of good urban 
transportation, with the properly balanced use of private vehicles and modern mass transport to 
help shape as well as serve urban growth.”62 Two years later, the Urban Mass Transportation Act 
was part of a wave of Kennedy-promoted legislation that was passed amid the outpouring of 
sympathy following the president’s assassination.63   
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But the difference in timing was decisive. Gardiner saved the TTC from a spiral of fare 
hikes and reduced service in the early 1950s by securing a modest, but timely subsidy. By the later 
1950s, he had led the expansion of the subway, and had taken the capital cost burden off the transit 
system, providing it considerable fiscal room. By the time American federal money began flowing 
in the late 1960s, it was already too late, because, as this dissertation will further explore, transit 
had already begun its inexorable decline. While TTC ridership dropped by 30% between 1953 and 
1963, a precipitous but survivable decline, American transit systems, on average, haemorrhaged 
57% of their ridership in the same period, and in many cities the figure was even worse.64 While 
ample federal capital funding was available, the new rail projects that it typically paid for had little 
broader network in which they could serve as a backbone. As a result, most were planned as little 
more than parking shuttles for commuters to an often-dwindling central business district. 
It is impossible to know for certain how Gardiner came to adopt such unorthodox views on 
transit when he did. The change does not seem to have been sparked by a singular event; he left 
no memoirs, and his biographer goes into little detail on his motivations with respect to transit. He 
may have been influenced by William McBrien, the long-time TTC head who was also a respected 
and influential Orange Conservative. Being a British Canadian, he may also have been more 
influenced by the mother country than would a similar American. London’s expansion, he once 
said, “followed the extension of the public transportation system. The motor car in England did 
not have the same revolutionary impact upon the development of their suburban municipalities as 
has been the case in America.”65  
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It may also have been simple pride, as his Metropolitan government had been placed in 
charge of the TTC and he did not want to be seen as having performed poorly at the task. The 
comparison with Moses was instructive: transit was one of the few realms of New York 
infrastructure planning that were left out of Moses’ control. Moreover, transit was a competitor to 
the toll bridges that were the key financial source of his power. When given the chance to expand 
his power by having his Triborough organization take over the subways in 1952, Moses 
uncharacteristically opposed the proposal, likely since the money-losing subways would have 
drained financial resources that he wanted to use for other projects.66 Gardiner’s position may also 
have simply been a result of his own power of observation triumphing over dogma; even by the 
1950s, it had become evident to any dispassionate observer that expressways were, as he often 
remarked, failing to live up to their promises of reducing congestion. 
 
Gardiner and Transit 
As Metro was going through its birth pangs, Gardiner was hesitant to press the issue of transit too 
hard. Suburban representatives were demanding enhanced service to their constituencies and a flat 
fare across Metro. He delayed, knowing that both measures would require substantial subsidy, and 
fearing rejection from the provincial government, which was still in thrall to the idea of transit 
self-sustainability, and which would inevitably be faced with similar subsidy demands from all 
other municipalities.67 Subsidizing transit was still, in Toronto as everywhere, anathema. Instead, 
McBrien’s policy, as Kaplan described it, was to “quiet suburban demands without actually 
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meeting them.”68 The suburban politicians were not fooled; they launched a barrage of motions to 
either abolish the commission or force it to improve suburban service. “What saved the TTC in 
1954,” Kaplan said, “was Gardiner’s ability to delay or defeat the suburban motions.69 Still, he 
struck a committee chaired by himself to study the question. Though a delaying tactic, this 
nevertheless engaged him further in the issue. 
As his speeches quoted above demonstrate, by 1955 he had become keenly focused on the 
transit question. To him, the idea of subsidy was no longer beyond the pale. In the early years of 
Metro, he secured the appointment of a long-time ally, former Toronto mayor Allan Lamport, to 
the chairmanship of the TTC. Lamport was a unique figure—he had been the first Liberal mayor 
of the city in decades, and had been a leader in loosening its astringent blue laws. He brought an 
amiable, jocular, but occasionally pugnacious personality.70 His sympathy for suburban transit 
expansion, by the standards of City politicians, made him an attractive candidate to Gardiner. 
However, Lamport also vehemently defended the long-cherished independence of the TTC, which 
left the commission out of much of Metro’s planning process in the early years, and eventually 
wore on the relationship.71  
As Gardiner took a greater interest in transit, he began to see the TTC’s independence as 
an obstacle to his plans, and he held the understandable view that if Metro was going to be 
subsidizing the TTC, it would need to take a more active role in its management. Lamport bristled, 
and mounted a campaign against his erstwhile patron.  He misjudged Gardiner as a determined 
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supporter of expressways who, if he secured control of the TTC, would doom prospects for subway 
construction.72 Instead, Gardiner proved to be an equally determined friend of transit, and he was 
able to corral suburban councillors into supporting it in a way that Lamport, inevitably associated 
with the City, could not have. 
Entreaties to Premier Frost from the long-time Liberal unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears. In 
a private briefing note in response to a letter from Lamport, T.C. Clarke, a senior advisor to the 
premier, remarked, “It would certainly appear that the T.T.C. is endeavouring to be a ‘world unto 
itself’ subject neither to the regulations of the Metropolitan Authority or for that matter to the 
regulations of the Province. Certainly, the Commission should have a certain amount of 
independence regarding their policies, etc., but surely they must be responsible to some other 
authority. Surely the Province, if not Metro, should have some jurisdiction over their methods of 
operation, particularly if the Province has the same authority over municipal functions.”73 
Lamport and Gardiner’s relationship gradually descended into sometimes absurd feuding, 
which provided ample fodder for the city’s newspapers and tarnished the TTC’s once-sterling 
reputation for good management.74 Though one magazine writer described Gardiner as the 
aggressor in most of their battles, Lamport’s own excesses did not enhance his credibility. The row 
culminated in Lamport dressing in disguise as a “tourist” to stand outside Gardiner’s office, with 
press in tow, to berate the TTC’s general manager of subway construction for daring to meet with 
the Metro chairman. Gardiner prevailed in the end, with the strong backing of good government 
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groups and much of the press, and after the province threatened to intervene in favour of Metro.75 
Lamport resigned from the TTC in 1960 to run a quixotic campaign for the Toronto mayoralty on 
an anti-Gardiner platform.76 
The comedy of the dispute disguised its importance. Though he was personally sympathetic 
to limited expansion of service to the suburbs, Lamport represented two factions that were 
perpetually hostile to the idea. Firstly, he represented the TTC administration, which was highly 
conservative and keen on maintaining its “efficiency” and financial position above all else. It had 
long opposed expansion of its service area through annexation, preferring to remain in the 
comparatively clement environment of the neighbourhoods built before the automobile. Secondly, 
he represented City transit riders, who viewed the provision of suburban service as a drain on the 
authority’s resources, which would be better spent on their already busy routes. These forces would 
remain strong to the present day, but through Lamport’s defeat and the imposition of Metro 
Council’s dominance of the TTC, Gardiner set the stage for the radical expansion of transit service 
to the suburbs that placed Toronto on a very different path from most American cities.  
In 1955, Gardiner lobbied Frost to allow Metro to provide an ostensibly one-time $2.5 
million subsidy to the TTC in order to mitigate a fare hike, making the case to him that the only 
alternative was to raise fares, which had been proven to drive passengers away and put transit 
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systems into a vicious cycle in the United States.77 In response to Gardiner’s letter, Frost’s advisors 
produced a memorandum opposing the idea. “Officials of the Department of Municipal Affairs 
believe that if the Metropolitan Council is permitted to make even one grant to cover the deficit of 
the Toronto Transit Commission, […] the municipality will be given the right to underwrite the 
deficits from then on.” They warned that this would destroy the political independence of the 
Commission—maintained even throughout the Depression—and result in the addition of 
unprofitable service in response to political pressure.78 They were not wrong in their forecast, but 
clinging to the old ways of operating was proven to be fatal to transit in many American cities. 
Despite the opposition, Gardiner’s persuasiveness and relationship with the premier enabled him 
to prevail. In so doing, he broke the dam that had long barred governments from subvention of 
public transit, as Frost’s advisers had predicted. 
The idea of direct provincial funding for transit was a bridge too far for Frost, however, 
and even Gardiner struggled for years before persuading him otherwise. “Our money for building 
highways comes from gasoline tax,” Frost wrote to an adviser after one of Gardiner’s appeals. 
“Subways would be of no revenue to us whatever and could never be, and in fact we would be 
subsidizing people not to use our highways, and accordingly not to pay us any revenue. This has 
no appeal to me.”79  
Gardiner also mounted a fierce campaign for federal subsidy of transit, a theme that would 
often emerge in Toronto transit discussion—raised not infrequently by provincial politicians 
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seeking to spread the financial burden.  He repeated the call in speech after speech, though to no 
avail—Canadian federal governments had never had a constitutional role in local affairs, and his 
persuasive charm was less effective on the Liberal federal government of Prime Minister Louis St. 
Laurent and his successor John Diefenbaker—a Conservative, but of a rival faction to Gardiner—
than it usually was on his old friend Premier Frost.80 
For the moment, Metro was on its own in its efforts to get its next subway project built—
an east-west route to complement the north-south Yonge line. The City had long supported the 
idea, but suburban politicians were far more sceptical of a project that they saw as primarily 
benefitting City residents. They were still demanding a single fare for the entire region in exchange 
for their assent, viewing the double fare that outer suburban riders paid to get downtown as 
punitive. Without that fare supplement, however, any hope of supporting the TTC’s expenses out 
of the farebox was doomed. Gardiner temporized for several years, hoping for salvation from levels 
of government above, until 1957 when he became determined to see the $150 million project 
through to completion. He declared that he would “pound this thing through with an iron fist.”81  
The decision to add a new subway line in 1958 was a decisive moment in the region’s 
transit history. The first subway had been approved with the belief that it would be self-
supporting—effectively a continuation of the way that transit had been run before the war. This 
time, it was different. Transit was no longer a profitable venture. All recognized that if the subway 
were to be built, it would have to be with direct government support. Transit had shifted from 
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being the principal means of moving people about the city, to being seen as an alternative to the 
automobile, which was choking cities with its insatiable demands for more road lanes and more 
parking spaces. Most North American cities waited until a decade or more later, when their transit 
system had shrivelled to next-to-nothing, but Toronto embraced transit’s new role while it was still 
a viable mode of transportation. To a considerable extent, it can thank Gardiner for the shift. 
The “Great Subway Debate” was, a contemporaneous source wrote with some 
exaggeration, “the biggest and longest row in Toronto’s stormy political history.”82 As befits such 
a lengthy disputation, there were several distinct elements in contention. Suburban opposition had 
to be overcome, but even before that could be resolved, Metro’s professional planners sparred with 
the TTC’s administrators over the choice of route for the new line. The dispute portended a theme 
that would become common in the decades to come, as it pitted youthful planners armed with a 
1950s version of “big data” against the long-time transit administrators who relied on their instinct 
and expertise gleaned from years of running a transit system. Murray Jones, a man barely in his 
thirties who was one of few Canadians at the time with a university degree in planning, led the 
former. Though Gardiner’s oft-stated scepticism of planners made him initially contemptuous, the 
Chairman eventually came to respect Jones. The planners analyzed desire lines using computers—
extraordinary technology in 1957—and determined that the best route for a new subway would be 
shaped as a ‘U’, replacing the busy streetcar along Bloor Street and Danforth Avenue on the eastern 
and western ends of the route, but turning south to run along the long-planned subway corridor of 
Queen Street. They were backed enthusiastically by good-government groups like the Bureau of 
Municipal Research, which unsurprisingly was attracted to their aura of technical planning 
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expertise.83 Despite their pretentions to rational dispassion, their recommendations also betrayed 
a different philosophical approach to transit planning. They intended to divert commuters 
travelling long distances from the suburbs into downtown from the highways, and they believed 
in anticipating future growth, or lack thereof.84  
The TTC’s administrators, as John Clare described in Maclean’s magazine, viewed the 
youthful Jones and his assistant, the European émigré intellectual Hans Blumenfeld, “much the 
same way veteran bush pilots might look at jet jockeys who had just won their wings. The TTC 
men had a hard time to keep from looking smug when they reminded their listeners that they knew 
nothing about electronic gadgets; all they knew was how to move people from one place to 
another.”85 The Planning Board’s wasn’t helped when the TTC officials were able to spot obvious 
flaws in the sophisticated computer model—flaws that had conveniently bolstered the Planning 
Board’s case for the ‘U’.86 
Backed by sympathetic newspapers and the Commission led by Allan Lamport, and armed 
with their own consultant, Norman Wilson, TTC staff preferred the tried-and-true method of 
replacing an already busy streetcar route along Bloor Street and Danforth Avenue with a subway. 
There was no need to figure out where passengers might want to travel in the future—it was merely 
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necessary to look at where they were travelling now.87 As the TTC’s staff noted, the ‘U’ would 
leave the Bloor streetcar route woefully overcrowded, with no prospect of relief for many years, 
and its aging infrastructure would need to be rehabilitated at considerable cost in the meantime.88  
The crux of the debate, the pro-transit Star claimed in a contemporaneous editorial, was 
about the future viability of transit as a major means of transportation in the region. The planners, 
the transit-sympathetic newspaper argued, did not believe that ridership would substantially 
increase in the future, and so they preferred a route that effectively accomplished both tasks at 
once: serving commuters from the northeast and northwest, and serving downtown east-west trips. 
One of the primary criteria governing their planning was that the new subway network “Should be 
able to operate as a satisfactory system, if future extension should prove to be not warranted.”89  
The planners did not see the subway as being part of an anywhere-to-anywhere transit 
network, but rather as a means of accommodating downtown-bound commuting traffic. “The sole 
justification for, and primary function of a rapid transit system in the Toronto Metropolitan Area,” 
they wrote, “is to serve movement between the medium density residential area [meaning the 
prewar neighbourhoods of the City of Toronto and adjacent municipalities] and the downtown 
area.”90 
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The TTC’s vision was to replace one streetcar route as part of a longer-term vision of 
replacing a number of its busiest surface routes with subways, producing a grid that they argued 
would both generate and accommodate escalating ridership as a true anywhere-to-anywhere 
network.92 The planners’ option, focused almost entirely on downtown commuters, would force 
riders travelling east-west across the city to take a long detour to the south through downtown, or 
to transfer twice from the subway to the old Bloor streetcar and then back onto the subway. 
By early 1958, the two options had been refined into alternatives that would be presented 
to Metro Council—effectively meaning Gardiner—for final adjudication. The TTC favoured a 
$191 million ($1.721 billion in 2020 dollars) project, including the cost of new subway trains, to 
build 12 km east-west route along Bloor and Danforth, intersecting the existing subway about two 
kilometres north of the downtown core. The main route was accompanied by an extension of the 
Yonge line looping back to the north along University Avenue, a wide boulevard a few blocks to 
the west of Yonge Street, to meet the Bloor subway and provide additional capacity for downtown-
bound riders. The Planning Board had by then dropped their plans for the to turn east and west 
once it had arrived at Bloor and Danforth, which had made the two options identical in length, in 
favour of a simple ‘U’ from Christie and Bloor to Greenwood and Danforth via Queen Street in 
the heart of downtown. They acknowledged that the central section on Bloor and Danforth should 
be prioritized over the eastern and western spurs. The shorter ‘U’ plan was $38 million cheaper 
than the TTC’s Bloor-Danforth-University plan, but the lower cost was partly offset by the need 
to invest $13 million in rebuilding the Bloor-Danforth streetcar infrastructure for additional years 
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of service. Jones suggested a “compromise” plan that would involve stretching construction over 
fifteen years instead of ten and would involve the completion of both routes, minus the University 
line that closely paralleled the existing Yonge subway. The TTC was dismissive, since it would 
not provide much-needed relief to the Yonge subway in time, or replace the Bloor streetcar before 
its tracks had fallen apart. Jones’ proposal must certainly be counted as a major missed opportunity 
to get the whole much-needed downtown network built by 1973, though its $268 million cost was 
well beyond Metro’s $200 million budget.93 
Gardiner’s resolution of the conundrum was closer in form to the ideal of rational planning 
as laid out by Banfield than that author’s real-world examples would have predicted, though the 
ultimate decision was made by a politician and not a dispassionate expert, and the decision was 
ratified by classical political horse-trading.94 Both groups would be given an opportunity to present 
their arguments and data to the Metro Council, which would make the final decision between the 
two alternatives. It would not prove to be easy. Both brought mountains of charts and other 
presentation materials, and after two days of disputation, there was a deadlock. It was, like many 
decisions, to be left to Gardiner. He spent the Christmas holidays studying fifteen pounds of 
reports, and by the New Year he had shifted from his previous inclination toward Jones’ ‘U’ route 
to a full-throated endorsement of the TTC’s favoured alternative. The council, inevitably, followed 
suit and the matter was decided.95 
The decision to respect its counsel over Metro’s professional planners seemed to portend a 
renewal of the TTC’s independence.  It was not to be. Though Gardiner had favoured the TTC’s 
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plan on the merits, it was his decision and he had no interest in relinquishing Metro’s authority if 
it was going to be writing the cheques for new transit infrastructure. As Lamport accurately 
assessed, the TTC, by then, was “just a rubber stamp for Fred Gardiner’s decisions.”96 
Once the route had been decided, the challenge was corralling the suburban councillors 
behind the subway project, and behind paying 60% of its cost from the Metro budget.  By late 
1957, the City of Toronto’s council, theretofore somewhat divided, was unanimously in support.97 
However, suburban support was still less universally enthusiastic, seemingly setting the stage for 
a classic city-suburban battle. Reeve Marie Curtis of the tiny streetcar suburb of Long Branch was 
among the most vocal opponents, and was no stranger to strong rhetoric. “Hitler also tried to stamp 
out people for what they believed,” she once declared in reference to her opposition to the subway 
project, “but he didn’t succeed.”98  She believed that her community would see little benefit from 
the new subway line, and bristled at the idea that it would be funded by her constituents’ taxes 
while they had to pay a double fare to ride downtown.99 This was in striking contrast to the form 
of debate in the United States at the time. Suburban municipalities there weren’t asked to pay for 
urban transit in the 1950s, and therefore had little ability to ask for their service or fares to be 
improved. 
Gardiner produced a 4,500-word memorandum to council, in which he laid out all of the 
arguments for the subway, which set off fourteen hours of heated debate. Accusations were hurled 
about, decrying the unfairness to the suburbs and the perilous expense. Reeve Albert Campbell of 
Scarborough joined Marie Curtis and other suburbanites to oppose the project unless they first 
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secured a commitment to a Metro-wide flat fare. Ford Brand, a Toronto controller, opposed the 
project on cost grounds. John Clare in Maclean’s wrote that despite his labour union background, 
Brand had “a manner, when faced with civic expenditure, that suggests a branch-bank manager 
listening to an old horseplayer’s application for a loan.” Even Nathan Phillips, ostensibly the 
subway’s strongest supporter, became a stumbling block when he refused to support a commercial 
property surtax—“a nasty word,” as he described it—to fund the subway, and also objected to 
Gardiner’s demand for a binding commitment that the city would rezone the predominantly low-
rise residential neighbourhoods 1,000 feet on either side of the route for high-density 
redevelopment. Phillips preferred to borrow the entire cost. “Let it be paid by future generations,” 
he proposed. “The ones without a vote,” Gardiner retorted.100 Clare described the dispute as an 
example of Phillips’ “well-known reluctance to take any legislative action that might make the 
voters annoyed with him.”101  
Gardiner, however, was not going to take no for an answer. "If you got a transfusion from 
me today, you'd freeze to death," he said ominously.102 But his victory was a classic demonstration 
of the art of political horse-trading. Albert Campbell’s support was bought with an ambiguous 
promise of future considerations for his borough, a promise Gardiner certainly had the power to 
keep. Nathan Phillips characteristically wilted under Gardiner’s glare. Ford Brand was placated 
with a modest increase in the TTC’s share of the project’s costs. With a keen eye on the negative 
impact to his future mayoral ambitions from opposition to a project that was very popular in the 
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City of Toronto, he decided to accept “the will of council,” as he put it. Gardiner’s demand for 
blanket upzoning was not taken up, to his subsequent irritation, but the City did rezone many areas, 
particularly in the central part of the route. Gardiner’s refusal to budge on the flat TTC fare, the 
nearly $4 million annual cost of which he deemed unacceptable, left Marie Curtis obdurately 
opposed. But by half-past-midnight, he had carried the day, with a vote of 18-2. “It’s a Frederick 
Gardiner Subway,” declared Globe and Mail opinion writer Ronald Haggart.103 
Even with Metro Council on side, the project was impossible without the assent of Leslie 
Frost.  Even just to borrow the funds required, the provincial cabinet would need to give 
permission, which was quickly obtained. A bigger challenge was overcoming the premier’s 
disinclination to provide provincial support for transit. Gardiner knew that direct operating funding 
support was out of the question, not least because it would mean the need for the province to 
provide similar funding to all the municipalities across Ontario.104 Capital funding was seemingly 
no more readily available, but Gardiner did not stop lobbying his old friend. Finally, in 1961, he 
broke through and Frost agreed to provide a $60 million loan, at cost, for the subway project. This 
allowed Metro to avoid flooding the municipal loan market and to pay a lower interest rate, which 
enabled completion of the project to be accelerated by three years, from 1969 to 1966.105 
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By 1965, the cost of the project had risen to $277.7 million. Metro would contribute $195.5 
million. Of that amount, $86.7 million would be obtained through a two-mill property tax levy, 
$9.3 million by the sale of surplus lands, and $21.4 million from provincial subsidy. The remaining 
$78 million would be borrowed and paid back out of general Metro revenues. To reduce the interest 
rate paid, $60 million of the Metro debentures were purchased by the province, while $29.5 million 
was borrowed through a federal program (of which 25% was expected to be forgiven). The TTC 
was expected to pay back $82.2 million in additional Metro borrowing out of its farebox.106 
Some respected local transit industry figures, including Richard Soberman, Wilson’s heir 
as Toronto’s transportation guru, have suggested that Gardiner and Metro erred in choosing the 
Bloor-Danforth alignment over the “Big ‘U’” because it forced the large number of riders destined 
to the financial district, especially in the peak period, to transfer.107 Over time, this has led to 
serious crowding on both the Yonge line south of Bloor, and in particular at the Bloor-Yonge 
transfer station. These criticisms are well-argued and indisputable, but the advantages of the Bloor-
Danforth alignment outweighed the pitfalls. A ‘U’ alignment would have created a very radial 
system, ideal for peak period commuters to the financial district, but at enormous cost to the utility 
of the broader network. Bloor-Danforth served downtown-bound riders imperfectly but 
adequately, while also providing a very well-placed and direct route for the large proportion of 
riders who are not destined for downtown. As Jane Jacobs and activists David and Nadine Nowlan 
once wrote, “The Yonge and Bloor-Danforth lines have been successes because they are 18-hours-
a-day, seven-days-a-week lines," rather than primarily commuter routes.108 
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Choosing the ‘U’ would have been an avowal of fatalism—an admission that the transit 
system could serve as little more than a means of relieving rush-hour highway congestion. The 
choice of the Bloor-Danforth alignment maintained the TTC as a true, anywhere-to-anywhere 
transit system, rather than simply a conduit for suburban commuters to downtown. 
 
Figure 7: TTC Interlining Plan109 
Many of the problems with the current arrangement were, moreover, entirely avoidable. 
The TTC designed the system on the assumption that both Yonge and Bloor-Danforth would be 
operated as a single interlined route, with trains from the Bloor-Danforth route turning to run south 
on University Avenue and then looping back north onto the existing Yonge line. This complex 
approach came at considerable inconvenience to operations, since it meant that delays at any point 
quickly spread to the whole system. Richard Soberman, Wilson’s heir as Toronto’s transit 
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engineering guru, has said that it also provoked significant objections from subway operators, since 
many of them ended up being forced to finish their shifts at a different station than where they 
started.110 Interlining was abandoned after only a few months of operation, in favour of operating 
the Bloor-Danforth and Yonge-University corridors as entirely separate lines. Because the TTC 
had expected that most riders would just stay on their trains to ride downtown along University 
rather than transferring, the Yonge-Bloor interchange station was built with platforms of standard 
width. With hindsight, the station platforms could have been built much wider, mitigating 
crowding issues and allowing for wider staircases between levels, and it could have even included 
the “Spanish solution” in which there are platforms on both sides of the train so that both sets of 
doors can be used simultaneously. The Yonge line station eventually had its platform widened in 
the early 1990s, but designing it for heavy transfer loads from the outset could have also allowed 
the station to be shifted further north, so that riders were not dumped onto the far northern end of 
the platform as they are today. The Bloor-Danforth line station retains its original narrow island, 
which is plainly inadequate, but with better foresight the platform could have been built as wide 
as needed to accommodate the transferring crowds.  
St. George station, where the University line meets the Bloor-Danforth, offered even 
greater possibilities since both were designed and built simultaneously. The two stations are 
already stacked and parallel, so it would have been trivial to adjust the track alignment so that the 
vast majority of transferring passengers (eastbound to southbound and westbound to northbound) 
would simply have to walk across the platform rather than needing to crowd onto the stairs. This 
layout is common practice at many subway interchange stations, like Lionel-Groulx in Montreal 
or Mehringdamm in Berlin.  
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The planners of the day also could not have foreseen that an east-west subway through the 
downtown core would not be built soon after. If anything, they were likely anticipating that the 
choice of a Bloor-Danforth alignment would make a Queen subway inevitable soon after. The 
latter remained on the books for decades, but was continually postponed in favour of other projects 
or as a result of funding scarcity. Given ongoing crowding, the project has been revived in the 21st 
century, but remains unbuilt. 
The Bloor-Danforth subway also pioneered the immensely successful TTC model of 
directly integrating a bus terminal into subway stations, so that passengers transferring to and from 
connecting bus routes do not need to pass through any fare gates and can wait in relatively weather 
protected comfort. While the Yonge subway included a few of these terminals at its northern 
stations, the Bloor-Danforth project solidified the standard with their inclusion at most stations—
a model that would be continued into the twenty-first century. This approach, cited by both Mees 
and Cervero as key to Toronto’s transit success, makes connecting between modes both much 
more convenient and much more intuitive.111 
 




Figure 8: TTC Subway Station Bus Terminal112 
 
Months after his subway victory, Gardiner provoked considerable shock by announcing his 
retirement, at the height of his powers. A series of illnesses had taken their toll, and he cleared out 
his desk at the modest Metro headquarters—soon to be replaced by a futuristic new structure 
shared with the City of Toronto that was a fitting symbol of the political changing of the guard—
in January of 1962. He returned to a thriving business career, and rarely again involved himself in 
municipal politics, aside from commentaries on the structure of metropolitan government as its 
reform was periodically contemplated. A telling exception was in 1963, when he successfully 
lobbied the new premier, John Robarts—this time with the help of the old transit sceptic, Leslie 
Frost—for what he had never been able to obtain when in office: direct grants for subway 
 




construction. Metro was to receive one third of the cost of roadbed construction, excluding items 
like track, rolling stock, and stations. The curious formula was because the grants were issued 
under the existing highway funding legislation—the roadbed was considered to be equivalent to a 
highway. The amounts were modest—the Star’s coverage emphasized that it wouldn’t even avert 
a fare hike—but the precedent was monumental.113 It was the first time the province had directly 
funded transit, and it would certainly not be the last. 
 
It was a long way from the old vision of transit as a self-sustaining business, which 
Gardiner had abandoned with little chagrin. First, he had guided Metro Council, and secured 
provincial assent, to provide a modest subsidy to operations for the enhancement of service while 
avoiding a fare increase. Then, he secured support for funding the majority of the cost of a new 
subway from the Metro tax base, unlike its predecessor, which was supposed to funded by the 
TTC’s farebox. As a result, the idea that government needed to fund transit in order to keep it 
competitive with the automobile would spread to the point that even operations would come to be 
regularly subsidized, again with Metro first jumping in and then the province following. 
The precedent established by these policies put in place during the early years of Metro, 
most notably the decision to subsidize so transit could continue expanding to compete with the 
automobile in newly developed areas, was vital to the survival of transit in its darkest hour. TTC 
ridership reached its nadir in the late 1950s and after that it stabilized and then began a steady rise. 
By contrast, even New York’s subway ridership continued to decline until 1977; in other cities, 
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the decline was even more precipitous.114 Gardiner had effectively threaded the needle. He secured 
approval of the new subway through implicit promises of improved service and lower fares for 
suburban areas, both of which were implemented in the following years. In so doing, he set the 
stage for the region’s transit revival. 
Certainly, Gardiner was no perfect friend of transit. Any observer could find numerous 
quotations with full-throated endorsements of new highways. He delayed Bloor-Danforth subway 
construction for the early years of Metro while his first two expressway projects were built—he 
was always very conservative in the amount he permitted the Metro Council to borrow for projects, 
and the demand in the early years for funding for all sorts of construction, ranging from schools to 
sewage treatment plants, was near-inexhaustible.115 Throughout the period, though, he was 
pressuring the higher levels of government for funding out of their more diverse tax bases—
municipalities were limited almost exclusively to the property tax—with limited success. He 
eventually proceeded with the project anyway, in 1957, and a few years later, his lobbying helped 
secure the funds from the province needed to accelerate construction. 
Gardiner was also certainly not alone in his advocacy for transit. McBrien had done much 
to establish the credibility of the TTC as a well-run organization, and to make the case for subway 
construction. Many of the members of Metro Council from the City of Toronto long favoured 
subway projects, as did newspapers like the liberal Toronto Daily Star, which hectored Gardiner 
for delays and prevarications on subway construction throughout the 1950s.116 There were also 
various community organizations supporting transit expansion and lobbying for provincial 
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funding, many of them cultivated by McBrien over many years.117 The Property Owners 
Association of Toronto, for example, adopted a resolution in 1956 calling for a plan to avoid “the 
unnecessary extravagance of expressways which past experience has shown simply to end up in a 
shifting of traffic bottlenecks from one place to another.”118 It was Gardiner, however, with his 
uniquely forceful personality, his close ties to the provincial government and Conservative 
establishment, and his reputation for fiscal probity, who had the power and credibility to prevent 
transit expansion from being starved for funds or bogged down in endless city-suburban discord. 
Despite his contributions to transit, Gardiner is best known for the expressway projects he 
championed. Two were built on his watch, and though they radiated from downtown to the west 
and northeast, these projects were low-hanging fruit in expressway terms, being located in an 
undeveloped river valley and along the then-largely-industrial lakeshore. They required minimal 
land clearance. The remainder of the expressway plans were far more destructive, requiring 
hacking through established residential neighbourhoods with Robert Moses’ proverbial meat-axe. 
By far the most famous was the Spadina Expressway, which was to cut through a historic 
neighbourhood home to much of the city’s intelligentsia, including none other than Jane Jacobs. 
He pushed its approval through council as one of his last acts, though construction on its 
destructive urban section hadn’t even begun a decade later. Spadina is perhaps better seen as a last 
vestige of his earlier highway-oriented views. His speeches clearly argued that transit provided 
better return on investment than highways, yet he still maintained that the initial network of 
expressways—one of the main reasons for the formation of the Metro government in the first 
place—was essential. Though his true thought process is impossible to ascertain conclusively, 
 
117 Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, 131–32; “Open Letter: Proposal For Two Diagonal Subway Routes.” 
118 “Resolution No. 4: Traffic Plan” (Property Owners Association of Toronto, May 9, 1956), Municipal 
Administration Correspondence Files - TTC (RG19-43), Archives of Ontario. 
128 
 
Gardiner may have been unwilling to discard the highway plans that had been a key impetus for 
the creation of his metropolitan government, even though he had come to question the value of 
expressway construction. 
Gardiner delayed, leaving Spadina’s approval to the last days before his retirement, and the 
other highway projects deferred to a later date. These were hardly the acts of a self-proclaimed 
“bulldozer” who wanted to get them built at all costs. Gardiner—tribune of small businesses and 
homeowners—balked at the idea of displacing thousands of members of his base. In the end, none 
of the expressways were completed after the original two. Gardiner’s plans for transit expansion 
survived him, but his expressway plans did not.119 
Though his views were radically pro-transit for his time, this is not how he is remembered 
in the literature. Perhaps it is too difficult to imagine a cigar-chomping Conservative Orange 
businessman with the nickname of “Big Daddy” as a pro-transit, anti-car radical. It is perhaps more 
comfortable to classify him with Robert Moses and other apostles of the automobile.  
Local transit engineer-turned-writer Ed Levy, in his book examining the history of Toronto 
transit plans, summarizes his role simply: “During the mid-1950s Gardiner sparred memorably 
and incessantly with Toronto Mayor Allan Lamport, a tireless proponent of early implementation 
of the east-west Bloor-Danforth subway. This was in opposition to the former’s unerring support 
for first completing key sections of a U.S.-style urban freeway (expressway) network for the newly 
constituted metropolitan corporation.”120 This choice to ignore Gardiner’s reversal, and therefore 
much of Gardiner’s legacy, has gravely distorted Toronto’s understanding of its own urban history, 
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which tends to embrace an American-style Manichaean struggle between transit-opposing 
suburbanites and transit-supporting urbanites. 
Prominent local urbanist, writer, and politician John Sewell scarcely mentions Gardiner in 
his seminal book The Shape of the City, which has profoundly shaped the way Toronto views its 
planning of that era. Instead, Sewell claims that suburban politicians, with whom Gardiner would 
certainly be included, were opposed to transit expansion. "City politicians found (almost to their 
surprise) that their preferred transportation option, public transit, was not readily supported by 
their counterparts in the suburbs."121 He wrote in 1978 that public transit was "one of those great 
discoveries that progressives in local politics have made in the last dozen years," ignoring that 
Gardiner, not someone that he would have considered a progressive, had been promoting transit 
for a decade longer.122 
Sewell should be quoted at length, as his view precisely encapsulates the conventional 
wisdom about transit in Toronto. “The city built before the Second World War was just about 
perfect for public transit,” in terms of built form, street grid, density, and mixed uses. “The modern 
suburb, by contrast, was not so amenable to transit. Low densities produced few potential riders 
for each mile travelled,” and long journeys and a discontinuous road system made transit route 
planning challenging. “As a result, the rational suburban resident used a private car for 
transportation needs,” he declared. This dissertation will establish that Toronto’s suburbs have 
managed to generate substantial ridership despite imperfect land use, and the hundreds of 
thousands of Toronto suburbanites who use transit every day would no doubt be startled to discover 
their irrationality. Sewell fixated on a simple dichotomy between suburbanites and urbanites—
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“Suburban politicians wanted public money put into roads, whereas city politicians preferred 
transit”—even though there are countless examples of suburban politicians, Gardiner foremost 
among them, agitating for transit system expansion.123 From suburbanites, many Toronto transit 
advocates refused to take yes for an answer. Their understanding of their own city was, seemingly, 
more shaped by the literature on the decline of transit in the United States than on observation of 
what was actually happening a few kilometres away. 
Popular memory of Gardiner is much the same. In The Globe and Mail’s lengthy obituary 
after his death in 1983, his catalytic role in the construction of the Bloor-Danforth subway, a 
project similar in scale to the St. Lawrence Seaway, was entirely ignored. By contrast, ample space 
was given to his support of highway projects. The only mention of transit at all was to state—in 
the last substantive paragraph of the article—that he was “an early advocate of the development 
of the commuter rail system.”124 Likewise, the Toronto Star’s obituaries made not a mention of 
his role in transit, other than to note a quotation—“You can't derrick the people out of their 
automobiles and put them on the subway"—without mentioning the following sentence, in which 
Gardiner argued that drivers had to be coaxed out of their cars with good transit service instead.125 
A 1992 retrospective on Gardiner’s death in the Star described his legacy as encompassing his 
eponymous expressway “and many others like the Don Valley Parkway, the Metro police force, 
an amalgamated parks system and public works projects such as pumping plants, roads and 
sewers.” Transit merited not a mention.126 In 2012, long-time Toronto journalist and transit expert 
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Stephen Wickens wrote a retrospective on the opening of the Bloor-Danforth-University subway, 
and described Gardiner as a figure who “would prefer that expressways get priority” over the 
subway.127 
Only Gardiner’s biographer, Timothy Colton, and Francis Frisken, a York University 
professor of urban studies, have written of Gardiner’s role in the region’s transit system. Even 
Colton, who, unlike most, writes favourably of Gardiner’s role in transit, writes that he didn’t do 
nearly enough to make transit strong. But in the North American context, Toronto distantly 
outpaced its American counterparts. 
As Caro showed, a single individual with a talent for accumulating power and a reputation 
for expertise could profoundly shape an urban region in the era of rational planning. While Moses 
used his power to marginalize public transportation in favour of the automobile, Gardiner saw the 
weaknesses of a car-dominated transportation system, and, to as great an extent as could have been 
possible for a single individual, directed Toronto onto a different path.  
The 1950s and early 1960s were a period of transit collapse in much of North America. 
Transit system after transit system faced financial crisis as a result of a vicious cycle of declining 
revenues, fare hikes, service cuts, and disappearing ridership. Gardiner used the power of the new 
metropolitan system, which he had helped to create, in order to arrest that cycle in Toronto. He 
won over sceptics, both urban and suburban, to the idea of subsidizing transit to avoid the need for 
radical fare increases and to permit expansion of transit service into the suburbs. Later, he secured 
the support of his council and, through his unique lobbying power, the provincial government for 
the construction and funding of a major new subway expansion. Gardiner had shared the 
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fascination with highways and other emblems of modernity, and the old conservative businessman 
had long believed in the importance of the TTC’s fiscal self-sustainability. At the decisive moment, 
however, he set aside these beliefs in favour of embracing transit as a long-term solution to the 
region’s transportation problems. In so doing, he allowed the TTC to survive its most perilous 






Chapter 4: TTC in the Early Years of Metro 
“We found that if you wait until you have an overall plan for everything you will 
wind up with nothing,” Chairman Gardiner said in an address on Metro’s progress in 
1958.1  This encapsulated the approach to transit that Metro pursued in the early years. 
There was no comprehensive plan that guided the expansion of transit into the suburbs—
such a plan would not come until the following decade, and relatively little of it was put 
into effect. Instead, the expansion took place as a result of a series of incremental, 
generally political decisions to equalize service and fares throughout the TTC’s newly 
expanded service area.  
Torontonians in the early years of Metro viewed transit as a public service.  
Suburbanites with little transit access viewed themselves as being cheated out of a public 
amenity to which they were entitled. Americans, at that time, viewed transit instead as a 
business. It was expected to operate profitably, and if it did not, it was the fault of the 
private sector monopolists who often owned the transit system. The public subsidization 
of transit was seen as a last resort, and all efforts were usually made to ensure that such 
subsidy was kept to a minimum—not least by minimizing service to new suburbs, which 
was expected to be unremunerative. This sent many American transit systems into a 
vicious spiral of declining ridership, service cuts, and fare increases to make up lost 
revenue. A genuinely regional approach to transit would not come for decades after the 
1950s suburban boom in most American metropolitan areas—far too late for transit, as 
there was little left for the regional government to administer, and suburbanites had 
established firmly auto-oriented travel patterns. 
 
1 Frederick G. Gardiner, “Metro’s Progress 1958.” 
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Transit in the 1950s was an aging, declining industry—one that, to many, was to be 
relegated by the automobile to the same fate as the horse and buggy. The decaying, 
crowded streetcars of the war years generated little nostalgia. As Lewis Mumford wrote 
in 1958, “The current objection to mass transportation comes chiefly from the fact that it 
has been allowed to decay: this lapse itself reflects the general blight of the central areas. 
In order to maintain profits, or in many cases to reduce deficits, rates have been raised, 
services have decreased, and equipment has become obsolete, without being replaced and 
improved.”2 Since the 1980s, the effects of speculator-driven short-termism on American 
business has become a frequent topic of academic and popular discussion.3 As early as 
the 1950s, however, the transit business was prey to corporate raiders, like Louis Wolfson 
and O. Roy Chalk, whose tactics of extracting capital from undervalued businesses in 
declining industries would be quite familiar to raiders of a later generation, like Carl Icahn 
and Frank Lorenzo. Burdened with ownership that had limited interest in the social role 
of transit, as well as by the debt often accumulated to pay for their acquisition, many 
American transit companies were in a poor position to compete with federally funded 
expressways, and to expand their services to the areas where most population growth was 
occurring. 
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In Toronto, by contrast, the TTC had been in public hands since the 1920s. After 
1954, it was controlled by an ambitious and forward-looking new metropolitan 
government that was investing heavily in new infrastructure and for which the transit 
system was one of its keystone services. Nevertheless, the TTC’s turnaround was not 
immediately apparent. Transit ridership continued to decline into the 1960s, reaching its 
post-Depression nadir in 1961. The turning of the decade, however, marked a turning 
point for transit. The change came slowly, almost imperceptibly at first. The parades and 
concerts marking the opening of the Yonge Subway had not been able to arrest the tide of 
declining ridership, at least outside the new line’s narrow corridor, and pessimism 
reigned—not least among the expert planners. 
As the Star wrote in a 1958 editorial, “If subways are built, will the people use 
them?” the editorial asked. “The planning board staff answers with an emphatic 'no'," 
citing the recent decline in TTC ridership and similar experiences in American cities. They 
argued that auto ownership and low suburban population density would depress transit 
ridership and, incorrectly as it turned out, they forecasted flat ridership in the years to 
follow.4 It was entirely in keeping with the dominant planning ideas of the time, as 
implemented by experts like Robert Moses, Ed Bacon, Harland Bartholomew, and others, 
all of whom were cynical about transit’s enduring viability in an era where most families 
could afford a car. But the Star, citing Wilson and the TTC, pointed out that the Yonge 
Subway disproves their case, in a striking example of observation coming into conflict 
with theory. While the planning experts suggested that nothing could draw people out of 
their cars, the TTC aptly pointed out that the Yonge Subway had resulted in a 44% 
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increase in the share of transit's share of traffic from the north during peak hours, while 
automobile traffic had declined by 1.6%. At the same time, transit traffic from the east, 
which was served only by streetcars, declined while the number of cars rose. A network of 
ubiquitous subways could not be the savior of transit, however, as no new lines were 
scheduled for completion until the late 1960s. Even then, most of Metro would remain 
beyond the reach of the subway system.5 
The enhancement of suburban transit was a vexing problem for the TTC. On the 
one hand, the TTC perceived its fiscal self-sustainability as the cornerstone of its 
institutional independence, and new services in relatively low-density and auto-oriented 
areas were considered to be a financial burden that could require subsidy, which would 
in turn provide space for political interference in the Commission’s operations. On the 
other hand, with the suburban municipalities coming to house the majority of the Metro 
population, and given their representatives’ power on Metro Council, outright rejection 
of suburbanites’ demands for more favourable transit policy could result in Metro 
Council, with provincial support, acting to erode or even abolish the TTC’s legislated 
autonomy. The effort to strike the correct balance to serve the TTC’s institutional interests 
would guide the Commission’s actions throughout the first years of Metro. 
Initially, the TTC followed William McBrien’s policy of very cautious growth, but 
as suburban pressure grew and the TTC’s independence was imperiled, the TTC relented 
and implemented an aggressive expansion of suburban service. When the new routes’ 
ridership and financial performance significantly exceeded expectations, the stage was set 
for ever-larger expansions of suburban transit service.   
 
5 “Subways: Metro’s Billion Dollar Issue.” 
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The success of transit expansion came despite many obstacles. Metro was investing 
heavily in steadily widening and connecting its arterial roads, as well as in building its 
first expressways. The latter received 50 percent provincial funding—not quite the 90 
percent available from the federal government in the United States under the Interstate 
Highway Act, but still sufficient to get many projects underway. The Lakeshore—later 
Gardiner—Expressway ran, as its initial name indicated, along the lake shore connecting 
the Queen Elizabeth Way, which ran from Hamilton to an abrupt end at the western limits 
of the City of Toronto, to the downtown core. Construction began in 1955, as one of the 
new metropolitan government’s first major projects, and it was completed in 1964.6 The 
Don Valley Parkway, approved in 1958, ran northeast from a connection with the 
Gardiner at the southeastern corner of downtown to the Highway 401 bypass across the 
northern edge of the urban area. It opened in stages from 1961 to 1966.7 The two 
expressways were intended to be the first phases of a comprehensive grid of expressways 
across Metro, including a full loop around the downtown core. 
Planners to the present day have consistently maintained the importance of land 
use on transit ridership, but Toronto offered few signs for optimism there either.  As 
writer and former mayor of Toronto John Sewell described, "Without exception, 
development stuck within the precepts of modern planning. Residential form followed 
Don Mills,” the city’s first and most famous suburban new town.8 E.P. Taylor, who 
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controlled Canada’s most prominent business conglomerate of the postwar era, Argus 
Corporation, acquired over two-thousand contiguous acres just to the north-east of the 
existing city in the Township of North York. He charged prominent international planners 
with developing plans for the area, and they incorporated all of the dominant planning 
ideas of the era.9 It consisted of four quadrants of single-use residential neighbourhoods 
on curvilinear streets, centred on a shopping mall at the main arterial intersection. “The 
curvy streets now seen on maps of Toronto,” wrote Sewell, “mark the break in the mid-
1950s as the influence of Don Mills becomes apparent, contrasting with the straight 
residential streets that had predominated until that time." The typical plan consisted of 
“A ring road around the major arterial intersection, the four corners of which were 
occupied by shopping centres and often some apartments. Outside the ring was a warren 
of cul-de-sacs.”10 Future Torontonian Jane Jacobs wrote Death and Life of Great 
American Cities, skewering modernist planning ideals, in 1961, but when the book was 
released, Toronto’s planning still hewed to the Bel Geddes vision of highway-oriented 
suburbia, with a sprinkling of Corbusian tower-in-a-park modernism. Aside from a 
modestly higher number of apartments, the new neighbourhoods of Toronto were 
scarcely different from coeval American suburbia. 
 
9 White, Planning Toronto, 103–5. 




Figure 9: Don Mills11 
 
Figure 10: Levittown, New York12 
This shift to auto-oriented land use—straight out of General Motors’ Futurama 
vision of 1939—is borne out in statistics. The new developments, like Don Mills, were far 
less dense than their prewar counterparts, compounding their more auto-oriented built 
form. From 1954 to 1964, suburban population and employment both nearly doubled, 
while the population of the prewar city was constant and employment declined slightly; 
 
11 Image Source: Toronto Star 
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over the same period, commuting to downtown dropped from 55% to 40% of work trips.13 
While this flattening of central business district employment came somewhat later than 
in the United States, where it had been happening for the preceding three decades, by the 
1950s, Toronto employment was also rapidly suburbanizing.14 The turnaround in transit 
ridership occurred at the very time that land use was ostensibly becoming less clement 
for transit. 
Review of the history of TTC ridership demonstrates that the opening of the Yonge 
Subway in 1954 did not permanently reverse the steady decline in transit ridership. Was 
the TTC’s turnaround due to the opening of the second subway on Bloor Street and 
Danforth Avenue in 1966? Figure 10 clearly demonstrates that the turn of the trend from 
decline to rapid ridership increase occurred several years earlier, in 1963. What event 
occurred in that year that would so dramatically alter the trend of the city’s transit? The 
key event of 1963 was an expansion of the TTC’s bus service, subsidized by the 
metropolitan government in a political compromise with the fast-growing suburbs, which 
established a grid of routes along the old concession roads that had become the arterial 
backbone of the fast-growing new suburbs. 
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This stood Toronto in sharp contrast to its postwar peers. In the early 1960s, San 
Francisco’s Municipal Railway and DC Transit remained confined within the fully 
developed prewar cities. While transit service, such as the Key System in the East Bay, 
some DC Transit streetcar routes in Maryland, and private buses lines in Virginia, was 
available within the earlier prewar suburbs outside the city limits, their financially 
straitened private operators were scarcely in a position to open many money-losing new 
routes in the new suburbs. This left most of the fastest growing American communities of 
the early 1960s with literally no transit service at all. Even where service was in place, it 
was very limited, commuter-oriented service to take office workers from suburbs to their 
jobs downtown—all other trips were assumed to be taken in the family car. 
In Toronto, the TTC not only ran buses into the new world of strip malls and cul-
de-sacs—it developed a comprehensive grid of routes that enabled not only trips 
downtown, but also cross-suburban trips. When Metropolitan Toronto expanded the 
TTC’s bus service to create a comprehensive network in the new suburbs, it created a 
surge in ridership that continued steadily for nearly three decades. As the subway was 
slowly expanded into the suburbs, it was embedded within a network of already busy 
surface transit routes that could dramatically extend the catchment area of its stations. 
With little fanfare, and over the continuing objections of many who had the best interests 
of the TTC in their hearts, this move created a city with heavy transit use, even in areas 
with land use that would have been written off as entirely unsuitable for transit in just 
about every American city. 
In the 1950s in Toronto, transit service was still viewed by suburbanites as 
something worth fighting for. When service was expanded into the suburbs and riders 
unexpectedly flocked to it, the initial skepticism about the viability of suburban transit 
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was quickly—though not completely—dispelled. It presaged decades of continuous transit 
expansion. Transit in many American metropolitan areas, like San Francisco, remains 
regionally fragmented to this day, with reasonably good service in the historic central city 
and far more limited service in the surrounding suburban municipalities. Even where 
transit was regionalized, as in the Washington area, such regionalization came far too late 
in the 1970s. By then, the existing transit service was hardly the attractive and useful 
service that Toronto’s suburbanites of the 1950s fought to have extended to their 
communities. Instead, it was a small, unreliable collection of rusty old buses that were 
mostly used by those with no other options.15 Instead of a widespread perception of transit 
as a useful service, it developed the same negative associations—heavily charged with 
racism—that were faced by affordable housing. For many suburban communities, transit 
became something to fight against, instead of fight for. Many suburbanites had left the 
central cities as part of the process of white flight; they viewed transit as an unwanted link 
to the minority populations of central cities from which they had fled out of racial 
animus.16 
At a time when racial animus and segregation were increasingly plaguing most 
American cities, Toronto was less torn, owing to its homogeneity. Nevertheless, Toronto 
was far from immune to classism, as demonstrated by the opposition to the first suburban 
social housing projects in the 1950s.  The difference was that transit in the 1950s and early 
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1960s was not yet associated with the poor and marginalized. Through political 
maneuvering, and no shortage of good fortune, the TTC was able to avail itself of modest 
subsidies and expand its service into new suburban neighbourhoods as soon as they were 
built. This established a pattern and custom of transit ridership that endures into the 
twenty-first century. 
 
The Toronto Transit Commission 
When the new Toronto Transit Commission was established on January 1, 1954, it was 
charged with three principal responsibilities. First, it was to consolidate and co-ordinate 
all forms of local transit, with the exception of mainline railways and taxis, and to plan 
future development of such services. Second, it was charged with establishing new local 
passenger transportation services in its radically expanded service area, and to make 
necessary adjustments to existing service. Third, it was to maintain a self-sustaining 
operation, in part through the establishment of a fare system including zones. The latter 
two objectives consistently came into conflict, as the need to expand suburban service 
would affect the Commission’s ability to operate without subsidy, and suburban 
councillors increasingly came to resent the need for their constituents to pay higher fares 
for what they perceived to be inferior service. More fundamentally, there was general 
concern, as noted by management consulting firm Woods Gordon & Co. in their 1957 
review of the system, that raising fares in pursuit of self-sustainability could drive riders 
away and imperil that sustainability in the long term. This was a recurrent topic of 
Gardiner’s speeches. In support of those fears, a 1958 report by American consultants 
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Hawley Simpson and Joe Ong projected a ridership decline of 0.33% for each 1% increase 
in fares.17 
The TTC’s greatest asset in the 1950s was its reputation for financial probity and 
stable management. McBrien, who died in Metro’s first year, had been a revered member 
of the city’s establishment, and had fiercely guarded the Commission’s independence 
from political interference by ensuring that it remained financially self-sustaining. As 
Harold Kaplan described, McBrien “gained interest group support for the notion that the 
transportation commission, in order to prosecute a bold, expansionist policy, had to 
remain independent of the timid and perhaps pro-expressway City councillors.” This 
anxiety about the ideological unfriendliness of councillors would be an enduring 
institutional characteristic of the TTC. “McBrien’s emphasis on an independent and 
expansionist organization met the demands of all the internal groups: the other 
commissioners, the technical staff, and the unionized labour force.”18  
The TTC embraced the Progressive-era aspiration for technocratic and apolitical 
administration with fervor. It sought relentlessly to assert and to preserve its autonomy. 
In his study of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Jameson Doig draws on 
the work of Phillip Selznick, who argues that the "conflicting demands of autonomy and 
responsiveness" are especially important in public authorities. At its best, the TTC lived 
up to Selznick's ideal of establishing external standards for the monitoring of its 
performance, and an "inner commitment to moral restraint and aspiration."19 Still, as 
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Richard Hofstadter has argued, the progressive reformers who spawned the public 
authorities were paradoxically conservative. Their anxiety about the perceived lack of 
concern on the part of much of the urban proletariat—especially new immigrants—for 
civic reform and “good government,” and their attraction to political bosses, made the 
reformers somewhat sceptical of chaotic urban democracy.20 
The TTC, in its technocratic approach, was a highly conservative organization. Like 
most authorities, it was granted formal autonomy and governed primarily by an 
ostensibly apolitical board of prominent citizens—frequently businessmen. It made 
decisions on all but the most important issues with little reference to the city’s political 
leadership or to the citizenry’s concerns. It was founded with the dual objectives of 
providing high-quality transit service to citizens and of operating on a financially self-
sustaining basis. As an organization, it was exceedingly wary of political accountability, 
which, it was feared, would produce an unreasonable tilt toward the former objective. The 
TTC viewed its autonomy as essential to the preservation of its financial sustainability. 
Yet a key reason for its zeal in defending its financial sustainability was a desire to 
maintain its institutional independence. It is difficult to disentangle these twin 
motivations. 
Alan Lamport, who succeeded McBrien, maintained his predecessor’s policies and 
outlook, but his style was far more combative. He eagerly engaged in and even sought 
public battles with Metro Council, with the Planning Board, and with Chairman Gardiner. 
He viewed all of them as irredeemably anti-transit and pro-expressway. Though there was 
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some justification for his position, there was also, as we have seen, considerable 
contradictory evidence. 
The TTC rejected the idea of political interference in route planning out of hand. 
Instead, they used a traditional predict-and-provide approach to service, in which a 
budget is set at the beginning of the year for how much service in total can be provided 
across the system. Then, the Research Department studied service need in suburban 
zones, and the operating divisions determined service needs in the central area, with data 
obtained from fare receipts. The latter was problematic since it did not count riders who 
used transfers. The scheduling department then produced a schedule based on the 
recommendations and the budget. That in turn was approved by the Service Change 
Committee or, in the case of significant changes, by the Commission itself. While the 
Commission maintained guidelines for minimum headways or maximum crowding, the 
guidelines were not strictly applied.21 At Gardiner’s urging, the TTC agreed to hear 
requests from the local municipalities, though they did not generally give them significant 
weight.22 
Though consulting firm Woods Gordon, charged by council to examine the 
system,23 had been flattering about its businesslike operations, others, looking at the 
bigger picture of transit ridership decline, were less sanguine about the TTC’s prospects. 
The Globe and Mail’s editorial following the report’s release recognized the system’s 
financial stability, but noted that "No one reading the report would get any idea of why 
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the TTC has been subject in recent years to such extreme criticism from the public it 
serves." Echoing the complaints of suburban members of Metro Council, it pointed out 
that much of Metro had been left bereft of transit service.24 
In spite of—and in part because of—its prudent management, the TTC was feeling 
the competitive pressure from the automobile. Registrations rose from 152,961 in 1940 to 
326,009 in 1954 and by 1960 there were more cars registered in Toronto than households. 
The explosion of car ownership most severely impacted off-peak ridership. While many 
would-be automobile commuters to downtown jobs continued to be stymied by a lack of 
available parking, as Metro’s planning commissioner Murray Jones noted in a 1962 
address, leisure trips were increasingly shifting to the car. This was an especially vexing 
problem for transit, since it needed to maintain an infrastructure scaled to the peaks. 
Jones’ remarks indicated the awareness of the problems of automobile transportation at 
what was seemingly the height of auto-mania, less than a decade after the Interstate 
Highway Act was passed in the United States and at a time when Metropolitan Toronto 
was attempting to build its own urban expressway grid. The key problems presented by 
the automobile to transit, he noted, began with its diversion of passengers from buses and 
trains, necessitating the curtailing of service or fare increases, which further reduced 
ridership. Secondly, the tide of automobiles congested the roads that buses and streetcars 
shared, increasing their cost of operation and hampering their reliability. The third 
problem, which he described as “most fundamental and least understood,” was the role 
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of the car in creating development with insufficient density to support public transit 
service.25  
These factors eroded the TTC’s foundation of financial stability, but there was no 
institutional mechanism to address such an eventuality. Though Cumming's report that 
led to the creation of Metro had argued "that the underlying liability of the metropolitan 
area for the provision of possible future deficits in this publicly owned system should be 
given formal recognition in any legislation," there remained a broad acceptance of the 
idea that the TTC must remain self-sustaining—not least among the TTC’s staff 
themselves.26 Nevertheless, the commission’s ratio of net operating income to gross 
revenue dropped precipitously from 38% in the monopoly war years from 1940-46, to 
12.5% in 1947-53, and 9.5% in 1954-55. Though it recovered to 19.5% in 1956 with fare 
increases and post-subway ridership growth, the downward trend was unmistakable. The 
operating profit was also more urgently needed than ever, given the need to service the 
enormous debt taken on to pay for the Yonge Subway—debenture debt had risen from 
$8.6 million in 1947 to $66.7 million in 1953. There were therefore increasingly frequent 
exceptions to the self-sustaining rule, from the small operating subsidies to cover deficits 
in the mid-1950s to the gradual increases in Metro's contributions to capital projects, 
particularly subways. The latter was the TTC's preferred method of subsidy, since it left 
their operations free from Metro's interference. As a result, the Woods Gordon report 
recommended that Metro cover the costs of “the right-of-way for rapid transit service,” 
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meaning the physical infrastructure of new subway lines.27 In a 1960 address, TTC 
Chairman C.C. Downey even dangled the possibility of TTC support for the elimination of 
zone fares, in exchange for full assumption of capital costs by Metro.28 
The diminution of the operating ratio was exacerbated because, while base fares 
increased by 100% from 1940 to 1956, that increase came below inflation, which rose by 
119% over the same period. TTC workers’ hourly wages rose even faster—159%—though 
the increase was roughly on par with the increase in average workers’ wages over that 
prosperous period. Base fares at 12.5 cents remained well below the majority of American 
cities’ transit systems at the time, which typically charged between 15 and 20 cents.29 
The TTC worked rather well within the City of Toronto, and its reputation was quite 
strong. Though its streetcar routes were crowded, fares were relatively low and their 
extraordinary frequency made them function relatively well—the TTC frequently boasted 
that, on its streetcar routes, there was “always a car in sight.” The picture was very 
different for suburbanites, as suburban politicians would never hesitate to point out. 
When the fare zone boundary, roughly at the municipal limits of the City of Toronto, was 
crossed, riders would have to pay nearly double the base fare.30 Riders in the outermost 
sections of Metro were subject to four additional zones, for each of which they were 
obliged to pay an additional fare. The system was not a true fare-by-distance scheme, as 
riders crossing a boundary—even when making a fairly short trip—were forced to pay a 
 
27 “Survey of Toronto Transit Commission,” 57–61. 
28 C.C. Downey, “Address to Metro Executive Committee,” 1960, Series 11, File 600, City of Toronto Archives. 
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TTC. “First Annual Report”; “Survey of Toronto Transit Commission,” 61. 
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cross the Zone 1 and 2 boundary were 4 for $1.10. 
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dramatically higher fare than riders, some of whom travelled much longer distances, who 
remained within the City. The punitive fare structure for suburban riders would be one of 
the key political issues in Metro’s first decades, especially as suburban taxpayers 
increasingly contributed to subsidization of the TTC. 
The problem was that the TTC could not afford to eliminate zone fares without 
either dramatically increasing fares in zone one, which risked driving away many riders, 
or by agreeing to an operating subsidy from Metro, which could mean risking the TTC’s 




Figure 12: TTC Initial Routes at Creation of Metro, 195431 
 
The creation of Metro had resulted in a large constituency of politicians—suburban 
members of Metro Council—whose voting base derived limited benefit from one of 
Metro’s most important operations. That base was also growing in numbers. By 1961, the 
Metro suburbs had a combined population of 946,380, while the City of Toronto had only 
672,407. Metro Council did not reflect this new reality, as legislation defined the 
membership of the council as 12 representatives from the City of Toronto, plus one from 
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each of the eleven suburban municipalities (the Chair voted to break a tie).32 Metro 
Council members were not directly elected; the suburban representatives were the mayor 
or reeve of each municipality, while Toronto’s representatives consisted of the mayor and 
a selection of other local elected officials. Social housing advocate and University of 
Toronto social work professor Albert Rose argued in his examination of Metropolitan 
Toronto governance that they were therefore elected mostly on their local records, 
allowing them to think on a region-wide basis when on Metro Council, rather than acting 
simply as representatives of their municipalities.33 Still, the divide in interests between 
City and suburban members was ever-present. In the early years, when Metro Council 
was largely under Gardiner’s thumb, the arrangement caused few problems. But with 
Gardiner gone, the strains were beginning to emerge and a redistribution to acknowledge 
the emergence of a suburban demographic majority was beginning to appear inevitable.  
When William Allen was elected chair by Metro Council in 1961, he brought a very 
different approach to the job. While Gardiner was a charismatic public figure and an 
imposing presence who dominated Metro Council, Allen was, as Rose described him, “a 
consummate administrator, far more a city manager than a politician.”34 Allen was a 
somewhat unexpected figure to lead Metro at the time: he came from the City of Toronto, 
he was a Roman Catholic, and he was a Liberal. He defeated his opponent, North York 
Reeve Norman Goodhead, by a vote of 14 to 10; though the divide was not entirely on city-
 
32 While suburbanites as a whole were severely underrepresented, the representational disparities were especially 
egregious between suburbs. The largest suburb, North York, with 269,959 residents in 1961, had the same single 
representative on Metro Council as Swansea with a population of 9,628. 
33 Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto. 
34 Rose, 158. 
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suburban lines, Allen received a large majority of the city votes while Goodhead collected 
a majority of suburbanites.  
North York was the most populous Metro suburb with 270,000 residents in 1961, 
and its reeve was a firebrand described by Rose as “an articulate, self-made man” who 
had become the leading spokesman for the 12 suburban municipalities, though he was 
later felled by a conflict-of-interest scandal.35 Notably, Goodhead had long favoured direct 
Metro control of the TTC, mostly because of anger over the lack of a single fare, but also 
in order to be able to force the TTC to improve suburban service. In a 1960 address, which 
he forwarded to Gardiner, he cited London and Stockholm as examples of cities that 
planned for the automobile, rail, and public transport “as basic essential services both in 
the city proper as well as surrounding suburban areas.”36 
Gardiner had been able to paper over city-suburban and other disagreements on 
Metro Council through the force of his own personality, though significant cleavages were 
exposed by the 1958 debate over the east-west subway route—a debate that the TTC and 
its largely city-based supporters won only through Gardiner’s personal intervention. 
Under Allen, the members of Metro Council began to express their own independent 
views—not least on the subject of transit. 
The most fundamental issue wracking the council through the 1950s and 60s was 
whether Metro should continue to exist at all. The City of Toronto, which had sparked the 
creation of Metro through its application to annex the suburbs, favoured replacing Metro 
with a single-tier municipality. Sympathy for this view was shared by many at Metro 
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including, long after he left office, Gardiner. Murray Jones spoke derisively of the 
tendency to “cling to the concept of attaching sovereignty to local units of government 
which were conceived and developed for a pre-metropolitan society.”37 The suburbs, 
determined to preserve their independence, were opposed. In this regard, Allen was a 
consensus figure—despite his City origins, he favoured maintaining the Metro structure. 
 
Figure 13: TTC Route Extensions 1954-1963 
In response to a renewed application from the City of Toronto to annex the Metro 
suburbs in 1963, the provincial government appointed a Royal Commission on 
Metropolitan Toronto. Carl H. Goldenberg, a prominent Quebec-based labour relations 
lawyer and expert on municipal governance who had led many royal commissions on 
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various issues, was charged with studying Metro and making recommendations on its 
reform.  
Though Goldenberg’s final report would take several years to produce, the TTC 
began to understand the need to develop suburban support for transit, lest they face an 
uncertain fate when the City of Toronto majority was no longer able to protect them. 
There had been significant growth in suburban route mileage since the creation of Metro, 
but the service was minimal. While one-way route mileage increased from 326 to 446 
(36.8%) between 1954 and 1962, vehicle miles only increased from 45.3 million to 49.5 
million (9.3%).38 
Given the salience of zone fares as a political issue, there were reports continually 
produced over the years that all indicated that the elimination of the zone fares would 
come at a considerable cost and would either require an unacceptable increase in central 
area fares or would bring the self-sustainability of the system to an end.39 The Woods 
Gordon consultants had even met with Mayor W.A. Edwards of Mimico, who urged them 
to study the possibility of a flat fare, but they demurred.40 
Suburban councillors were unbowed. Some of the most vocal opposition continued 
to come from the reeves of the older streetcar suburbs like Mimico and Long Branch, 
whose constituents chafed under the requirement to pay a double fare when riding the 
streetcar downtown. They relentlessly demanded a flat fare, and they made their support 
for the Bloor-Danforth subway a quid pro quo. While Gardiner was able to head off the 
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debate and push through the subway without full elimination of the zone fare, he shortly 
after spoke with Lamport, then chairman of the TTC, about the possibility of eliminating 
zone fares to appease the suburbanites. Lamport again reiterated the TTC’s objections 
that it would be “uneconomic and unfair to the majority” of riders, and implied that 
pressing for a change to fare arrangements would be a violation on Metro’s part of the 
Metro-TTC agreement on shared financing of the subway.41 Though the TTC had again 
won the fare battle, it produced a simmering hostility between the TTC and many 
members of Metro Council. 
The dispute, exemplified by Lamport’s flamboyant battles with Gardiner, left the 
TTC’s theretofore pristine reputation tarnished. The brash former Toronto mayor acted 
as a lightning rod for suburban frustration with the TTC. Their dissatisfaction culminated 
in a Metro Council initiative for the TTC to be abolished and transformed into a Metro 
department, directly accountable to Metro Council—the TTC’s nightmare scenario. While 
the campaign was ultimately defeated, with Metro taking a modestly more active role and 
Lamport removed as chairman, the TTC was chastened and understood that it needed to 
improve its political relationships. As Commissioner C.C. Downey described in a 1960 
presentation to the Metro Executive Committee, the TTC’s morale—so strong at the time 
of the Woods-Gordon report in 1957—had been badly shaken by the years of discord.42 
The TTC itself remained starkly divided on the best approach to transit. Political 
scientist Harold Kaplan described various factions shaping the TTC’s policies. Interest 
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groups, many City officials, and the politically inclined faction of the board (collectively 
dubbed “politicos” by Kaplan) supported a dramatic expansion of suburban bus service. 
The staff of the TTC, as well as the more technically oriented members of the board, were 
opposed, believing that it would harm the Commission’s long-cherished efficiency and 
therefore imperil its independence. The latter, dubbed “administrators” by Kaplan, 
typically made up three of the five members of the TTC board and were more apolitical, 
tended to defer to staff, and were drawn largely from the business community or the civil 
service. Even as the staff began to draw closer to the Metro planners after the former’s 
victory in the subway route battle, cooperation was limited by the fear of many “politicos” 
and interest groups that the Planning Board tilted too far in favour of suburban subway 
expansion and of expressways. The factional divides within the TTC and its broader 
constituency persisted and shaped transit policy to a considerable degree, and would 
eventually allow Metro Council to exert more control over the system and to tilt decision-
making toward greater suburban service expansion.43 
All in all, the first decade of Metro was relatively favourable for the TTC. 
Transportation investment by governments, unlike in most American cities, was 
genuinely balanced between roads and transit, though transit was still expected to pay its 
own operating costs while highways were not. In Metro’s first decade, the TTC spent 
approximately $120 million on the public transit system, of which $92 million was spent 
on rapid transit facilities and about $30 million on new buses, streetcars, and other 
equipment; 60% of the funds came from fares, while the remaining 40% of capital 
expenditures were covered by a subsidy from Metro. Over the same period from 1953-63, 
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Metro spent about $160 million on roadways, of which about 50% was covered by 
provincial subsidy; the province spent an additional $54 million on the provincial 
highway system within Metro.44 In 1962, Metro’s planning commissioner Murray Jones 
spoke of the aspiration to spend about an equal amount on roads and rapid transit over 
the following two decades.45 Still, despite the large capital investments in new subways, 
ridership continued to decline. The TTC was far from out of the woods, and the tensions 
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Chapter 5: The 1963 Service Expansion 
The TTC’s ridership reached a post-Depression nadir in 1961. For the first time, its 
financial sustainability was an open question. Suburban councillors on Metro Council 
were increasingly irate about the perceived inadequacy of service to their constituencies, 
and about the punitive extra fare levied on riders crossing between the old City of Toronto 
and the new suburbs.1 In 1958, they had reluctantly acceded to construction of a new east-
west subway on Bloor Street and Danforth Avenue to complement the north-south Yonge 
subway built in 1954, but in return they expected meaningful concessions from the TTC. 
Their demands for a fully equal fare system were, for the moment, off the table owing to 
cost and the TTC’s opposition, but the TTC finally bent, agreeing to a proposal by 
Commissioner Charles Walton to eliminate the lightly populated outer two of four fare 
zones and charge them at the Zone 2 rate, beginning in 1962.2  
The fare zone rationalization placated suburban councillors, at least temporarily. 
Scarborough Reeve Albert Campbell called it "A very big thing to residents of this 
township," while Etobicoke reeve H.O. Waffle viewed it as "A big step in the right 
direction." Campbell was unsurprisingly pleased that residents of outer Scarborough 
would receive a whopping fare cut from 45 to 27.5 cents per ride downtown. The modest 
population of the outer two zones meant that the cost to the TTC was for the moment 
limited—projected to be about $155,000 per year. Nevertheless, all suburbanites agreed 
that the change should merely be a precursor to a one-zone fare system. Marie Curtis 
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continued her fierce fight for a one-zone fare system: "It seems peculiar to me that people 
out here who are still paying the two-mill subsidy for subway construction still have to 
pay two fares. I'm not going to rest until something's done about it." Other suburban 
representatives held similar views, while City of Toronto representatives opposed the idea 
of suburban fare reductions altogether.  
Effectively, there were three different perspectives on transit policy in Metro. The 
City was opposed to subsidy for suburban service improvements or for eliminating zone 
fares, but were in favour of subsidy to prevent fare increases on City riders in Zone 1. 
Suburbanites wanted subsidy for improved suburban service and for eliminating zone 
fares, and wouldn’t accept subsidy for keeping existing fares low or for capital expansion 
without it. The TTC itself was opposed to operating subsidy, but actively sought additional 
capital subsidy.  
In the short term, the City view generally prevailed, with the support of the TTC 
itself. When deficits threatened to force unreasonable fare increases on Zone 1 riders, 
capital or temporary operating subsidy from Metro Council was generally forthcoming to 
head it off.  But the City representatives had little prospect of imposing their will over the 
long term. While they were able to prevent a flat fare for the moment, the growing 
suburban demands for fare reform and service improvements, combined with the City of 
Toronto's need for suburban support for its desired subway expansions, made fare 
rationalization a political idea whose time had come.3  
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Ford Brand, an oft-dissenting TTC commissioner and former City of Toronto 
controller, said that the cost of eliminating zone fares should not be borne by the TTC 
alone. With the support of the Star’s editorial board, he wanted to use the elimination of 
the outermost fare zones as leverage to force Metro Council to agree to subsidy of the TTC. 
He was opposed by the other commissioners and by the TTC’s administrators, the latter 
who remained uninterested in Metro operating subsidy as they jealously guarded the 
TTC’s independence from Metro Council.4 For them, Brand’s proposal was a mortal 
threat, since they believed subsidy from Metro would mean that Metro would, in return, 
insist on making key planning and operational decisions on a political basis. The TTC had 
embraced for decades its position as an independent public authority, and its staff had no 
desire to embrace change.  
On February 2, 1962, the TTC met with Metro Council’s Executive Committee to 
discuss its situation. TTC Chairman Downey provided a sunny portrayal of the TTC’s 
current financial state, while warning that deficits would soon balloon without heavy fare 
increases. Press coverage of the meeting was hijacked by Brand, who produced a 
dissenting brief painting an even darker picture of the TTC’s financial position. He argued 
that its self-sustaining state was already a mirage, produced by service cuts and fare 
increases that were driving passengers away. Some members of the Executive Committee 
had already drawn the conclusion that the legislation calling for self-sustaining operation 
was obsolete. “The present legislation is outmoded,” said Norman Goodhead. He asked 
for a report on what service would be needed to adequately serve the entire metropolitan 
area, and “the degree of inability of the Commission to carry out such plans under the 
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existing legislation which requires the operations of the Commission to be self-
sustaining”—implying a turn away from self-sustaining operation. The TTC management 
was reluctant as always to agree to an operating subsidy, fearing a loss of independence 
and instead preferring to ask for additional capital subsidy and exemption from taxation. 
Allen firmly overruled the TTC’s objections as he closed the meeting, directing the TTC to 
produce the report as Goodhead had requested. “Tell us where you’re short, and give us 
an estimate of the dollar cost, then the problem is ours,” he said.5  
Following the meeting, the TTC wrote a letter dated February 12, 1962 to all 
thirteen Metro municipalities asking for them to outline requests, ordered by preference, 
for additional services within their boundaries. These requests could involve increased 
frequency on existing routes, extensions to existing routes, and new routes.6 
Each municipality’s emphasis was different. Overall, there were seventy-nine 
requests for service improvement. North York, the most populous suburban borough, 
made the most extensive requests, including five requests for more frequent service, eight 
for route extension, and eleven for new routes. Scarborough—the most geographically 
expansive borough—had the second most requests. Only York and North York requested 
increased frequency on established services. Other municipalities focused on improved 
coverage through new routes and the extension of existing routes. The City of Toronto’s 
requests were fairly modest. Other requests were more fanciful, including calls for a 
monorail along Highway 401. In all but one case, the municipalities failed to order the 
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requests by priority as requested—suggesting the political difficulty of prioritizing one 
neighbourhood over another.7  
In June 1962, the TTC presented Goodhead’s requested report to Metro’s executive 
committee, incorporating the results of the surveys. The cover letter outlined the 
Commission’s future plans for transit and its inability to carry out the plans on a self-
sustaining basis as required by the legislation establishing the commission. 
Uncharacteristically, they avoided specifying their preference for capital subsidy over 
operating subsidy, omitting discussion of the source of funding for the proposed 
improvements. The report touched on subway expansion and plans for the progressive 
abandonment of streetcars before coming to the issue of suburban bus service. “The 
extension of an adequate bus system in the expanding suburban areas is a pressing and 
continuing problem,” they wrote. “The Commission appreciates the desirability to provide 
public transit to a new or growing community as quickly as other [municipal services] are 
provided.” The problem was that such routes required subsidy. “Bus routes into new 
territory are, almost without exception, operated at a loss for some time,” the 
commissioners cautioned. “Accordingly, the Commission is limited in the number of such 
routes or extensions which it can establish under the requirements of existing legislation 
which requires its operations to be self-sustaining.”8 
Of the seventy-nine municipal requests, the TTC recommended that forty be 
implemented. Of those, eight routes were recommended for immediate implementation, 
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and the remaining thirty-two were suggested for implementation if the TTC received 
additional financial resources.9 
In August 1962, in response to the report, Metro Council voted 13–10 after eight 
hours of debate, to request provincial permission to subsidize transit in order to limit fare 
increases and improve service to the suburbs. Impelled by the precipitous decline in 
ridership—fifteen million riders lost in 1961 alone—the councillors embraced the concept 
of subsidy in order to fund the expansion of suburban transit service, as well as to 
minimize a planned fare hike. Metro Council discussed funding all forty recommended 
service improvements—and added two more—at a projected cost of $1.4 million in 1963. 
That amounted to about 3.6% of total 1962 TTC expenditures. As usual, the TTC 
management preferred to limit the subsidy by imposing a fare hike. “I don’t think there’s 
as much opposition to a fare increase as some people think,” TTC chairman Downey 
remarked. “We might lose a few riders by putting the price up, but we’d gain them back 
through extending our suburban services.” Metro Chairman Allen, a long-time opponent 
of fare hikes, relented and accepted a small increase. The 1963 deficit, including the 
service improvements, was proposed to be covered by a combination of a $1.5 million 
subsidy and a modest fare increase from seven to six tickets for a dollar.10 It was a 
momentous decision: Metro Council had committed itself to an end to self-sustaining 
operation for the TTC, and to the provision of subsidy for service improvements. 
Metro subsidy for transit service expansion could count on the support of the 
powerful and liberal Star newspaper, which completely accepted the idea that improved 
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service would drive ridership. “Since Metro was formed 10 years ago, the population has 
grown 38 per cent,” cited one editorial. “But the TTC is carrying 16 per cent fewer 
passengers. Why? Largely because it tended to surrender the suburbs--where the main 
population growth was taking place--to the private automobile. It didn't offer a reasonable 
transit alternative. It looked upon the new suburban lines with distaste as sure money-
losers."11 The Star instead favoured introducing transit as soon as suburban development 
occurred, in stark contrast with most North American cities. “There are parts of Metro 
which are being inadequately served by the TTC, or which are receiving no service at all,” 
it wrote in a 1961 editorial. “These are mainly new suburban areas, which the TTC refuses 
to enter until it is assured for heavy passenger loads. While it waits, residents get used to 
driving their cars, and when the TTC finally provides a service, they are reluctant to 
change their mode of travel.” The only solution, they argued, was subsidy: “Every resident 
of Metro--not just transit riders--benefits from an efficient transit system. Metro should 
therefore subsidize any losses” following changes to fare policy.12  
Opponents of operating subsidy, however, could consistently count on the support 
of the TTC’s own administration, which was more than willing to sacrifice a financial 
infusion that would come at the potential cost of its administrative independence. The 
Star followed the TTC’s lead, favouring Metro’s assumption of debt payments for capital 
costs and exemption of the commission from taxes, rather than direct operating funding.13 
The TTC’s resistance to adding new subsidized suburban services provoked an organized 
campaign—led by Reeve Goodhead—to abolish the TTC’s independence entirely and to 
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transform it into a department of Metro. Partly in response to the campaign, the TTC 
finally shifted its position in favour of improved suburban service—even if it meant 
accepting subsidy and the loss of independence that might come with it. 
The TTC began operating its twelve highest-priority route expansions in 
September, amounting to about a half-million additional vehicle-miles of service. Spurred 
also by the reduction in the zone fare penalty, the TTC in 1962 showed its first annual 
ridership increase since the subway was opened in 1954. It was a small uptick—from 268 
to 271 million riders—but it heralded a changed trajectory.14 From seven years of 
inexorable decline, mirroring the pattern across the continent, the TTC was to begin a 
nearly unbroken quarter-century of ridership increases—in stark contrast with its North 
American peers (see Chapter 7). 
With the prospect of Metro subsidy in exchange for increased service, the TTC 
further refined the planned suburban service expansion. The metro municipalities 
updated their requests for additional service, particularly to serve new development 
areas, in their 1963 annual presentations to the TTC. In June, Scarborough acknowledged 
that the TTC had made “considerable strides” in serving the borough, but had numerous 
additional requests for service.15 The TTC also used more systematic means, including a 
1963 origin and destination survey of 4,400 homes and 100 industries in the western part 
of Metro. It unsurprisingly revealed that the TTC in the western suburban municipalities 
carried a much higher percentage of long-haul trips (16.8%)—mainly to downtown—than 
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local suburban trips (8.8%). Even among rush hour work trips, the latter accounted for a 
third of trips in the suburban area, and that proportion was continuing to grow.16  
The opening of the subsidy floodgates also enabled the temporary reversal of the 
fare increase. After only nineteen days of higher fares, Metro Council narrowly agreed to 
a $2.5 million subsidy in exchange for reversion to the previous fare structure. In this 
instance, the City representatives, along with the reeves of the relatively urban Village of 
Swansea and Township of East York, formed a solid bloc in favour of subsidy. The 
suburbanites were fiercely opposed, angered by inaction on suburban service expansion 
and on the elimination of zone fares. Goodhead exemplified the reaction when he 
ridiculed a TTC statement that the new Sheppard Avenue bus route would be extended 
“as the area develops,” countering that “[t]his is an area that has been developed for the 
past 20 years.” The TTC “haven’t a cotton-picking clue as to what is happening in the 
suburbs,” he thundered. The suburban reeves decided to launch a legal challenge against 
the subsidy. As a last-ditch manoeuvre when approval was imminent, the suburbanites 
had moved to add an additional $1 million in subsidy to be used exclusively for the 
expansion of suburban bus service. While the motion was defeated, the political need for 
improved transit service to the suburbs was apparent.17  
The TTC was finally ready to respond. The 1963 expansion was to be considerably 
more ambitious than what the TTC had undertaken a year earlier, amounting to over a 
million vehicle-miles of additional service. More importantly, it marked the development 
 
16 “Ninth Annual Report”; J.G. Inglis, General Manager of Operations, “West Suburban Service Recommendations 
in Association with the Origin Destination Survey” (Toronto Transit Commission, July 18, 1963), Toronto Transit 
Commission Fonds, City of Toronto Archives. 
17 “Metro Subsidy for TTC To Cancel Fare Increase,” The Globe and Mail, May 4, 1963; “Metro Prepares Bills For 
Transit Subsidy As Councils Grumble,” The Globe and Mail, May 7, 1963; “Goodhead to Fight TTC Fare Subsidy,” 
Toronto Daily Star, May 8, 1963. 
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of a grid of frequent bus routes that would be able to serve cross-suburban trips while also 
improving access to the central business district. They would use the former concession 
roads, spaced about a mile apart and forming a grid of arterial routes throughout the 
suburbs, to bring transit access to the entire developed area of Metro.18 The rollout of new 
routes on September 1 went smoothly, and the reaction was nearly everything that the 
TTC could have hoped for.19  
 
Figure 14: 1963 Service Expansion20 
Reeve John MacBeth, whose borough of Etobicoke was the largest recipient of new 
services, described it as “a new day for public transportation in the suburbs. And it’s a 
new day in our relationships with the TTC.” Reeve Albert Campbell of Scarborough, who 
 
18 “Report on Transit Service Expansion” (Toronto Transit Commission, August 12, 1963). 
19 “No Snags In New TTC Routes,” Toronto Daily Star, September 3, 1963. 
20 “Tenth Annual Report.” 
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was to become Metro Chairman in 1969, was equally positive: “This represents the start 
of the grid system in the suburbs. I am very pleased.” Goodhead remained unappeased, 
dismissing the improvements, which were disproportionately modest in North York, as 
“a drop in the bucket,” but it was clear that genuine suburban transit expansion was a 
political winner among suburbanites.21  
The programme was an evident success, and the Star’s editorial page exulted over 
the results of the expansion. Astoundingly, the additional service, instead of being a 
financial drain on the Commission, proved to have brought in more money in fares than 
it cost to operate. “The folly of [the TTC's reticence to expand suburban services] is 
indicated by the early results from the recent expansion [...]. It has found the key to 
prosperity. Let it use the key freely.”22 
In a review sixth months after the improvement, the TTC described the results as 
“very encouraging.” Overall TTC ridership continued to rise over the period—by 2.5%—
but the increase was entirely attributable to new suburban riders. Ridership in suburban 
Zone 2 rose by a dramatic 9.3% in the sixth months following the service improvement; 
in the urban Zone 1, ridership increased by only 1.1%, more than the total of which was a 
result of new suburban riders travelling into Zone 1. Travel entirely within the urban core 
actually declined. When unlinked trips23 are considered, the rise in suburban ridership 
 
21 “Etobicoke Cheers TTC Changes, North York’s Goodhead Critical,” Toronto Daily Star, August 20, 1963, sec. 
Metro News. 
22 “TTC Woos the Suburbs.” 
23 “Unlinked” means that each segment of a journey involving transfers is counted as a separate trip. 
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was even greater—14%—as suburban riders were taking advantage of the new grid 
network to make cross-suburban trips using multiple bus routes.24 
Jarrett Walker speaks of the inevitable choice between allocating service to 
"ridership" or "coverage" routes. The former are located in more densely populated parts 
of the region, while the latter are in low-density suburban areas. He suggests that 
allocating as much service as possible to high-density areas will inevitably lead to the 
maximization of ridership. While this may be accurate when examining American transit 
systems with very limited service at the outset, the 1963 service expansion suggests that 
as long as good service is already available in the dense central area, adding service in 
lower-density areas may in fact serve to maximize ridership.25 
The review attempted to tease out the causes of the ridership increase. While 
employment levels are usually the key driver of ridership change, the report noted that if 
the change had been due to the increase in employment, central area riding would also 
have seen an increase. Furthermore, there was no meaningful ridership increase in the 
months before the September improvements—even after the University Avenue subway 
extension that opened in February—though employment grew at a similar rate before and 
after September. Most notably, suburban ridership growth continued even after fares 
increased on New Year’s Day 1964. 
 
24 “1963 Suburban Expansion Programme: A Report on Six Months of Operation” (Toronto Transit Commission, 
June 4, 1964), Toronto Transit Commission Fonds, City of Toronto Archive. 




Figure 15: 1963 Suburban Service Improvements (in Red) Weighted by Ridership26 
 
Scarborough council wrote “to acknowledge the considerable strides taken by the 
Commission in 1963, having reference to new and extended services in the township.” 
They called the new Lawrence Avenue service “an unqualified success” and praised the 
“very necessary and useful function” of the new north-south grid routes. They noted that 
the service changes “undoubtedly” contributed to the 1963 ridership increases.27 
The TTC advertised its success in local newspapers. “Every year, TTC wheels have 
rolled into new districts in a transit expansion program unmatched anywhere on this 
continent,” the commission boasted. “The cumulative result: an increase of more than a 
 
26 “1963 Suburban Expansion Programme.” 
27 “Council of the Township of Scarborough Presentation for 1964 to the Chairman and Members, Toronto Transit 
Commission,” April 1, 1964, TTC Minutes, City of Toronto Archives. 
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million riders in 1962, two and a quarter million more in 1963, two million more riders” 
from January to June of 1964. It pinpointed the suburban expansion as driver of many of 
the gains, claiming riders had “discovered that [1963's] million-mile grid system 
extensions provide better service to the shopping centres, the recreation facilities and the 
work locations in their own communities. They’ve discovered, too, that new and extended 
direct-to-subway bus lines run deeper into outlying areas than ever before. This means 
faster, more convenient service to downtown.”28  
 
Figure 16: TTC Advertisement29 
 
28 “TTC Advertisement,” Toronto Daily Star, June 16, 1964. 
29 Toronto Daily Star, June 16, 1964. 
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By mollifying the suburbanites with service expansion, the TTC was able to secure 
its wish of capital, rather than operating subsidy. On December 6th, with the support of 
all City representatives and five of eleven suburban members, Metro Council voted to 
assume $51.8 million in TTC debt owing for the construction of the Yonge and Bloor-
Danforth subways, and to shift the Metro contribution to subway construction from 55 to 
70 per cent.30 The changes were approved by the OMB in January of 1964.31 The long-
cherished notion that the Yonge subway was entirely funded from the farebox is mythical. 
It was largely funded by borrowing, much of which was ultimately paid by Metro 
taxpayers. The assumed debenture interest amounted to $1.45 million in 1964.32 The 
timing of the shift in suburban votes was critical, as the City representatives were to lose 
their Metro Council majority when Metro was restructured in 1967.33 
The Progressive Conservative provincial government, which had a strong 
suburban support base, also entered the field. Beginning in 1964, it agreed to fund one 
third of the roadbed of the Bloor-Danforth subway line, which was then under 
construction, through its highway funding program.34 The roadbed, meaning the tunnels 
and rights-of-way as opposed to the stations, tracks, and vehicles, was deemed to be 
equivalent to a highway, which also received one-third funding. The province also agreed 
 
30 “Metro Council Votes to Take Over $51 Million TTC Debt: Move Will Add $4.60 To Average Annual Tax,” The 
Globe and Mail, December 6, 1963. 
31 “Approval by Ontario Municipal Board of Financial Assistance by Metropolitan Corporation to Toronto Transit 
Commission,” Appendix A, Volume I, Metropolitan Toronto Council Minutes (Executive Committee, 1964). 
32 “Eleventh Annual Report” (Toronto Transit Commission, 1964). 
33 The original Metro Council arrangement severely underrepresented suburbanites, especially those from the most 
populous suburbs, which still only had a single representative. North York, with 270,000 residents in 1961, had one 
representative; the City of Toronto, with 670,000 residents, had 12 representatives. In 1967, Metro Council seats 
were reassigned to be in proportion to population. 
34 “Financing of Public Transit in Toronto,” Submission to Goldenberg Commission (Toronto Transit Commission, 
1974), 4, Fonds 220, Series 11, File 953, City of Toronto Archives. 
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to purchase Metro’s debentures, so that the municipality could borrow at a much lower 
rate. The provincial amounts were small, at least initially. The roadbed funding first 
flowed in 1964, and amounted to $6 million.35 In 1962 and 1963, the province purchased 
$10 million in debentures. The amount grew to $20 million in 1964.36 The stage had been 
set for a dramatic escalation in municipal and provincial government support for transit. 
In 1964, the TTC operated 2.3 million additional vehicle-miles of service in 
comparison with 1963, a 4.3% increase. The ridership declines of the late 1950s and early 
1960s were over. While ridership rose by 1.2 million (0.45%) in 1962, the increase was 2.3 
million (0.86%) in 1963, and 4.2 million (1.5%) in 1964. That was the first full year with 
the new suburban grid network, and the increase came despite implementation of the 
delayed fare increase on January 1. Following another major suburban service expansion 
of over a million vehicle-miles in 1965, ridership growth exploded once again. 12.8 million 
additional riders took the TTC in that year, a 4.63% increase.  
These remarkable results were in stark contrast to the 1963 projections of Simpson 
& Curtin Consultants and Joe Ong, prominent American transit consultants who expected 
the system to continue a slow ridership decline until the Bloor-Danforth subway and its 
suburban extensions opened in 1966 and 1968, respectively. In those years, they projected 
that ridership would briefly spike before resuming an inexorable decline. Their forecast 
ridership for 1967 (294.9 million) was 19.5 million below the figure the TTC achieved, and 
 
35 G.O. Grant, “Memorandum for Mr. G.A. Lascelles, Commissioner of Finance” (Commissioner of Roads, 
Metropolitan Toronto, September 23, 1963), Series 11, File 608, City of Toronto Archives; G.A. Lascelles to 
William R. Allen, Q.C., “Re: Provincial Subsidy - Bloor-Danforth Subway,” October 29, 1964, Series 11, File 608, 
City of Toronto Archives; William R. Allen, “Letter to Hon. Charles S. MacNaughton, Minister of Highways,” 
November 3, 1964. 
36 James N. Allan and J.W. Spooner, “Ontario Government Press Release,” December 1, 1964, Series 11, File 608, 
City of Toronto Archives. 
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their model had assumed a lower fare. Simpson and Ong had projected that transit 
ridership would increase by 8.25% from 1962 to 1972. In reality, after assiduously 
improving local suburban transit service, the TTC increased its ridership in that period by 
28.7%. After the TTC—with provincial assistance—eliminated the zone fare in 1973 and 
further expanded suburban service (see Chapter 8), ridership spiked by another 12.3%.37 
The sharp divergence between consultants’ projections and the ridership that was actually 
achieved following service improvements did not go unnoticed. In private 
correspondence, TTC Commissioner C.C. Downey noted to Metro Chairman Allen that 
since Simpson and Ong’s ridership projections were so far off, their $4 million projection 
of the annual cost of eliminating zone fares could be similarly pessimistic.38  
Optimism about suburban transit was further enhanced by the unexpectedly 
strong financial performance of the new services. Though the TTC had said in its 1962 
Annual Report that “the fact must be faced that bus routes into new suburban districts 
are heavy money losers, sometimes for many years,” they proved to have been far too 
fatalistic about the prospects of suburban transit.39 Supplemented by Metro’s assumption 
of some of the TTC’s debt service charges, the new services were so financially successful 
that in 1964—the first year that the new services were in place—the TTC made a profit of 
$3.9 million. While operating expenses rose by $1.15 million, revenues rose by $6.4 
million due to increased suburban ridership and the higher fare. From January to May, 
 
37 Simpson & Curtin Consultants and Joe R. Ong, “Economic Study of Bloor-Danforth Subway and Proposed 
Extensions”; “1972 Annual Report to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto” (Toronto Transit Commission, 
1972); “1973 Annual Report to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 
1973). 
38 C.C. Downey to William R. Allen, Personal, September 21, 1965, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto Archives. 
39 “Ninth Annual Report.” 
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revenues were 3% higher than the budget had projected.40 Profit rose to $4.1 million in 
1965, as the $1.975 million cost of additional service was more than offset by the $2.135 
million increase in revenue from higher ridership.41 The amounts massively exceeded the 
TTC’s 1963 projections of a $63,000 combined surplus from 1963 to 1968.42 While it did 
not prove possible to maintain profitability indefinitely amid the rampant inflation of the 
1970s, the provision of service to new suburbs was not the clear financial drain that was 
predicted, as long as the service was attractive enough to entice suburban riders who 
could afford cars. The ridership turnaround and the beginning of steady growth after 1963 
put the TTC on a much more stable footing. There was no longer a question of whether it 
would fade away into insignificance like so many of its American counterparts. More 
critically, the service expansion had come as many of the new suburban neighbourhoods 
were being built, allowing them to establish transit-oriented travel patterns from the 
outset, and while the TTC still retained substantial Metro-wide support. 
The ridership and financial success of the expansion thoroughly belies the 
assertion of some Toronto writers, like Lawrence Solomon, a vehement critic of urban 
sprawl who perhaps let his distaste for suburbs blind him to the success of the TTC’s 
suburban transit. Indeed, he denounces the agency as having been an “agent of sprawl” 
after Metro forced it to expand service to the suburbs.43 He lamented the failure of the 
TTC to attract more riders in the first decade of the TTC, when it expanded its route-
 
40 R.R. Gillespie, “T.T.C. Passenger Revenue - Metropolitan Zone Fare System, May 1964” (Toronto Transit 
Commission, June 17, 1964), City of Toronto Archives. 
41 “Ninth Annual Report”; “Tenth Annual Report”; “Eleventh Annual Report”; “Twelfth Annual Report” (Toronto 
Transit Commission, 1965). 
42 “Assumption of TTC Debt Will Be Studied by Metro,” The Globe and Mail, August 14, 1963. 
43 Solomon, Toronto Sprawls, 13. 
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mileage significantly but provided only limited service on its suburban routes. He entirely 
neglects to examine the following decade, when the TTC dramatically expanded service 
on its suburban routes and experienced tremendous ridership gains. While he describes 
the suburban services as “uneconomic,” he ignores that the financial performance of the 
TTC improved after the 1963 expansion.44 Regardless, as will be explored in Chapter 7, 
American agencies that attempted to cling to the idea of operating transit as a profitable 
business through the postwar decades ended up in the spiral of fare hikes, ridership 
declines, and service cuts. Eschewing subsidy and refusing to serve the growing parts of 
the metropolitan area would not have been a better path for the TTC.  
The Bloor-Danforth subway opened its fare gates on February 25, 1966, 
accompanied by another enormous expansion of the connecting bus network. Instead of 
waiting for the aging and wildly overcrowded streetcars, riders travelling east and west 
across the city could now descend the stairs into immaculate white-tiled stations and 
climb aboard speedy new silver trains. The architecture drew no raves; a critic compared 
the stations unfavourably to Montreal’s new Metro stations, complaining that “little 
thought seems to have been given to the emotional context of travelling.” While they were 
“superbly functional” and “pathologically clean,” they were “as colourful as the gent’s 
toilets that adorned Victorian England at the time of the Prince Consort.” The surface 
entrance pavilions, which doubled as sheltered terminals for connecting bus routes so 
that passengers could pass seamlessly into the subway below without stopping at fare 
gates, were “a prelude to the tiled sterility below.”45 Despite the aesthetic shortcomings, 
 
44 Solomon, 14–15. 
45 Robert Gretton, “Metro: Laurier,” The Canadian Architect 12, no. 2 (February 1, 1967): 27–29. 
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the functionality of the service, embedded within a frequent network of surface transit, 
attracted legions of new riders—19,110,441 (6.6%) more in 1966 than in the previous year. 
Of the new riders, over 7 million were in the suburbs—a 12% increase in suburban 
ridership—even though the subway didn’t directly serve the suburban municipalities. The 
2.2 million vehicle-miles of additional suburban service (another 16% increase) made it 
easy for suburbanites to get from their homes to the subway, which then provided them 
with a quick ride downtown or across town, the latter possibility being one of the key 
reasons for preferring the Bloor-Danforth route over the “U” route that was exclusively 
oriented toward downtown commuting.46 
These results were in keeping with the service elasticities estimated by Boisjoly et 
al, and even better than those estimated by Currie et al. The TTC obtained a 7.5% 
suburban ridership increase for a 10% increase in vehicle-miles of suburban service, 
compared with 8.27% estimated by Boisjoly et al and 3.5% estimated by Currie and 
Wallis.47 
The ridership turnaround and the beginning of steady growth after 1963 put the 
TTC on a much more stable footing. It was no longer a question of whether it would fade 
away into insignificance like so many of its American counterparts. The commission’s new 
chair, Ralph Day, a businessman with ample respect for the TTC’s staff, helped the 
organization heal from fierce internecine battles of the late 1950s when the TTC’s fiercely 
defended independence was threatened by its proposed transformation into a normal 
Metro department.  
 
46 “Annual Report to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 1966” (Toronto Transit Commission, July 13, 1967). 
47 Currie and Wallis, “Effective Ways to Grow Urban Bus Markets – a Synthesis of Evidence”; Boisjoly et al., 
“Invest in the Ride.” 
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Under Day, the defence of its independence was maintained, with the commission 
going so far as to ban the Metro Council liaison from all its discussions not directly related 
to subway construction, where Metro’s outsize financial contribution made his exclusion 
untenable. Members of the public were excluded entirely.48 As Eli Comay, who replaced 
Jones as Metro planning commissioner in 1962, explained in a 1966 address, Metro 
Council played an increasing role in subway planning, but “while the commission is 
subjected to sporadic pressures from local Councils and other groups for specific service 
improvements, it has retained complete authority over basic service decisions.”49 
Paul Mees claimed that Toronto’s transit exemplifies comprehensive planning, 
because the TTC ran all local transit in contrast with transit systems in other major cities 
that were fragmented between several private operators.50 However, the TTC’s expansion 
of service to the suburbs was not a result of comprehensive long-term planning. 
Comprehensive planning efforts of the period, as we will see, paid little attention to bus 
service; transit planning was all about large-scale capital projects. Instead, the creation of 
the suburban bus grid was perhaps best defined as an example of Charles Lindblom’s 
theory of “muddling through.”51 The “scientific” rational-comprehensive model was then 
very much in vogue. As seminally described by Edward Banfield, it called for definition of 
objectives, followed by development of alternatives to achieve the stated objectives, and 
finally evaluation of the various alternatives to determine the optimal solution.52 This 
model formed the basis of many comprehensive transportation planning studies, which 
 
48 Frisken, “Public Transit and the Public Interest: An Empirical Evaluation of Two Administrative Models,” 35. 
49 Comay, “The Toronto Transit Commission and the Metropolitan Corporation: An Appraisal.” 
50 Mees, A Very Public Solution, 269. 
51 Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through.’” 
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sought to determine, using quantitative methods such as demand models, the optimal 
transportation infrastructure network. Alan Black, in his examination of the Chicago 
transportation plan of that period, provides an excellent example of the model, in which 
formal policy options are developed and then ostensibly dispassionately evaluated based 
on pre-established criteria.53  
The 1963 service expansion, by contrast, is much better described by Lindblom’s 
“selective limited comparisons” model. As Lindblom described, the “selection of value 
goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one another but 
are closely intertwined.” The suburban bus grid was not a policy developed as a result of 
rational evaluation of a series of alternatives. Instead, it was a reaction to the institutional 
needs of the TTC to satisfy the political needs of the suburban members of Metro Council, 
which prompted the development of a policy that would effectively show the TTC flag in 
suburban areas at minimal cost. According to Lindblom, “The test of a ‘good’ policy is 
typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their 
agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective).” This is quite an 
apt description of the situation in Toronto at the time: the TTC was reluctant to expand 
suburban service, while suburban councillors preferred a cut to their constituents’ fares, 
but both could agree on an expansion of local suburban bus service. Finally, Lindblom 
argues that in the selected limited comparisons model, there is no serious evaluation of 
alternatives. While there was some quantitative analysis conducted by the TTC to 
determine where precisely the suburban expansions should be located, many of the 
 
53 Black, “The Chicago Area Transportation Study.” 
182 
 
changes were the result of requests from local municipal councils, and in any case, there 
was never a serious study of other alternatives to providing suburban bus service.  
The TTC successfully muddled its way through to the creation of a successful 
suburban transit system. This was a unique experiment in North America. No other city 
was seriously expanding local transit to the furthest-flung new suburbs in the early 1960s. 
At a time when much transit remained in private hands in the United States, and when 
many systems were cutting rather than expanding, the TTC embarked, ad hoc though the 
planning may have been, on a bold experiment. It was an experiment that undeniably 
succeeded. Countless Torontonians embraced the postwar dream of moving out to a 
house with a big yard in the suburbs. But, uniquely, they left the car in the garage much 
of the time and walked out to the main road to catch the bus because the service that was 
offered was attractive enough to entice them to make that choice. If the Metro and the 
TTC had taken the advice of those transit fatalists who suggested that suburban transit 
service was uneconomic and doomed to failure, that experiment would never have taken 
place. Instead, those bold decisions in the early 1960s set Metropolitan Toronto on a very 
different path from other urban regions across the continent.
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Chapter 6: Big Plans, Land Use, and the Planning Board 
Toronto has a long history of comprehensive planning. The city began with 
Governor John Graves Simcoe’s establishment of a grid of streets extending from the lake. 
Toronto followed the North American trend with aesthetically oriented city beautiful 
plans for the downtown of the 1920s and 1930s, which remained mostly unbuilt aside 
from Union Station.1 The 1960s saw a blossoming of a new, more comprehensive form of 
planning in the Toronto Area, led by the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board. It was 
later joined by the Provincial government, which embarked on its own regional planning 
efforts. The Planning Board was established at the same time as the new Metropolitan 
government, but its geographical remit was even more extensive. The plans were a curious 
hybrid: while there was considerable recognition of the need to shift people to public 
transportation, they retained all of the enormous plans for expressway expansion of the 
1940s and 50s. This early planning was nevertheless quite influential in the course of 
development of the region—much more than later, more ambitious plans—and it included 
several elements that have enabled or facilitated the success of the TTC. Nevertheless, 
Metro planners were sceptical of the potential for transit to increase its mode share, were 
focused almost entirely on transit capital projects like subways, and played no meaningful 
role in the expansion of local transit service in suburbia that was the key turning point in 
the TTC’s ridership performance. Between the cancellation of its expressways and the 
TTC’s incremental approach to transit, Metro’s sophisticated planning operation had a 
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relatively limited direct role in shaping Toronto’s transportation system, but their broader 
policies around land use were important in enabling Toronto’s transit success. 
Paul Mees has argued that Toronto’s suburban transit success is a result of 
comprehensive planning.2 The history, however, clearly indicates that the high suburban 
service levels were created on an ad hoc, rather than comprehensively planned, basis. 
They were ratified later through the establishment of service standards. Mees is of course 
correct, however, that they were enabled by transit being administered by a single central 
authority at the TTC. Even if there was no comprehensive plan, the unified governance 
made universal standards not merely possible, but arguably inevitable. Still, the historical 
record shows that Toronto’s transit success owes more to short-term political calculation, 
fortuitous circumstance, and incremental planning efforts like the 1963 expansion than it 
does to long-term, comprehensive regional planning. 
One of the most strikingly progressive actions of the Frost government when it 
created Metro was to give the Planning Board responsibility for not only planning Metro 
itself, much of which remained agricultural, but also the surrounding Townships of 
Toronto (now Mississauga), Toronto Gore (now part of Brampton), Vaughan, Markham, 
and Pickering, as well as the towns embedded within them. The goal of the board’s wide 
jurisdiction was to preclude “leapfrog” development beyond the boundaries of Metro.  
 




Figure 17: Map of the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board3 
 
This approach swam against the tide of many of the dominant planning ideas of 
the period. The United Kingdom was then undertaking construction of numerous satellite 
“new towns,” inspired by the Garden Cities of Ebenezer Howard.4 France also developed 
a series of villes nouvelles in the 1960s, and in the United States, Rexford Tugwell’s 
Greenbelt, Maryland had linked the concept to the principles of the New Deal. The guiding 
motivation of the Metro planners’ idiosyncratic policy was not transportation, but rather 
water and sewage. Metro officials were especially anxious about growing numbers of 
 
3 “Official Plan of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area” (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, 1959). 
4 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 138–41. 
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suburban developments using septic tanks for their sewage, which was a looming public 
health and environmental concern.5 Connecting the growing suburbs to water and sewage 
infrastructure was one of the key reasons for the creation of the metropolitan 
government.6 Plans for the region consistently recommended concentrating development 
in a band along the lake, with northern parts of the region remaining rural, to facilitate 
the provision of water and sewer infrastructure from the lake.7  
In addition to these more prosaic reasons, the influence of planning consultant 
Hans Blumenfeld undoubtedly contributed to the Planning Board’s outlook. In his 
writing, he had perspicaciously noted that satellite towns rarely function as independent 
communities. The greater distance from other parts of the conurbation necessitated by 
their geographical isolation simply results in longer commuting distances. At any rate, he 
argued that it would be impossible to restrain the size of successful satellite cities so that 
they did not grow into one another. “The fixation on the ‘New Town,” he wrote, “is rooted 
in a conscious or unconscious desire to escape from the complexities of our rapidly 
changing times into a simpler and stabler world that probably never existed and certainly 
cannot exist today.”8 
Though speculators had already acquired large development sites in the non-metro 
townships, Gardiner declared that the Planning Board was “doing everything possible to 
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block mass residential development in the rural areas.”9 The local municipalities were not 
always enthusiastic. Fred Armstrong, reeve of Woodbridge, compared the Planning Board 
to the Gestapo, claiming that it is undemocratic, “has too much authority and is strangling 
development in the fringe areas.”10 
While local municipalities retained control of local planning matters, including the 
zoning of land not adjacent to metropolitan roads, the Board planned for the region as a 
whole. Since Metro did not pass a binding official plan until 1980, its role was largely 
advisory to both the province, which retained ultimate authority to approve major 
developments, and to local municipalities as they developed their own plans.11  This belied 
its power, however, as the province almost always followed its recommendations, 
especially when it came to development approvals in rural areas. Using his influence with 
the provincial cabinet, Gardiner had established a practice that the provincial minister 
always consulted with the Planning Board before approving a project.12 As a result, there 
was very little non-contiguous development in the two decades of the planning board’s 
jurisdiction beyond Metro. 
The exception proves the rule, as White argues. The sole major development of the 
era that was not contiguous with the Toronto urbanized area was Bramalea, a 4,000-acre 
suburban master planned community located in the Township of Chinguacousy—just 
outside the planning board’s jurisdiction.13 Located well to the northwest of Metro, it was 
a truly isolated new town when construction began in the early 1960s, and it was planned 
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on thoroughly auto-oriented principles. The Planning Board’s jurisdiction was limited to 
the municipalities contiguous to Metropolitan Toronto, and the small township of 
Toronto Gore provided a buffer. Bramalea was near the Town of Brampton, which was 
the largest town in the environs of Metro.14 
Erin Mills was a similar and contemporaneous development project, but it sat 
within the Planning Board’s jurisdiction in the Township of Toronto west of Metro. 
Located on a site several kilometres to the west of existing development and north of the 
lake, it was rejected, despite being proposed by E.P. Taylor, the very prominent 
industrialist who had built Don Mills. Despite his influence, he was not able to secure 
provincial cabinet assent to the project against the planning board’s policies. It was only 
built later, in the 1970s, after the area was no longer subject to Metro planners’ authority, 
and when existing development had already reached the site.15 
Aside from these few notable exceptions, there were few attempts to build the type 
of non-contiguous new town, whether transit-oriented as in the European cases of 
Vällingby and, to some extent, Milton Keynes, or auto-oriented, as in Greenbelt, 
Maryland. Instead, development steadily progressed outward from the city centre, 
advancing in a solid front as arterial grid blocks were filled in. As the suburban townships 
gradually developed, the existing villages were subsumed and became little more than 
geographical expressions, marked only by the curiosity of a handful of prewar buildings 
 
14 Bill Davis, who represented Brampton and succeeded Robarts as premier is frequently blamed or credited, 
depending on perspective, for Brampton receiving special privileges in terms of infrastructure and for its exemption 
from planning limits. This situation existed well before Davis was elected premier, and can likely be attributed to 
Brampton’s position as by far the largest town in the area immediately around Metro, with a population of 18,000 
people in 1961 in comparison with 5,000 in Streetsville and 7,000 in Port Credit. Before Davis, Brampton was 
represented by T.L. Kennedy, an equally influential figure who had served as premier for a year in the 1940s and 
was minister of agriculture until 1953. He was, however, a Streetsville native. His influence was not able to prevent 
Streetsville from being included in the Planning Board’s jurisdiction. 
15 White, Planning Toronto, 132. 
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amid a sea of postwar construction. The model contrasted with the American northeast, 
where many suburbs grew from existing villages, which retained their traditional core. 
The new developments themselves were typically planned extensively by 
consultants working for developers, who were required to produce a detailed plan in order 
to receive development approval. They were often modeled on Don Mills, in some cases 
by explicit mandate: in the borough of Scarborough, developers were required to 
complete secondary plans for their projects, and the Scarborough planning commissioner 
specifically requested that they emulate Don Mills. Don Mills itself was simply an 
expression of broader trends in North American planning, as Richard White noted in his 
history of Toronto planning. “What occurred in Metropolitan Toronto from 1950 to 1965,” 
he wrote, “was not the cloning of Don Mills but the application of a new, internationally 
accepted style of suburban design, of which Don Mills is one of Toronto’s leading 
examples.”16 
The Toronto model could trace its intellectual lineage to the “neighbourhood unit” 
model of Clarence Perry, described in his 1939 book Housing for the Machine Age. White 
attributes its spread in Toronto to Eugene Faludi, who was the most active of these 
consultants in the 1950s, but the model persisted for decades.17 Some developments, 
notably Don Mills, had pretentions to being self-contained communities, an aspiration 
that remarkably persists in the 21st century. It was, and is, of course entirely unrealistic 
for a neighbourhood embedded within a large metropolitan area, especially as two-
income families became more common and household members had to commute to 
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entirely different locations. After the first few years, only about five percent of Don Mills 
residents were employed within the community.18 Though the idea had superficial appeal, 
it was never going to be possible to eliminate the need for travel by quarantining residents 
within their neighbourhoods, especially with the widespread available of automobiles. 
Each development—typically consisting of an approximately square-mile 
superblock created by the region’s arterial grid, and sometimes combined with adjacent 
blocks—was planned as a self-contained unit with schools and recreational facilities at its 
heart. Around them were houses on a warren of curvilinear streets. Businesses, including 
shops, were relegated to the fringes—in the form of strip malls along the arterials in the 
early years, and in later years often with shopping centres at the arterial intersections. 
They embraced Perry’s view that shops in the interior would “blemish upon residential 
quality” and would “occasion noise and traffic in an area where quiet and tranquility are 
desirable.”19 
This model had both positive and negative effects for transit. On the one hand, the 
absence of leapfrog development meant that it was easy to extend surface transit along 
arterial roads as new concession blocks developed. The arterial grid of bus routes ran 
along roads lined with shops and other businesses, since those were the permitted 
locations for commerce. An often overlooked, but essential element of the neighbourhood 
planning was the provision of direct paths from internal neighbourhood streets to the 
arterials, which prevented transit users from needing to walk out of their way on 
meandering suburban residential streets. This in turn enabled the TTC to keep most of its 
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19 Arthur Clarence Perry, Housing for the Machine Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1939), 68–71. 
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suburban routes on the direct arterial roads, rather than needing to take inefficient paths 
down circuitous neighbourhood streets to bring bus stops within reasonable walking 
distance. 
On the other hand, the neighbourhood unit model precluded the “string of pearls” 
approach of new towns centred on transit stations that epitomized transit-oriented 
greenfield development in Europe, most notably in Scandinavia.20 That particular model 
of new town could bring considerable benefits to the provision of public transportation, 
especially rail transit. New towns could be designed around railway stations, with the 
station at the heart of the commercial centre of the town surrounded by higher-density 
housing, and finally lower density housing in an outer ring. The European approach 
created a more attractive pedestrian environment within the neighbourhood. 
Vällingby, a new town on the outskirts of Stockholm, is an illustrative example. Key 
to the distinctive approach was the European planners’ comparative toleration of mixed 
uses, and in particular their acceptance of commerce as being legitimately present at the 
heart of a community.  Vällingby was built according to a high modernist plan in which 
the Tunnelbana (subway) station is at the centre of the district, with a civic square and 
shopping centre above. It is ringed by high-rise apartment buildings, as well as a handful 
of office buildings. Beyond are lower-density walk-up apartments and single-family 
homes. The entire neighbourhood is within a reasonable walking distance of the rail 
station. As a result of this approach, the large majority of residents who commute out of 
Stockholm’s new towns use transit, while the majority of residents who work in the new 
 
20 Bernick and Robert Cervero, Transit Villages in the 21st Century, 111. 
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town walk or cycle.21 As Doucet and Doucet pointed out, this is in stark contrast with 
suburban Toronto, where many residents get to work by transit, but few walk or cycle to 
work within their communities.22 
Even when developments were consciously designed on the new town model, and 
designed at relatively high density, transit infrastructure was rarely included. Flemingdon 
Park, just south of Don Mills, is a master planned neighbourhood built in the early 1960s 
that included 180 acres dedicated to 4,884 units of housing, mostly in walk-up and high-
rise apartment blocks. They were set, along with 35 acres of industrial and office park, in 
a Corbusian plan amid 140 acres of green space. Macklin L. Hancock, the president of 
Project Planning Associates who was lead planner for the neighbourhood and had 
previously been one of the main designers of Don Mills, described the project as being 
inspired by Vällingby. Transit, however, was a comparative afterthought. While Vällingby 
was planned entirely around its rapid transit station, Hancock’s consideration of 
transportation access to Flemingdon Park in his review of the project focuses almost 
entirely on highways and on the neighbourhood’s connections to the adjacent Don Valley 
Parkway. He simply notes that “The nearness to the central core makes future transit 
practicable,” though he considers that such service will come in the long-term.23 
Nevertheless, Flemingdon Park demonstrates the success of transit in suburban 
Toronto. It has become a very transit-oriented community, as one of the city’s busiest bus 
routes directly serves the neighbourhood, among several other routes. It has a high transit 
 
21 Cervero, The Transit Metropolis, 116–27. 
22 Doucet and Doucet, Streetcars and the Changing Geography of Toronto. 
23 Macklin L. Hancock, “Flemingdon Park, A New Urban Community,” in Planning the Canadian Environment, by 
L.O. Gertler (Montreal: Harvest House, 1968), 205–28. 
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mode share, and the bus routes serving the area are very well used. This demonstrates the 
value of the frequent bus grid to enable neighbourhoods even at a distance from rail 
service to heavily use transit. It was even the subject of an experiment in the 1980s, in 
which the TTC significantly improved transit service to determine whether riders would 
follow; they did, in large numbers.24 However, the lack of planning to introduce rail 
service when the area was built means that travel times remain long to many destinations 
and buses are overcrowded. There are plans in 2019 for an “Ontario Line” rapid transit 
route to serve Flemingdon Park, but it will come at a far higher cost than if it had been 
included as part of the community’s initial planning—as it typically was in European new 
towns.   
Flemingdon Park’s large proportion of multi-unit housing was unusual, but not 
unique in newly developed areas of Toronto in the 1960s. Though the bulk of housing 
construction remained in the form of single-family homes, the Planning Board hesitantly 
encouraged increased population density in order to limit the cost of services, including 
transit. Still, they were not willing or able to make the goals of higher density legally 
binding; one planner’s proposal to mandate that no district’s zoning could permit density 
thirty percent below or fifty percent above the official plan’s goals for the district was 
dismissed by Jones as politically infeasible.25 The planners also remained sceptical of the 
social cost of apartment living, with Jones arguing that high-rise apartment living was 
"anything but ideal for the needs of growing children or their parents" and instead 
favouring "middle density accommodation in non-apartment multiple dwellings." 
 
24 Steve Munro, interview by author, February 13, 2020. 
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Nevertheless, Jones pointed out that "some of the pockets of suburban apartment 
development are now sufficiently concentrated to support good suburban bus service."26 
Some suburban municipalities chose to permit apartment construction, largely due to the 
tax revenues it generated, and developers unexpectedly responded with numerous 
projects.27 About two-fifths of apartments built from 1955-63 were in the large suburban 
municipalities of Scarborough, Etobicoke, and North York.28 A number of high-rise 
apartment buildings were built near new subway stations, but many of them were, like 
Flemingdon Park, simply sited along major arterial roads. As Filion et al has explained, 
many of the densest pockets of residential construction in the city were not located on rail 
transit routes.29 
Social housing was also widely present in Toronto’s suburbs, a policy that was 
initially driven, over substantial opposition, by Gardiner. By forcing through the 
Lawrence Heights project in North York over two years of objections from neighbours and 
the township, he set a precedent for the suburbs to accept a reasonable share of social 
housing.30 This was in stark contrast to most American urban regions, where affordable 
housing in suburban municipalities did not generally come until decades later, and even 
then often only after lengthy litigation.31 
 
26 Murray Jones, “Metropolitan Man, Some Economic and Social Aspects,” Plan Canada 4, no. 1 (June 1963): 18–
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28 Jones, “Metropolitan Man, Some Economic and Social Aspects.” 
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The presence of apartments meant that, while many suburban areas remained 
typical suburban single-family communities, Toronto’s overall suburban densities were 
somewhat higher than typical postwar suburbia in the United States. Nevertheless, they 
were not spectacularly higher. Despite decades of policies in Toronto promoting 
intensification, overall density of Toronto’s suburbs is no higher than that of Los Angeles, 
and about 50% lower than Santa Ana in Orange County, where transit ridership is 
negligible. While these densities facilitated transit’s success, they were certainly not 
sufficient, as the limited transit use in many similarly dense U.S. locations demonstrates. 
Furthermore, the availability of frequent transit was an essential ingredient for enabling 
suburban multi-family housing to be successful, and for the suburbs to achieve a relatively 
greater social mix. 
The Planning Board itself consisted of members who were mostly affluent laymen, 
and who were later joined by representatives of the municipalities outside Metro and of 
agencies including the TTC. They were advised by a capable expert staff. It was ostensibly 
apolitical and technocratic, which was especially important given its expansive 
jurisdiction beyond Metro’s boundaries. However, once Gardiner had secured his ex 
officio seat, he became the driving force.32  
In addition to its role of providing advice on individual development proposals, the 
board built up a highly sophisticated expert staff to prepare very expansive, and, in many 
cases, highly progressive comprehensive plans for the region. Its first commissioner was 
Murray Jones, a thirty-year-old, well-spoken graduate of Canada’s first academic 
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planning program at McGill University, who, with Gardiner’s support, developed a 
sophisticated research operation.33  
The Board placed Toronto at the global cutting edge of transportation demand 
forecasting. The Cleveland Transportation Study, led by Thomas Fratar, developed the 
first computerized method for distributing future origin-destination travel data using 
expected urban growth, and based on this work the Eno Foundation for Highway Traffic 
Control published Highway Traffic Estimation in 1956, which introduced the concept to 
widespread adoption.34 In the same year, the Planning Board was already using similar 
techniques in studies for the new east-west subway; by 1964, it had an enormous Univac 
1107 dubbed the Metropolitan Traffic Computer, which was used to compile data from a 
variety of surveys into a comprehensive transportation demand model.35  
Eli Comay, who succeeded Jones in 1962, continued the intellectual tradition. He 
was a Detroit-native red-diaper baby and Harvard planning graduate who came to 
Toronto after McCarthyism forced him out of his job as a planner at the City of Chicago. 
Another key member was Hans Blumenfeld, also a serious thinker on planning issues, 
who served as a kind of internal consultant. Born near Hamburg, he also had communist 
inclinations and had participated in the planning of the Moscow Metro until he was 
expelled from the Soviet Union amid Stalin’s Great Purge. Though he remained 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union, he moved to the United States, and then joined the 
Planning Board in 1955 at the age of 63, also after McCarthyism hampered his planning 
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career in the United States. Len Gertler, a practicing planner and professor of planning at 
the University of Waterloo, described him as a “wise man scholar in the field.”36 Though 
he was unquestionably a man of the left, it was the left of an earlier generation—the left 
of the five-year plans—a left that focused on goals like industrial growth and expanded 
infrastructure. He frequently clashed with the urban New Left that emerged in Toronto 
of the 1970s, which had a much more nostalgic and small-is-beautiful outlook, and which 
tenaciously fought his plans for expressways and urban renewal.  
Transportation planning within Metro was coordinated by the Transportation 
Planning Advisory Committee between multiple agencies, including the TTC, the 
Planning Board, and the Roads and Traffic departments. More detailed operational 
planning was coordinated by the Transportation Technical Advisory Committee, on which 
the same agencies were represented and which made its recommendations to Metro 
Council, the Planning Board, the operating agencies, or the local municipalities. Comay 
claimed that despite the many committees, in practice they “achieve[d] a reasonable 
degree of coordination.”37 
In 1956, the Planning Board produced its first major transit planning document, 
examining an East-West Subway and Expressway across the downtown. The report also 
included broader conclusions on transportation planning. It noted the importance of 
transit, including the need for surface transit to feed riders to a subway, since only 
downtown would have the density of origins and destinations needed to fill a subway by 
pedestrian access alone. Still, it also emphasized ample parking at subway stations. But 
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the Board focused on transit as means primarily of serving peak period commuter trips, 
especially to downtown, rather than as a comprehensive transportation system.38  
The Board released a draft official plan, largely produced by Comay, in 1959. It was 
a voluminous document complete with extensive aerial photography and a variety of well-
designed maps. The transportation plan, which was expected to be refined with a more 
detailed subsequent report, did include a 37-mile subway network. In addition to the 
Bloor-Danforth-University route that was already approved, there were to be extensions 
to the Bloor-Danforth and Yonge lines into the suburbs, a subway to the northwest in the 
Spadina expressway alignment, and the subway on Queen Street that had been part of the 
city’s plans since 1911. Nevertheless, the plan was pessimistic about the viability of transit, 
suggesting that rapid transit connected to feeder buses would be viable as a mode of 
transit only out to about 10 miles from the downtown core. Beyond that, it was assumed 
that the transit system would not be competitive in terms of travel time with the 
automobile, and suggested they be served by commuter rail with stations about 2 miles 
apart or with express buses on expressways. In those respects, it bore a strong 
resemblance to Bartholomew’s coeval plan for Washington. 
Like many “balanced” transportation plans of the era, most of the emphasis was 
on expressways, of which thirteen were proposed. The plan was developed using the 
planning board’s pioneering computerized transportation demand model.39 Even years 
later, in his autobiography, Blumenfeld argued that, while the idea that transportation 
could rely entirely on the automobile was “absurd,” it was also folly to reject urban 
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expressways entirely. He was a consistent partisan of the “balanced” approach to 
transportation planning. Curiously, Cervero described Blumenfeld as an “arch-enemy of 
the car culture,” and as a leader in organizing opposition to Metro’s planned Spadina 
Expressway.40 This assessment may have surprised Blumenfeld, who was one of the key 
designers of the Spadina project, and who argued in his biography that “the ‘stop-the-
freeway’ dogmatism reflects the same primitive pseudologic as did the ‘clear-the-slums’ 
doctrine.”41 Freeways, he believed, are necessary to move goods and people travelling to 
dispersed locations, and they have lower neighbourhood impacts than moving traffic on 
local streets. He and the rest of the Metro planners were not simply throughput 
maximizing engineers, however. They were very much in the Moses/Bartholomew 
tradition of expressway design, favouring creative approaches to minimize the impact of 
urban expressways, like building through parks and decking overtop.42  
The plan included a regional expressway network to be built by the provincial 
government and an urban network to be built by Metro. The latter included five radial 
expressways totalling 103 miles, of which two (the Lakeshore—later Gardiner—
Expressway and the Don Valley Parkway) were already underway. The plans called for a 
destructive expressway loop around the downtown core that would be familiar to the 
residents of most American cities. Planning scholar Jeffrey Brown described a contrast in 
expressway visions between the “traffic service” model, which was favoured by engineers 
and prioritized vehicle throughput, and the model favoured by planners that also 
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incorporate a broader social and urban renewal role and seek to mitigate the negative 
effect of new highways on neighbourhoods. While none of the new urban highways were 
explicitly designed with the intention to demolish areas deemed slums, as was the case in 
many similar American projects, the necessary demolition was still unimaginable by 
present standards. This came despite considerable efforts to, as Brown would describe, 
sacrifice traffic capacity for neighbourhood compatibility. The Metro expressways, while 
impressive in scope on a map, were to have relatively few lanes and they followed routes 
that avoided residential neighbourhoods where possible. Still, communities ranging from 
the bohemian Annex, the heavily immigrant Christie Street corridor, and elite Rosedale 
were all planned to be bisected by new roads.43 
In the end, the unwieldy draft plan never actually became official, as the 
constituent municipalities of Metro viewed the idea of a binding metropolitan plan as an 
intrusion into their own planning jurisdiction. Gardiner, never enthused with 
comprehensive planning, did not quarrel. "It would have only stirred up trouble," he told 
his biographer Timothy Colton in an interview. "We were getting things accomplished for 
the metropolitan area without having to set it all down in a plan."44 Instead, the plan acted 
as a broad vision for urban growth, as well as a guide for the development of metropolitan 
infrastructure.45  
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Figure 18: Recommended Transportation Plan, 196446 
The promised refinement of the “preliminary” transportation plan from 1959 
finally appeared in 1964. It included a significant land use component, which sought to 
favour contiguous development while permitting significant growth on greenfields and 
recognizing the increasing desire of industries to locate on the periphery. This effort 
produced a transportation master plan that largely ratified existing decisions. It included 
a network of expressways, the suburban portion of which was largely completed by the 
Province in the subsequent decades while the urban projects, to be built by Metro, were 
nearly all abandoned. The transit plan was mostly built over the following decade, and it 
brought rapid transit to Metro’s main suburbs. It included the Bloor-Danforth subway, 
then under construction, as well as a subway in the planned Spadina expressway corridor 
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and a northward extension to the existing Yonge line. The most notable shift was in its 
position that a Queen Street subway was not warranted, suggesting instead a short tunnel 
through the core for the existing streetcars. While the Queen subway remained on the 
books, it began receding ever further into the distance.47  
A preparatory report produced by Traffic Research Corporation and Hans 
Blumenfeld tellingly described the significant projected volume of passengers on the 
surface transit network as “one of the most surprising and most important results.” It 
emphasized the “decisive importance of the maintenance of a fast, frequent, and extensive 
surface transit system, both as a feeder to the subways and as a supplement to them; as 
well as the need of a road system of a capacity sufficient to accommodate both private 
vehicles and public transit at acceptable speeds.”48 Notably, their scenarios projected 
peak bus headways ranging from two minutes in the inner city to ten minutes in the 
outermost suburbs.49  
The final report nevertheless included only a cursory discursion on the 
“importance of surface transit,” which emphasized the provision of express buses since 
speed of service was deemed to be critical. The recommended plan included a “relatively 
modest express bus network,” with the subway fed by 12 express routes on arterial streets 
and 10 routes on expressways.50 When suburban bus service was expanded in the 1960s 
and 70s, it did not follow this comprehensive plan’s proposals. Instead, nearly all new 
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suburban service consisted of more ad hoc improvements to local arterial buses. An 
arterial express bus network would not be introduced until the twenty-first century, while 
as of 2020 there is no comprehensive network of buses on the city’s expressways. 
In some respects, the philosophy behind the plan was quite progressive. While the 
goal of the plan was defined as "the efficient and safe movement of people and goods," it 
noted that such a goal cannot be easily defined. "Efficient movement certainly means fast 
movement," but they warned that "faster movement may also induce people to take longer 
trips." While some increases in mobility may be "good," as in the case of improvement to 
very poor transportation facilities that limited people's employment options to locations 
near their homes, they warned that excessive increases in mobility could simply lead to 
"sprawl." Avoiding a vicious cycle of the latter would require effective land use planning.51 
Nevertheless, the criteria used to evaluate alternatives were characteristic of most 
traditional, predict-and-provide plans of the era: “1. Minimize total travelling time; 2. 
Maximize average travelling speed; 3. Minimize points of congestion; 4. Equalize 
accessibility within most parts of the urban area, and particular maximize accessibility to 
the central area; 5. Maximize the use of public transportation, in particular rapid transit; 
6. Maximize the use of expressways." 
As a plan, it bore a considerable resemblance to the heavily quantitative, rational-
comprehensive plans being produced in many other regions, albeit with somewhat 
broader objectives. The Chicago Area Transportation Study of the late 1950s and early 
1960s was one of the many similar plans, which were further spurred by a federal mandate 
for regional comprehensive planning in exchange for highway funds. As Alan Black 
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described, the Chicago plan’s goals were focused primarily on maximizing speed while 
minimizing cost and disruption.  It also included a transit component—one new line and 
extensions to three existing lines—but there was no discussion whatsoever of bus service 
beyond planning two express bus routes on expressways. The primary emphasis was on a 
230-mile expansion of the expressway network. Black’s description of the Chicago plan 
could equally apply to the Toronto plan: “The major fault of CATS was failing to anticipate 
the issues that were to become important in transportation planning. The staff often 
talked about the future, but it was a future that extrapolated the past and maintained the 
status quo.” Though Toronto’s plan more seriously considered the importance of transit, 
its apolitical, quantitative approach failed to anticipate the substantial social changes that 
would come in the late 1960s—not least, in this case, the popular revolt against urban 
expressways and against mass demolition for public works more generally (see chapter 
9).52 
As a transit plan, it largely compiled projects that were already approved or had 
long been discussed. As a result, with the notable exception of the Queen subway that 
remains unbuilt, it includes nearly the entire network that is in place as of 2020. The 
expressway plan was far less prophetic. Though most of the provincial highways were 
built, expressway revolts of the 1970s derailed virtually the entire urban Metro 
expressway network.  
An updated official plan in 1966 was much less detailed than that of 1959, and it, 
too, was downgraded from a binding official plan to “a statement of the policy of the 
Metropolitan Corporation for the planning of future Metropolitan works and services and 
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as a guide for future development in the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area.”53 It 
included several subway extensions, but principal discussion was limited to 
recommendations that projects be coordinated between the Planning Board and the TTC. 
Buses did not rate a mention, beyond the need for good facilities for connection between 
bus and subway. While inner city stations were expected to be served by feeder buses, 
outer suburban stations were to be equipped with ample parking lots.54 
The outer suburban subway extensions were designed specifically to maximize the 
amount of parking available at the stations, and it was a constant focus of planning 
studies. Many of the outermost stations, particularly the terminals, were surrounded by 
large surface parking lots. They were of, at most, marginal significance, however, in terms 
of the stations’ ridership. A few years after it opened, Islington station, the western 
terminal of the Bloor-Danforth subway, was accommodating 50,000 riders per day. 
Though it was surrounded by a sea of parking, fully 70% of its riders got to the station by 
connecting bus.55  At Warden station, the eastern terminal of the line, 17,000 riders 
connected to the bus. Only 2,000 used the parking lots, while another 3,000 were 
dropped off.56 The TTC’s suburban bus grid, in place since 1963, received comparatively 
little attention in planning studies, but it was quite obviously the key to filling all the rail 
transit routes in the studies’ ambitious capital plans. 
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Though large-scale planning efforts of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board 
were never implemented as official plans, and the Planning Board spent little effort to 
analyze the effects of surface transit, some of its policies nevertheless significantly 
enhanced the prospects of public transportation in Toronto. The Board was quite 
successful in its early years at achieving its goals of preventing leapfrog development, 
encouraging somewhat higher densities, and expanding transportation infrastructure. 
This situation was not to endure. Despite far more ambitious planning studies led by the 
provincial government, the effectiveness of regional planning waned after the 1960s. 
The TTC, Metro and the Province continually produced lavish studies throughout 
the period. An extremely thorough, 64-volume review of the transportation plan was 
initiated contemporaneously with the cancellation of Spadina. It was led by the city’s long-
time transportation guru—University of Toronto engineering professor Richard 
Soberman. The study acknowledged the end of the age of the expressway and, as a result, 
abandoned the “balanced” approach of the 1966 plan in favour of an explicitly transit-
oriented approach to transportation infrastructure planning. The study lasted from 1972 
to 1975, and as one of its participants, Juri Pill, described, it was "the second major 
'postclassic' transportation study in North America, after Boston's." For the first time, 
citizens were actively consulted on the plan, though it was still largely guided by 
professional planners.57  
The review produced reams of valuable information about the system, which was 
then used to develop seven alternative scenarios ranging from intensification of the 
downtown core to regional dispersion. They were dubbed “Choices for the Future.” Most 
 
57 Pill, Planning and Politics Preface; Richard M. Soberman, “Rethinking Urban Transportation: Lessons from 
Toronto,” Transportation Research Record 1606, no. 1 (1997): 33–39. 
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significantly, they included options for dispersal of employment from downtown into 
suburban centres in each of North York, Etobicoke, and Scarborough. This would become 
influential in years that followed, as it served the interests of both urban and suburban 
political leaders. The newly elected “Reform Council” in the City of Toronto was eager to 
prevent the demolition of historic downtown neighbourhoods for new office 
development, and were happy to see it shifted to suburban development areas. Suburban 
leaders, most notably North York’s mayor Mel Lastman, were eager to see their bailiwicks 
transformed into real cities with downtowns, rather than mere suburban appendages of 
Toronto.  
This suburban subcentres approach would increasingly shape planning in Metro, 
especially after the new Central Area Plan of 1975, promoted by the City of Toronto’s 
reform council, actively embraced deflecting office development to the suburban 
subcentres.58 The reformers were eager to reduce the pressure of development on the 
historic neighbourhoods of the downtown core, and so the plan sought to limit high-rise 
office construction to a small financial district. An additional measure tied office 
development to the provision of additional transit infrastructure, which made the anti-
development reformers sceptical of new subways downtown.59 The long-planned Queen 
subway was postponed to the distant future in the Transportation Plan Review. In the 
years that followed, most Metro plans for new rapid transit focused on the suburban 
centres, while some progressive downtown councillors like Jack Layton, later leader of 
 
58 “Central Area Plan Review: Proposals” (Toronto: City of Toronto Planning Board, 1975); Sewell, The Shape of 
the City, 218–19. 
59 White, Planning Toronto, 313–14. 
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the federal NDP, opposed downtown subway projects on the grounds that they would 
bring more development.60 
In the end, the reform councillors may have been too successful in their efforts to 
divert office development away from downtown. Initially, they were so concerned about 
the danger of office high-rise construction overwhelming the downtown core and 
destroying the city’s comparatively small prewar neighbourhoods that they imposed a 
blanket forty-five-foot height limit on downtown development. That rule was eventually 
overturned by the OMB, and by the 1980s, the city was accepting some more limited high-
rise construction. Given the opposition of many downtown councillors, plans for new 
subway projects in the core did not advance. The upshot has been that as downtown 
continued to remain a popular destination for office development, while the Yonge 
subway has been close to capacity for decades, downtown workers have increasingly 
sought to live as close as possible to their offices. This has resulted in an altogether 
unprecedented condominium construction boom since the 1980s that has necessitated 
the demolition of far more historic core neighbourhoods of the type that the reform 
council wanted to protect than would have ever resulted from unchecked subway-fed 
office development. 
Suburban rapid transit projects did not have a record that was much more 
favourable than those downtown, even if the local councillors were more sympathetic. 
Unlike Washington and San Francisco, which built dozens of kilometres of new rapid 
transit in the 1970s and 1980s, Toronto built comparatively little despite reams of 
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ambitious plans. Choices for the Future was primarily a capital plan, with local bus service 
as usual discussed only tangentially. While expressway expansion was unsurprisingly 
excluded, each of the scenarios included a variety of rapid transit projects. A few subway 
extensions were included, including the Spadina line that was by then already underway, 
but a comprehensive network of new rapid transit routes criss-crossing the suburbs was 
to be built using a new, vaguely defined “Intermediate Capacity Transit System” that was 
to be cheaper and lower capacity than a subway, but still offer rapid transit service quality 
and speed. The planning processes’ most important consequence was the province’s 
development of GO Transit, a commuter rail system using the old railway corridors to 
bring commuters from outside Metro to Union Station downtown. 
In 1972, the TTC finally abandoned its long-held plans to follow the rest of the 
continent and eliminate the downtown mixed-traffic streetcars. In part, it was a 
recognition that new downtown subways were not coming any time soon to replace them. 
More importantly, it was a result of the wave of urban activism that had surged following 
the Spadina battle. A group of streetcar advocates, notably including long-time Toronto 
transit activist and writer Steve Munro, fought successfully to secure the policy change.61  
The upshot was that the TTC needed a new streetcar to replace the aging PCCs from 
before the war. The province responded by using a crown corporation, the Urban Transit 
Development Corporation, to develop the vehicle—dubbed the Canadian Light Rail 
 
61 “Trams to Stay on St. Clair, Mount Pleasant: TTC Decides Street Cars Are Not Obsolete, after All,” The Globe 
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Vehicle (CLRV). Many favoured using the new vehicle for the suburban ICTS routes in an 
early form of the LRT that would later become ubiquitous across North America.62  
The province had different ideas. In 1973, it announced a plan to cooperate with 
German company Krauss-Maffei on the development of a new automated maglev train 
that would fulfill the role of ICTS. Though Krauss-Maffei soon dropped out and its project 
for test track at the Canadian National Exhibition grounds was abandoned, the province 
decided to continue development of the technology using a more conventional steel-
wheel-on-rail approach. Its first deployment did not come until 1985, when it was used 
for a feeder route between the eastern end of the subway and the Scarborough City Centre. 
Though the technology provided to be a considerable commercial success that was sold 
around the world, it was never used more widely in Toronto.63 
The province’s automated light rapid transit technology earned the lasting enmity 
of light rail supporters, led most notably by Steve Munro, who continue to blame its 
lengthy development for the stalling of transit infrastructure construction and for 
preventing expanded use of the new streetcar on lines across the suburbs. The light rail 
insurgency persists to the present day, and temporarily became the basis of the city’s 
transit planning with the announcement of a large light rail plan—dubbed “Transit City”—
in 2007. 
On the one hand, Metro’s planning efforts helped to shape the region’s urban 
growth in a relatively transit friendly manner. On the other hand, Metro’s transit 
 
62 Thomas Claridge, “Will Use Queen Street Trams: TTC Plans Street Car Line Extension of Subway through 
Scarborough,” The Globe and Mail, September 18, 1969; Jonathan Fear, “Scarborough Street Car Line Cut from 
1977 TTC Works Budget,” The Globe and Mail, March 5, 1977; Richard M. Soberman, interview; Steve Munro, 
interview. 
63 The technology, eventually sold to Bombardier Transportation and renamed Skytrain, was used in Vancouver, 
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infrastructure planning was comparatively ineffective. From the late 1970s onward, 
countless hours of work and thousands of pages of comprehensive planning studies for 
transit in Toronto came to little. Even as ridership was growing steadily, and the city was 
increasingly becoming a model for transit across the continent, the elaborate plans 
resulted in remarkably little change. Few of their large capital projects were built, while 
the key decisions that shaped Toronto as a transit model—the provision of frequent bus 
transit in the suburbs and the zone fare reform—rated little more than a mention in the 
great plans. Toronto’s transit success is instead the result of political choices, adopted on 
an ad hoc basis, which set Toronto on a profoundly different path from its North American 
counterparts. It was the small decisions to make the bus run frequently past suburban 




Chapter 7: Toronto in a North American Context 
Toronto’s policy of suburban transit expansion in the 1960s was enabled by unique 
political circumstances: a metropolitan government encompassing the entire developed 
area, a political constituency of suburbanites with little transit access who viewed 
themselves as being cheated out of a public service to which they were entitled. This stood 
in stark contrast with American cities of the same period, which did not have metropolitan 
governance and therefore where suburbanites did not have any stake in the region’s 
transit system. Later, in the 1970s when regional transit systems became more common 
in the United States, racial animus increasingly drove a wedge between the central city 
and the new suburbs. This chapter will explore the history of transit planning in the 
United States from the 1950s through the 1970s, focusing in particular on Metropolitan 
Washington and the San Francisco Bay Area. These two metropolitan regions, with many 
similarities to Toronto, will then be compared with Metropolitan Toronto in terms of their 
transit policies of the period. This comparison will enable the determination of the key 
policy differences between Toronto and its American counterparts that made it possible 
for Metropolitan Toronto to sustain and even expand its transit ridership while American 
urban regions—even those implementing massive transit capital investments like 
Washington and San Francisco—were not so successful. 
The absolute power of the provincial government over municipalities enabled it to 
impose a metropolitan government, even over suburban objections; the transfer of transit 
to the jurisdiction of that metropolitan government set the stage for Toronto’s unique 
provision of suburban transit service. Furthermore, the timing of this move in the mid-
1950s—when the central city remained the strong focal point of the region, when transit 
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remained a widely used and well-functioning service, and when the great postwar 
suburban boom was only beginning—was key to its success. Extending a successful and 
well-regarded transit system into brand new suburbs made success possible in a way that 
the late 1960s and 1970s expansion of transit in American urban regions, which generally 
tried to rebuild transit from scratch into already well-established auto-oriented suburban 
communities, could not hope to achieve.  
 
Too Little Too Late: U.S. Federal Support for Transit 
In many American cities, like Washington, D.C., transit in the early 1960s 
remained in private hands, rendering the idea of subsidy anathema. Even where transit 
was in public hands, like in New York City, Boston, and Chicago, it was generally expected 
to operate on a self-sustaining basis. The greater problem, however, was that in most 
American urban regions, the transit system’s jurisdiction remained mostly confined to 
the prewar city—an area that was declining as a percentage of the metropolitan population 
and, in many cases, in absolute terms. Suburbanites had no political or financial role in 
administering or supporting transit. The effect of racism in the United States also 
hampered suburban transit expansion, as whites who had fled the increasingly diverse 
central cities for suburbia came to oppose transit expansion in order to maintain the 
ghettoization of African-Americans. The failure to expand high-quality local transit into 
the fastest-growing parts of American metropolitan regions left transit an increasingly 
irrelevant rump. 
Throughout the 1950s, transit companies across the United States endured a 
vicious spiral of ridership decline, compounded by fare increases and service cuts. Rescue 
by the public sector was the only hope, but it typically came far too late and too reluctantly. 
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Highways, by contrast, had been the paragon of modernity for decades—a technology 
backed by a formidable economic lobby, and a technology that formed the basis of the 
aspirational vision of the American dream that Hollywood was selling the world over. In 
the popular and political imagination, highways were a public service, a national defence 
need, a symbol of progress. Transit was a monopolistic private business that inspired 
affection from no one—to this day, transit employees still refer to their agency as the 
“company.”1 When federal transit subsidies finally began to flow in substantial volume in 
the 1970s,  it was far too late to revive transit systems that had severely atrophied, and to 
prise drivers out of their cars in suburbs that had enjoyed little or no transit service since 
they had been built a decade or two earlier.2  
Torontonians like Fred Gardiner were ahead of their time in recognizing the 
consequences of a transportation system that relied entirely on the automobile, but not 
by much. Intellectuals like Mumford and Jacobs were already criticizing the destruction 
wrought by the reconstruction of cities for the automobile in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
By the Kennedy Administration, American federal government officials were talking 
about the need for investment in transit—only a few years after Gardiner’s speeches of the 
late 50s. The difference is that when the intellectual tide against suburbanization, transit 
decline, and automobility turned, Toronto already had an institutional structure—a 
transit agency publicly owned by a metropolitan government—to rapidly put new policies 
 
1 There are a number of histories of the development of the American highway system and the accompanying 
automobile culture, including: Mark H. Rose and Raymond A. Mohl, Interstate: Highway Politics and Policy Since 
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Suburban (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Lewis, Divided Highways. 
2 James A. Dunn, Miles to Go: European and American Transportation Policies, MIT Press Series in Transportation 
Studies 6 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1981); David W. Jones, Urban Transit Policy: An Economic and Political 
History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1985). 
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in place. In the US, that type of structure took decades to be developed, where it took root 
at all, and by then it was too late. 
The number of revenue passengers carried by U.S. transit systems had declined 
from 13.85 billion in 1950 to 5.29 billion in 1973. Despite the explosion of the country's 
suburban population, the number of riders on suburban transit systems outside major 
cities declined from 882 million in 1950 to 294 million in 1973. Heavy rail (subway) 
ridership declined comparatively modestly, from 2.26 billion annual passengers in 1950 
to 1.71 billion in 1973, as it was most time-competitive with the car, least affected by road 
congestion, and endured the fewest service cuts. Streetcar and tram ridership, by contrast, 
evaporated from 3.90 billion in in 1950 to 207 million in 1973, as did electric trolley coach 
ridership, which dropped from 1.66 billion in 1950 to 97 million in 1973. These declines 
were not merely a result of the replacement of technologies considered obsolete. Bus 
ridership also declined from 9.42 billion in 1950 to 4.64 billion in 1973.3 As previously 
noted, Cleveland’s transit ridership decline from 493 million riders per year in 1946 to 78 
million in 1974 is an illustrative example.  
As Toronto’s planners were increasingly focusing on the importance of mass 
transit and on the inability of expressways to meet all of the region’s transportation needs, 
American planners and government officials were slowly reaching the same realization. A 
1962 report to the U.S. president by the secretary of commerce and the home finance 
administrator argued that “The major objectives of urban transportation policy are the 
achievement of sound land-use patterns, the assurance of transportation facilities for all 
segments of the population, the improvement of overall traffic flow, and the meeting of 
 
3 “’74-’75 Transit Fact Book” (Washington, D.C.: American Public Transit Association, n.d.), 75. 
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total transportation needs at minimum cost. Only a balanced transportation system can 
attain these goals - and in many urban areas this means an extensive mass transportation 
network fully integrated with the highway and street system.” The report’s writers 
recognized that the financial state of mass transit systems—in many cases still private 
companies—made achieving such goals impossible: “A cycle of fare increases and service 
cuts to offset loss of ridership followed by further declines in use points clearly to the need 
for a substantial contribution of public funds to support needed mass transportation 
improvements. We therefore recommend a new program of grants and loans for urban 
mass transportation."4  
When the Urban Mass Transportation Act was passed in 1964, it set the precedent 
for federal capital funding for urban public transit. Though it was intended to provide 
two-thirds federal funding for projects, the amounts allocated by Congress were 
comparatively modest—only $75 million in 1965 and $150 million in the following two 
years—and no state could receive more than 12.5% of the total funding disbursed. The 
support was also limited because it did not include any operating funding, and many 
cities, let alone private transit companies, lacked funds to operate projects. Furthermore, 
federal funding was not available for the planning and engineering studies required to 
produce proposals to qualify for the grants. As George Smerk has argued, the federal 
lobbying power of the transit industry was fairly weak, partly since the main organization, 
the American Transit Association, primarily represented bus operators instead of the 
commuter rail and rapid transit that were of primary interest to the federal government.5 
 
4 Secretary of Commerce and Home Finance Administrator, “Urban Transportation - Joint Report to the President” 
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It would take many more years of decline before the ATA was able to secure federal 
operating funding for local bus transit. 
Nevertheless, interest in public transportation and recognition of the limitations 
of expressways in urban areas was growing, even as new ribbons of concrete were 
spreading across the country and through the hearts of major cities. Senator Claiborne 
Pell of Rhode Island published Megalopolis Unbound in 1966, a book insisting that mass 
transportation would be essential to meet the transportation needs of the emerging 
northeastern “megalopolis.”6 In the same year, UMTA funding was extended for an 
additional three years, and the act was enhanced with additional funds for research into 
new modes of transportation and with subsidy for struggling commuter railroads.7 In the 
following year, Lyndon Johnson followed the advice of Najeeb Halaby, the administrator 
of the Federal Aviation Agency, and created a separate Department of Transportation, 
permanently institutionalizing the federal role in transportation.8 The new department 
took over the Urban Mass Transportation Administration and elevated it from its 
relatively minor role in the Department of Housing and Urban Development into an equal 
of the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration.9  
Federal highway funding had created enormous growth in regional transportation 
planning, but there was increasing recognition that these engineering-driven studies 
generally ignored or marginalized mass transportation, and were overly focused on long-
range planning.10 
 
6 Claiborne Pell, Megalopolis Unbound: The Supercity and the Transportation of Tomorrow (Praeger, 1966). 
7 Smerk, “Development of Federal Urban Mass Transportation Policy.” 
8 Najeeb Halaby to Lyndon Johnson, June 30, 1965. 
9 Smerk, “Development of Federal Urban Mass Transportation Policy.” 
10 Weiner, “Urban Transportation Planning in the United States: An Historical Overview,” 81. 
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When Nixon succeeded Johnson in 1968, he was unexpectedly friendly to further 
mass transit funding. His Secretary of Transportation John Volpe, a former governor of 
Massachusetts and enthusiastic highway builder who had been a prominent supporter of 
Nixon's presidential nomination, grew increasingly sympathetic to public transportation 
and hostile to urban expressways over his tenure.11 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nixon’s 
senior advisor on urban issues, had raised concerns as early as 1960 about the impacts of 
urban highway projects.12 These policies gained further impetus after the Arab oil boycott 
and energy crisis in 1973. 
In calling for the new transit funding, Nixon sent a message in August 1969 to 
Congress indicating that “Public transportation has suffered from years of neglect in 
America. In the last 30 years, urban transportation systems have experienced a cycle of 
increasing costs, decreasing funds for replacements, cutbacks in service, and decrease in 
passengers.” He noted that transit fares had almost tripled since 1945, while ridership had 
decreased by two-thirds. Transit industry profits before tax had declined from $313 
million in 1945 to $25 million in 1967, and 235 bus and subway companies had gone out 
of business. He argued that a federal mass transportation funding program comparable 
to the Interstate Highway Program was needed in order to provide a “truly balanced” 
transportation system. He therefore proposed a $10 billion funding package over 12 years, 
beginning with a doubling of funding to $300 million in the first year and rising to $1 
billion annually by 1975. Both public and private transit companies would be eligible for 
funding, although private transit companies were disappearing rapidly at the time. Given 
 
11 Rose and Mohl, Interstate, 147–57. 
12 See Daniel P. Moynihan, “New Roads and Urban Chaos,” The Reporter, April 14, 1960, which marked him as 
one of the earliest strong critics of the urban expressway program. 
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the date, he unsurprisingly referenced a recent national engineering achievement that has 
since become cliché in public transportation debates: "The Nation which has sent men to 
the moon would demonstrate that it can meet the transportation needs of the city as 
well."13 
Congress responded by passing the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act in 
1970, which hewed closely to Nixon’s request and delivered the large-scale, sustained 
federal capital funding for transit that would enable numerous major rail transit projects 
across the country.14 As this modest capital funding was being disbursed, private transit 
companies were imploding. By 1974, though they still represented 45% of transit 
companies, they only carried 6% of national riders.15 Increasing public ownership of 
transit made government subsidy more palatable. 
After years of lobbying by the transit industry for federal operating support, they 
finally got their wish in 1974, when the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act 
authorized $4 billion in operating funding, on a 50-50 funding basis allocated by 
population and population density, as well as $7.3 billion in capital funding with an 80% 
federal share.16 Operating funding amounted to $3.4 billion by 1980 and endured until 
1998, albeit after reductions during the administration of Ronald Reagan, who repeatedly 
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asked rhetorical questions on a theme of "Why should someone in Sioux Falls pay taxes 
so that a bureaucrat in Washington, D.C., can ride to work on transit?"17 
For most transit systems, though undoubtedly very welcome, the federal funding 
was little more than life support for skeletal systems that were being used only by those 
who were unable to drive, as well as by some peak-period commuters to declining but 
still-congested downtowns.  As a result, transit agencies were largely unable to take 
advantage of the explosion in the cost of driving amid the energy crises of the 1970s. 
Transit ridership only rose from 5.25 billion in 1972, before the energy crisis, to 5.67 
billion in 1976 (8.0%), though the national average price of gas increased by 64%. The 
TTC, at the same time, had a 19.7% ridership increase, helped along by the elimination of 
zone fares.18 Spiraling inflation also placed further pressure on transit agencies, as the 
price of fuel and wage costs both increased rapidly.19 
 
Greater Washington 
Washington is, in many ways, a transit policy model. Its Metro was a technological 
and architectural marvel. Its suburban counties in Maryland and Virginia delivered the 
most impressive transit-oriented development on the continent. But this shining success 
was built on a decaying foundation. Metro, before its recent maintenance debacle, was an 
outstanding service for those fortunate enough to be able to walk to and from its stations, 
 
17 Brendon Hemily and Michael D. Meyer, “The Future of Urban Public Transportation: The Problems and 
Opportunities of a Changing Federal Role Two Views on Urban Mass Transportation,” Transportation Law Journal 
12, no. 2 (1981): 287–300; Reasa D. Currier, “Public Transit: Looking Back and Moving Forward - A Legislative 
History of Public Transportation in the United States and Analysis of Major Issues for the Authorization of the 
Surface Transportation Bill,” Transportation Law Journal 37, no. 2 (2010): 119–42; James A. Dunn, Driving 
Forces: The Automobile, Its Enemies, and the Politics of Mobility (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 93. 
18 “1976 Annual Report” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, November 25, 1977). 
19 “’74-’75 Transit Fact Book”; “Transit Fact Book.” 
221 
 
or to be able to find a space in one of its park-and-ride lots. By contrast, the local bus 
service—the only transit service within walking distance of most of the region’s 
population—is seriously limited by comparison. When Metro was created, bus service was 
an afterthought, a badly frayed remnant of an old transit system that had few defenders.  
That fate could perhaps have been avoided. In 1955, only two years after Metro 
took over the TTC, the Senate passed a bill to permit a public takeover of Capital Transit, 
the private transit monopoly that had paralyzed the city with a 52-day bus strike that 
summer. At the last moment, however, a bid of $13.54 million from New York investors 
led by O. Roy Chalk was accepted, and the renamed D.C. Transit remained in private 
hands, precluding significant subsidy.20 If the infamous muckraking syndicated 
columnist Drew Pearson can be believed, President Eisenhower’s brother-in-law may 
have helped facilitate approval of the deal.21 With the system remaining in private hands, 
significant public subsidy remained anathema. It was also largely excluded from broader 
regional transportation planning efforts. 
 Transit planning and the coordination of transit operations across the region—
particularly in the fast-growing suburbs—were hampered by the region’s spread over two 
states and the District of Columbia. The divisions made the transit system’s routes 
especially complex. Transit experts had described the system “as the most complicated 
urban bus system in the United States, and perhaps in the world,” with riders needing to 
keep track of an estimated 1,140 distinct routes operating during rush hour.22 
 
20 Senator Thomas Eagleton, “District of Columbia Transit Act,” Report (U.S. Senate, April 7, 1970). 
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Nevertheless, active federal involvement—loosely paralleling the Province of Ontario’s 
role in addressing regional governance in Toronto—helped the Washington area build 
regional institutions more effectively and quickly than in most other American urban 
regions—especially ones that crossed state lines. Jerome Alper, a lawyer appointed to the 
staff of a commission created by the three jurisdictions to address the fragmentation, 
outlined the problems in a 1955 report. Nearly all transit service in the 1950s was provided 
by five private companies, with Capital Transit, serving the District of Columbia as well 
as the adjacent area of Maryland, carrying the vast majority of riders, and other 
companies serving suburban riders in Maryland and Virginia. The integration of the 
system was poor; even though Capital Transit operated both Maryland and D.C. services, 
most riders were forced to change vehicles at the boundary. There were limited transfer 
fare discounts between the companies’ networks on intrastate trips, and none at all for 
interstate trips. The lack of coordination was acknowledged to be a contributing factor to 
the decline in transit ridership, especially given the rapid population growth of the 
Virginia and Maryland suburbs. 23  
The problem of poor suburban service was understood in Washington. A staff 
report for the House Committee on the District of Columbia outlined the issues: “The 
present route network is a remnant of the past, when the majority of the area’s population 
still resided within the City of Washington and suburbs were few.” Even in the city, many 
routes were obsolete: “Route changes have not followed the population […] The best-
served routes are still where the city’s heart was twenty years ago.” Though the District 
could still rely on relatively abundant service, service in the newest suburbs was next to 
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non-existent. “The situation in the suburbs is even worse,” the congressional staff wrote, 
“where routes have not begun to reach new population centers. The routes continue to be 
aimed at commuter travel into Washington, with the greatest void left in inter-county 
travel.” That was the type of travel that had been enabled by the TTC’s suburban grid of 
frequent bus routes.24 
Motivated by the threat of a federally imposed agency, both states and the District 
were able to devise a joint transit regulatory agency for the region. The Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) was an interstate compact modeled on 
the Port Authority of New York, and its first act was to force the companies to honour 
each other’s transfers and coordinate their schedules. The compact was ratified by the 
federal government in the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, which also 
included the establishment of the National Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA), a 
federal agency charged with continuing transportation planning in the region following 
the Bartholomew-led Mass Transportation Study of 1959.25 
“We choose to go to the moon,” President Kennedy declared in September 1962. It 
was a stirring assertion of American aspirations toward technological progress through 
collective effort. Transportation, though certainly more prosaic, was also an arena where 
the Kennedy administration sought to pursue a path that updated concepts of modernity 
from the freedom of the private car to a more balanced program that also included 
collective modes of transportation. President Kennedy therefore appointed C. Darwin 
Stolzenbach, a very different figure from the austere highway engineers of 1950s 
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transportation planning, as the NCTA’s first administrator. He was a federal government 
and academic economist who had been an activist against the Northwest Freeway.26 The 
NCTA developed a new transportation plan in 1962 that was, unsurprisingly given its 
leader’s background, less highway-oriented than the 1959 plan. Nevertheless, it still 
proposed spending $826 million on new highways, as well as $793 million for an 83-mile 
rail system stretching deep into the suburbs. The rail network was promised to be 
financially self-sustaining. As in Toronto, the idea of transit as a business died hard.27 
Local bus service was almost entirely absent from the report. Though it mentioned 
in passing the need for good local bus service, and, like the coeval Toronto plan, it 
recommended several express bus routes on freeways, it was an almost entirely rail-
focused transit plan. In Toronto, the TTC was under the direct control of suburban 
councillors, who agitated for service improvements in their constituencies, while in 
Washington, suburban transit remained in the hands of failing private companies with 
only loose government regulation. Unlike the close coordination of new TTC subway 
service with connecting bus service expansion, in Washington the two modes remained 
entirely separate.  
The NCTA’s plan faced considerable opposition from the highway lobby, as well as 
from O. Roy Chalk,  the owner of D.C. Transit (the renamed Capital Transit), who 
presented a fanciful alternative proposal for a “combination monorail-subway and 
underground automobile highway.”28 Still, legislation for a smaller, initial 23-mile system 
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mostly within the District was submitted to congress. The bill stalled shortly after 
President Kennedy’s assassination, but was revived amid optimism following the passage 
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. The updated plan was similar—25 miles 
in length—and was expected to cost $431 million, of which 65% would be funded through 
bonds to be paid off with farebox revenue, leaving $100 million to be covered by federal 
grants and a $50 million contribution from the District. To appease labour unions, which 
had opposed the previous plan for operation by a federal agency because it would preclude 
binding arbitration, the legislation called for operation by a private company. To mollify 
the highway lobby, the agency largely vacated the field of highway planning, which was to 
be left to the highway engineers. After Stolzenbach was replaced by the less controversial 
Walter McCarter, an elderly retired general manager of the Chicago Transit Authority, the 
bill passed and was signed into law in 1965.29 
In the following year, the two states and D.C., building on their earlier transit 
regulatory compact, created a new compact that established the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) to take over the development of the 
regional transit project.30  
Maryland and Virginia had no interest in a rapid transit system that barely left 
D.C., so a much more ambitious plan was approved in 1968 following intense 
negotiations. The 97.2-mile system would stretch deep into the Maryland and Virginia 
suburbs and was expected to cost $2.525 billion, of which one-third was expected to be 
funded from the fare box, $575 million would come from the local governments, and 
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$1.151 billion from the federal government.31 The system—dubbed Metro by designer 
Massimo Vignelli—broke ground only a year later. It was far more ambitious than 
anything in Toronto, both in scale and in design.  
With the creation of WMATA, Washington had the type of regional transit 
governance that Toronto had secured in 1953. It came, however, a decade later—a decade 
during which transit ridership had declined precipitously—and, most importantly, it 
entirely omitted local bus service, which remained in private hands. 
As the TTC was rapidly expanding transit throughout the metropolitan area, the 
private DC Transit—mostly limited to the shrinking prewar city—was failing. Ridership 
was declining, service was decaying, and fares were decreasing. From 1963 to 1970, the 
regulators permitted an increase in fares from 25 to 40 US cents, following Chalk’s 
persistent requests. Over the same period, the TTC fare rose from 14 cents to 25 cents.32 
The percentage increase was comparable, though the TTC’s fare remained far lower. 
Though Chalk tried to entice suburban riders with modest service improvements and 
newer buses, meaningful suburban improvements without subsidy could only come at the 
cost of the standard of service in poorer DC. This drew the ire of the Metropolitan Citizens 
Advisory Council, which petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to 
overturn a fare increase. In their petition, they argued that the suburbs had received 
disproportionate service improvements even though suburban services were 
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unprofitable.33 These types of battles between jurisdictions were also present in Toronto, 
but the political structure of Metro and the public ownership of the TTC meant that Metro 
was able to subsidize suburban service so the TTC could make improvements without 
needing to sacrifice service in the City of Toronto. 
The sincerity of Chalk’s commitment to sustainable transit could also be gainsaid. 
He continued his predecessor Louis Wolfson’s practice of extracting as much capital as 
possible from the company. Though his syndicate invested only $500,000 in equity, with 
the rest of the $13.5 million purchase price secured by mortgages on the company’s assets 
and a loan from Wolfson, D.C. Transit paid $500,000 per year in dividends for six 
consecutive years, amounting to most of the operating profits over that period. He also 
failed to make necessary contributions to the employee pension fund, accumulating a $2 
million deficit. 34 
By 1969, the company was near insolvency and two bills were introduced in 
Congress, one to permit the subsidization of DC Transit, and the other to enable its 
outright takeover by WMATA. The latter was strongly favoured by the government of the 
District of Columbia. The system was already receiving subsidy in the amount of $1.4 
million for the provision of school services, as well as $600,000 in tax relief from the 
District.35 WMATA’s takeover was clearly driven by the need to integrate Metro with local 
bus services. The Senate report on the legislation described the problem: “As the Metro 
rapid transit system moves toward reality, the need to coordinate all forms of mass transit 
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grows more apparent. Within 6 years, five spines of the Metro System will extend into the 
Maryland and Virginia suburbs, requiring a massive system of feeder bus service along 
new routes, on new schedules matched to Metro routes and timetables, and with a fare 
structure integrated with Metro fares.”36 
 
The San Francisco Bay Area 
Like Washington, the San Francisco Bay Area was also the location of a highly 
ambitious and innovative regional rapid transit system. Its genesis came even earlier than 
Washington’s, with the California Legislature’s creation of the San Francisco Bay Area 
Rapid Transit Commission in 1951 following local discussions dating back to the end of 
the war. The Bay Area was unusually well-suited to transit, given the large water barriers 
on three sides of San Francisco, which created serious traffic choke points. Only the Bay 
Bridge, opened in 1936, connected San Francisco to its large hinterland in the East Bay. 
The bridge included an important transit component, as the Key System streetcars that 
ran throughout the East Bay used its lower deck to reach the San Francisco business 
district. 
The Key System operated an impressive network, but it experienced the same 
decline undergone by streetcar companies throughout the United States as they faced 
increasing competition from the automobile. The Key System had the notable fate of being 
acquired by National City Lines, a company controlled by General Motors and a variety 
of other companies in the automobile and petroleum industries. NCL later became 
infamous following congressional investigations that argued the company deliberately 
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bought streetcar systems to close them down and replace them with buses. Bradford Snell, 
who presented to the congressional hearings, was the most notable proponent of the 
conspiracy thesis, which was made famous through its fictionalization in the 1988 film 
Who Framed Roger Rabbit? Scholars like George Smerk and Glenn Yago also supported 
the thesis.37 Others are more sceptical of the importance of General Motors and its 
partners’ role, since streetcar systems were rapidly replaced by buses in the 1950s even 
where NCL was not involved.38 Regardless of cause, the Key System declined quickly in 
the 1940s and 1950s, and its last streetcars trundled over the Bay Bridge in 1958, after 
which their tracks were removed for additional road lanes. 
By then, however, the Rapid Transit Commission already had an elaborate plan for 
a new 123-mile regional rail system.39 The plans were further refined by the San Francisco 
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, which was formed by the state legislature in 1957. Its 
sleek, computer-controlled trains would whisk passengers from suburban stations, under 
the bay, to downtown San Francisco.40 In the suburbs, they would be elevated so that they 
were not caught in automobile traffic as were the Key System’s streetcars. Like 
Washington’s Metro, it would be a technological showpiece for a region that was to 
become the world’s technology capital. Even its employees’ uniforms would be of the 
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moment. Its designers and engineers had little interest in emulating past transit systems, 
as the TTC had emulated New York’s, among others. Instead, it would redesign rapid 
transit from first principles.41 Even its track gauge did not match the North American 
standard; instead, a wider gauge, matching the standard gauge of the Indian 
subcontinent, was chosen to improve ride quality at high speeds. 
A few weeks after the angst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the voters of the three 
counties looked to the future with optimism and approved a $792 million bond issue to 
fund a futuristic 71.5-mile rapid transit network. It was an enormous figure, coming even 
before federal funding was made available two years later. Like all other major 
infrastructure projects at the time, it faced tremendous cost overruns amid the rapid 
inflation of the 1970s. In the end, it cost about $1.6 billion, of which approximately 20% 
was provided by the federal government.42 It was completed with astonishing rapidity: 
the final segment of the initial system opened in 1974, after only about a decade of 
construction. The original Washington Metro plan would wait until the 21st century for 
completion. 
Though the BART District encompassed three counties, there was no broader 
regional governance structure. As Robert Cervero has described, the Bay Area lacked the 
regional planning counterpart to Toronto’s Metro, which has left station-area 
development decisions to be determined by market forces and local municipalities. As a 
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result, he argued, there has been considerably less development around stations.43 The 
comparison is equally unfavourable with Washington, where, despite the lack of regional 
governance, considerably greater efforts were made to implement transit-oriented 
development.44 Cervero omits, however, that the absence of regional governance of all 
transit—as opposed to just regional rapid transit—meant that the BART system, even 
more than Washington Metro, was not embedded at all in a unified transit system. Rather, 
it was designed and has served as a commuter service largely oriented to park-and-ride, 
and its connections to local transit remain limited. 
The comprehensive plan for BART made virtually no mention of surface transit. 
Though it called for "An Integrated Transportation Network," that section included no 
mention of buses--only of the need to connect with freeways and to provide ample parking 
at stations. The nascent AC Transit District, which was created by Alameda and Contra 
Costa Counties to acquire the bankrupt Key System in 1959 and would operate local 
transit service in most of BART’s East Bay service area, did not receive a single mention.45  
The new district, like WMATA, was charged with planning an entirely new transit 
system. Unlike WMATA, it never acquired the local transit services. San Francisco’s 
Municipal Railway (Muni) carried on serving the city, with some of its streetcars shifted 
to feed into a two-level tunnel under Market Street that was shared with BART. AC Transit 
also remained a separate district. 
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Like DC Transit, the Key System was performing poorly when AC Transit took over, 
with only 66 annual rides per capita in 1957, compared with 214 in Toronto in the same 
year (per capita ridership in the City of San Francisco was more comparable to Toronto), 
although its buses were in rather better condition than DC Transit’s.46 The Key System 
had made no effort to serve the rapidly growing new suburbs, but AC Transit had the 
advantage of taking over the private operator fourteen years earlier than WMATA, which 
meant that it was before many of the region’s suburban areas had been built and 
established their travel patterns. The system was created following the approval of a $16.5 
million bond issue by Alameda County and Contra Costa County voters, thanks in large 
part to support from a well-organized Citizens’ Committee for Better East Bay Transit.47 
Like the TTC and WMATA’s Metrobus, its service area was a blend of pre-war cities, 
wartime boom towns, and post-war suburbs, all of which had very different characteristic 
built forms. The two counties combined for a population of 1.317 million in 1960, much 
of which was concentrated in historic cities like Oakland and Berkeley. Thousands of 
others had come from across the country to work in the booming war industries of 
Richmond. Suburban growth in places like Hayward and Fremont was also surging in the 
1950s and 60s.  
The plans developed by consultants DeLeuw Cather for the new system were 
relatively modest, but they included a network of five new express bus routes to serve both 
cross-regional trips and travel across the Bay Bridge to San Francisco. The new system 
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would, in a more modest fashion than Metro and BART, seek to improve the image of 
transit by acquiring more comfortable new buses—standard GMC “New Look” models 
that AC Transit dubbed Transitliners—and building improved bus shelters. They also 
planned improvements to frequency, though the recommended improvements were still 
rather limited. Typical midday and evening headways on local routes were to improve 
from between 30 and 45 minutes to between 20 and 30 minutes. Transbay routes were to 
improve from 45-minute to 30-minute midday headways, while most were to have no 
evening service at all. Finally, there were to be 55 miles of new routes, a few of which 
would be in the fast-growing new suburbs, but most of which remained within the 
established cities.48 
 
The Toronto Contrast 
Metropolitan Toronto, Greater Washington, and the San Francisco Bay Area had much in 
common in the latter half of the twentieth century. All three were fast-growing regions 
with dynamic economies. They retained strong urban cores, not suffering the severe 
urban decay that faced many other American cities. Indeed, both Washington and the Bay 
Area are American transit success stories. They did not face the transit implosion 
experienced by Toronto’s fellow Great Lakes metropolises like Detroit and Cleveland. 
Instead, they both were the site of enormous transit capital investments that produced 
technologically sophisticated showpiece rapid transit systems. Despite similar starting 
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points and more impressive investment, however, their transit ridership performance 
never quite matched that of Toronto.  
 Some of this divergence is undoubtedly due to external factors. There are certainly 
cultural factors, including the crisis of urban racial segregation that was growing in 
salience throughout the postwar period. Specific political choices, however, played an 
equally important role. The creation of a metropolitan government in Toronto, charged 
with administering all transit—including local buses—at a time when local transit 
remained well-used and well-regarded was the most important of those choices. A 
Canadian provincial government, constitutionally granted total power over 
municipalities, was able to impose the regionalization of transit over reticent municipal 
governments. The State of California, or the Federal government, in the case of Greater 
Washington, had no such power. While Toronto was busily extending its high-quality 
local transit network from the historic city to serve the new suburbs as soon as they were 
built, Greater Washington and the Bay Area’s local transit was fragmented and, in the 
former case, controlled by poorly administered private companies. Toronto’s subway 
system was planned in intimate coordination with the already-established frequent 
suburban bus services. Routes were planned and stations were designed to facilitate 
connections, and fares were seamlessly integrated. In the two American regions, their new 
rapid transit systems were planned entirely in isolation from local bus service. In 
Washington, the local bus service had descended into dilapidation just as the gleaming 
new trains entered service. The failure to create a truly integrated, multimodal transit 
system until local service was too far gone made it impossible for Greater Washington and 




Many scholars have argued that Canadian and American cities differ so greatly that 
the opportunity for genuine comparison is limited. Using polling data, some have argued 
that Canadians have different cultural values—most significantly, for this comparison, 
they are more tolerant of government intervention and regulation.49 It is unquestionably 
true that Canada did not have the same history of racist exclusion, segregation, and white 
flight that plagued American cities.50 Throughout the postwar period, downtown 
neighbourhoods in neighbourhood often remained important centres of employment and 
sought-after places to live. 
Preeminent Toronto transit scholar and consultant Richard Soberman credits the 
greater success of transit in Canada vis-à-vis the United States to four main factors: more 
receptivity to metropolitan government, meaning more coordination between 
transportation and land use planning; generally higher density, perhaps partly due to the 
lack of mortgage interest tax deductibility; the absence of a program similar to the 
Interstate Highway Act; and "innovative" provincial initiatives toward transit finance and 
technology.51  
There is undeniable truth in all of these assertions, but they can be overstated. 
While Canadians may be, broadly speaking, more tolerant of government intervention, 
Americans have shown themselves to be very willing to embrace government involvement 
in the transportation sector. The Interstate Highway program is the most notable 
example, but the federal government, beginning in the 1960s, also provided significant 
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funding for transit. In the postwar decades, American metropolises like San Francisco 
and Washington built far more impressive rapid transit networks than Toronto, and all of 
them were publicly funded. While many American cities experienced disinvestment in 
prewar neighbourhoods, particularly as a result of redlining and white flight, many 
American downtowns remained important centres of employment. Toronto also 
witnessed mushrooming growth of employment in suburban office and industrial parks.52 
The considerably greater power of the provincial government with regard to cities 
in comparison with most American states was critically important, making it possible to 
impose metropolitan government regardless of whether residents were receptive—many 
suburbanites were adamantly opposed. Still, many American transit agencies were 
expanded to encompass their metropolitan areas, including in New York, Washington, 
and Cleveland, among others. The difference was timing: while Toronto’s 
metropolitanization of the TTC occurred in the 1950s, while it was still financially and 
reputationally strong, the same process occurred in most American cities at least a decade 
later, when transit was in a parlous state. The lack of metropolitan land-use planning in 
most American regions was unquestionably a hindrance, though some suburbs like 
Arlington and Montgomery counties in Greater Washington were nevertheless highly 
successful at implementing transit-oriented development.53 
Soberman also makes a valid point about the higher density of Canadian 
metropolitan areas, and his suggestion that it is related to the lack of mortgage interest 
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deductibility is plausible. The existence of metropolitan planning may also be a factor. 
However, it is still important not to overstate the difference. The current population 
density of the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area is lower than that of the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area, and similar to that of the San Francisco Bay Area.54 
While Canada had no equivalent to the Interstate Highway Act, this distinction is 
more meaningful in the intercity sector, where the expressway network is far less 
extensive. Within Greater Toronto, while expressway mileage is lower than in similar 
American cities, the provincial government still built a vast network of highways. It 
includes the 16-lane Highway 401 that is, by some measures, the busiest expressway in 
the world. While Toronto’s urban expressway network is far less extensive than those of 
Detroit, Los Angeles, or Houston, it is not strikingly different from San Francisco’s or 
Washington’s.55 
The most important point raised by Soberman may be the last: provincial 
involvement. While the Government of Ontario’s embrace of fanciful transportation 
technologies, like maglev, was not of great significance, their timing in embracing subsidy 
in the early 1970s was critical, as will be explored in Chapter 9. Still, at the same time, the 
U.S. federal government also began providing capital and operating subsidy for transit in 
major American cities. 
There are undeniable divergences between Canadian and American cities, but the 
differences are not so great that the cities cannot be compared, and that lessons cannot 
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be drawn from one that are applicable to the other.  Aaron Moore has gone so far as to 
argue that that North American cities are all distinct from one another, which means that 
cross-border comparisons are no less valid than comparisons within countries.56 Greater 
Washington and the San Francisco Bay Area are among the most comparable American 
regions to Greater Toronto. Their total populations in the postwar years were similar, and 
all three were fast-growing and economically successful—they were the destination of 
legions of migrants from declining regions.57 They all retained strong downtown 
employment districts, and have relatively high metropolitan density by American 
standards. They all have regionalized transit systems that invested considerable sums in 
building rail transit networks in the postwar decades. 
Though Toronto’s population density is somewhat higher than that of most 
American cities, and the suburbs also have somewhat more apartment buildings than 
most American suburbs, it is not unreasonable to assume that the existence of viable 
public transportation in the suburbs also enabled the existence of the high-density 
development in a symbiosis, rather than simply the reverse. Furthermore, as Filion et al 
have argued, Toronto’s scattered clusters of high rises—many located far from major 
transit infrastructure—mean that the relatively high density offers less direct benefit for 
transit than could be assumed from the raw figures.58   
Toronto’s transit in the 1950s was not so different from American cities of the 
period. As we have seen, it also suffered serious ridership declines. Its stunning 
turnaround in the 1960s, which set it on a very different track from its American 
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counterparts, had not been foreseen. Consultants Simpson and Ong’s forecasts of the 
TTC’s growth had not been especially conservative for the 1960s. They were projecting far 
higher growth for the TTC at 8.25% from 1962 to 1972 than was achieved by many 
American transit systems over that period.59 In that decade, while Toronto’s ridership 
rose by 28.7%, New York City’s subway ridership declined by 16.4%.60 Unlike the TTC, 
which served the booming suburbs, the New York City Transit Authority remained locked 
into the five boroughs, which were experiencing declining population.61 Even after the 
State of New York under Nelson Rockefeller created a regionally oriented Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority in 1968, the new authority’s Program for Action included no 
plans for extending the subway or frequent bus service into the fast-growing suburbs.62 
As of 2019, only two bus routes on Long Island, a region with a population of nearly three 
million people, operate at least half-hourly until midnight, seven days per week. Even in 
cities with strong transit systems in the United States, frequent local transit service rarely 
exists outside the prewar city.  
The Washington region’s population was comparable to but somewhat larger than 
that of the Toronto region, with 2.2 million in 1960, compared with 1.78 million in greater 
Toronto in 1961. It was expected to add 1.2 million residents by 1980, much like greater 
Toronto’s expected growth of 1.02 million by 1980. It was the third-fastest growing 
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metropolitan region in the country from 1940 to 1960, owing to the immense wartime 
expansion of the federal government, much of which was located in the downtown core. 
Its suburbs were also quite dense by American standards, at about 3,750 people per 
square mile in 1962, the second highest among major American metropolitan areas after 
Los Angeles and compared with 3,953 per square mile in North York in 1961.63 
Washington had been no outlier in the precipitous decline of transit system 
ridership. 40.3% of annual trips per capita disappeared from 1952 to 1962. This was not 
terribly different from Toronto, however, where there was a similar decline of 37.6% over 
the same period.64 Toronto, however, reversed the decline following its suburban 
expansion, while Washington did not. From 1962, Toronto’s total ridership increased by 
29.1% to 1972, more than keeping pace with population growth.65 Meanwhile, in 
Metropolitan Washington, ridership declined in the same period despite rapid population 
growth. In 1963, the D.C. Transit system had 120.7 million riders, while the total transit 
ridership in the region, including Virginia buses, was 128.8 million in 1971. Excluding 
Virginia buses, which accounted for approximately 21% of regional ridership, ridership in 
DC and Maryland was down by about 15.7%.66 
Ridership outside the historic prewar area was modest. Of 198 million riders in the 
region in 1954, 157 million (79.2%) were within the District of Columbia, and many of the 
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remainder were in prewar communities in Maryland and Virginia. Even after nearly two 
decades of dramatic suburban population growth, ridership entirely outside D.C. was only 
8.2% of the total in 1972, and much of that was in long-established communities like 
Alexandria. Ridership in Toronto’s suburbs, which excludes all prewar areas unlike the 
Washington figure, was 14.5% of the total in 1972.67 
This is unsurprising since the number of vehicle-miles operated in Metropolitan 
Washington was down from 52.6 million in 1950 to 48.7 million in 1974.68 Though there 
was some service expansion outside DC—from 16.245 million vehicle-miles in 1950 to 
approximately 22.6 million in 1974—the increase came at the cost of service within the 
District.69 The increase also paled in comparison with the TTC, which nearly quintupled 
service in new suburbs, from 5.14 million vehicle-miles in 1955 to 24.01 million in 1972.70 
After its takeover of DC Transit, WMATA quickly acquired new buses, eliminated 
certain transfer fares, and implemented modest service improvements. Larger service 
improvements were stymied, however, in part by ballooning deficits. While Toronto 
expanded its system during the boom years of the 1960s, and it received support from the 
province in the more challenging 1970s, as will be discussed in Chapter 9, WMATA had 
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taken over a system that required significant investment just to keep running, and it had 
done so at a time of unprecedented inflation. 71  
In 1974, a year after the public takeover of DC Transit, WMATA operated 48.7 
million bus-miles. In the same year, TTC operated 53.8 million surface vehicle-miles, as 
well as 29.7 million subway car-miles (Washington’s Metro was not yet operating).72 The 
WMATA service area also had a substantially higher population, 2.73 million in 1970, 
than Metro Toronto’s 2.09 million.  
WMATA did plan growth for the bus services, but it was still far from catching up 
with the TTC. They projected growth to 183,400 vehicle-miles on weekdays, up from 
127,600 in 1974. The TTC was already operating a daily average of 147,308 surface vehicle 
miles in 1974, but that understates Toronto’s service because the figure includes 
weekends, when service is more limited, and also excludes the TTC’s 81,365 car-miles of 
subway service. The distinction is evident in service standards. Even after an overall 
increase of 44% in weekday vehicle-miles, the WMATA service standard remained 
limited, with maximum headways of 30 minutes for base routes within the Capital 
Beltway, and one hour outside the Beltway.73 This paled in comparison with the TTC, 
where many routes operated every 15 minutes or better even outside peak periods in the 
suburbs, and the downtown streetcars operated so frequently that the TTC used the 
slogan “Always a car in sight.”74 The upshot was a significant difference in ridership: 124.8 
million WMATA riders in 1973, compared with 332.1 on the TTC. 
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Schrag argues that the takeover of DC Transit, while unavoidable, was devastating 
to WMATA. Firstly, the fantasy of generating an operating profit by designing Metro as a 
luxury commuter service died quickly after the takeover of DC Transit’s bus services, 
which had a clientele that could not afford luxury fares. Secondly, the dismal state of the 
DC Transit system, and the poor relationship between its management and employees, 
badly tarnished the high-tech utopian image that had been carefully cultivated for 
Metro.75 Over 239 of its buses had to be immediately discarded for their salvage value 
since, as WMATA’s chairman explained, they were “worthless for any other use.”76 The 
takeover of DC Transit and the other private bus companies made it possible for WMATA 
to become a genuine transit agency, but the state of DC Transit’s infrastructure was so 
poor and the ensuing reputation of buses—especially in the suburbs—was so negative that 
there was no groundswell for suburban bus expansion as there was in Toronto in the early 
1960s when the TTC operated a well-regarded service. It was also simply too late: Toronto 
expanded bus service into suburbs as they were built in the 1960s, but by 1972, many of 
the suburbs were already built and their travel patterns well-established.  
Toronto’s subway served as a model for Metro, but also as a cautionary tale. As 
historian of the Washington Metro Zachary Schrag recounts, “When NCTA publicist Cody 
Pfanstiehl needed to convince suburbanites that not all subways were as filthy and as 
noisy as New York’s, he took community leaders to Toronto.”77 Though the cleanliness 
and efficiency were noted, the spartan architecture of the Toronto subway, with its low 
ceilings and frequent columns, provoked less approbation. The Washington Metro’s 
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planners had higher aesthetic aspirations—they wanted to build a showpiece for the 
American capital. It would be a metro with stations that could compete aesthetically with 
the Stalinist underground palaces in the capital of the United States’ Cold War rival, albeit 
in a contemporary brutalist, rather than antediluvian pseudo-baroque style. These 
aspirations came paradoxically at a time when Nikita Khrushchev was promoting a more 
restrained and economical Soviet architecture.  The Washington designers were not 
wrong that Toronto’s subway was quite a conservative operation. When it opened in 1954, 
its design and operations were not significantly different from prewar subways in cities 
like New York. The NCTA wanted to build a system that was an aesthetic and 
technological marvel.78  
Despite its architectural opulence, technological superiority, passenger comfort, 
and far greater geographical extent, Metro was never able to match the more muted 
Toronto subway’s ridership. Even after the comprehensively planned 103-mile system 
was completed in 2001, Metro had 631,817 riders on an average weekday.79 The TTC’s far 
more limited 68.3 km (42.4 mile) rapid transit network carried 851,000 passengers in the 
same year, even after a decade of ridership stagnation.80 
When the TTC built subways into the new suburbs in the 1960s and 70s, it was 
extending service into an area that already had a well-developed local transit network. 
The Washington Metro, by contrast, was built into suburban Maryland and Virginia, but 
WMATA was barred by legislation from operating a bus service. When the calamitous 
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financial state of the private DC Transit, as well as four smaller suburban bus systems, 
forced WMATA to take them over, they were a pale shadow of their former selves. Service 
in the fast-growing new suburbs was negligible—Metro riders were expected either to 
drive to the station or to live in adjacent transit-oriented development.81 In Toronto, 
already by 1973, 83% of the total Metro population was within 1,000 feet of transit service, 
and 94% of those were receiving service with an average peak headway under 15 
minutes.82 As a result, the Washington Metro—the most successful postwar rapid transit 
system in the United States—had 5,554 daily riders per route-kilometre in 2008, prior to 
recent ridership declines due to a maintenance crisis. The TTC’s subway ridership per 
kilometre was 16,800 in the same year.83 
The East Bay region, similar in population to Metropolitan Toronto in the 1960s, 
also provides an illustrative comparison. When Alameda and Contra Costa Counties took 
over their private transit systems, they launched a meaningful expansion. It was not, 
however, on the scale of the TTC’s expansion, especially in the suburbs. It also was not 
nearly as well integrated into the BART rail system being built at the time. The latter 
focused instead almost entirely on park-and-ride as a means to access its suburban 
stations. 
Large ridership increases soon followed AC Transit’ post-public-takeover 
expansion. From the 1960-61 fiscal year to 1961-62, annual ridership increased by 4.5% 
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to 49.99 million after a service increase 0f 1.65 million annual vehicle-miles or 8.2%.84 
The service increase was significant—comparable in percentage terms to the 1963 
expansion of TTC service—but it came from a considerably lower base, and the pace of 
increase, unlike in Toronto, was not sustained over the following years. While the 1963 
TTC expansion was concentrated entirely in the fast-growing suburbs, as the City of 
Toronto already had excellent service, much of AC Transit’s service expansion was to 
bring service in the prewar cities up to a minimum standard and to augment commuter 
service across the bay. 
From 1962 to 1965, service stagnated—from 21.85 million vehicle miles in 1961-62 
to 22.66 million in 1964-65—and ridership increased only very modestly to 53.28 million 
in 1964-65.85 The absolute level of service is strikingly low when compared to the TTC, 
which had a service area of comparable population and operated 56.17 million vehicle-
miles in 1964-65—13.58 million in the new suburbs alone.86  
While AC Transit added some service through the 1960s and early 70s, and there 
were modest ridership gains, the service increases were too small to make transit 
sufficiently attractive to most potential riders, especially outside peak periods. Even by 
1973-74, shortly before the first phase of BART opened, AC Transit was operating 27.1 
million service miles, and ridership was 55.22 million (a modest increase from 1964-65 
owing to a new method of counting passengers that, if applied, would have reduced that 
year’s ridership to about 51 million). 87 However, the two counties grew by 24% from 1960 
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to 1970, so the agency was hardly keeping pace. The service distinctions are most evident 
when the system is examined in greater detail. While the vast majority of Torontonians, 
including residents of new suburbs, were within walking distance of a bus route that ran 
frequently all day by the 1970s, it was not until 1974 that the entire City of Fremont, with 
a population of nearly 125,000, had any midday bus service at all. Even after the service 
was introduced, it was only half-hourly on weekdays, hourly on Saturdays, and did not 
run at all on Sundays.88 
 
Figure 19: TTC vs AC Transit Change in Vehicle-Miles of Service (1962=100) 
 
The combination of federal funding, contracts from BART for feeder services, and 
the energy crisis caused AC Transit’s ridership to grow later in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
 











but subsequent service cuts have since resulted in large drops in ridership. In 2018, 
ridership was about the same as it was in the early 1960s—51.76 million, though the 
population of the two counties had doubled to 2.84 million people from 1.32 million in 
1960. Service was, strikingly, worse than it was in the early 1960s: only 19.9 million 
annual service miles. 
AC Transit did improve service in its early years, but the improvement was far too 
modest to meaningfully change the way it was perceived in the region. The gains were 
concentrated largely in the established prewar neighbourhoods of cities like Oakland, and 
on Transbay commuter routes, while local transit remained modest to nonexistent in the 
fastest-growing parts of the region. 
 
Figure 20: TTC vs AC Transit Ridership Change (1962=100) 
Indeed, the Bay Area, to a significant degree, emulated the approach that Sewell 












limiting ostensibly unremunerative local service in new suburbs. The City of San 
Francisco is similar in size to the prewar City of Toronto, and Muni, its local transit 
agency, is confined within the city limits. Muni has developed an extensive LRT network 
serving much of the city, including a streetcar subway in the city core, mirroring the old 
TTC plans for Queen Street. Its transit mode share to work is 33%, not too much lower 
than the 39.2% achieved by the TTC in Doucet and Doucet’s “Streetcar City,” which 
consists of the prewar parts of the City of Toronto.89 In the rest of the region, however, 
transit ridership pales by comparison. The lower figure of 33% compared with prewar 
Toronto, despite the density and well-developed rail infrastructure of the City of San 
Francisco, can likely be attributed to transit’s comparative unsuitability to trips outside 
the city limits unless the destination happens to be located within walking distance of a 
BART station. San Francisco residents, even if they have frequent transit service passing 
their home, effectively must have a car if they need to make regular trips to the vast 
majority of the urban area that is outside the city limits. 
The construction of the 71.5-mile BART system in only a decade is an astounding 
administrative and engineering achievement. However, it has failed to live up to its full 
potential because, unlike the TTC subway, it was built into an area that had far more 
limited local transit service. That is why BART, as of 2008, moved only 2,192 daily riders 
per kilometre, while the Toronto subway and RT moved 16,800 per kilometre.90 
In Toronto, a very large proportion of riders at suburban stations arrive by 
connecting surface transit, because it is both fast and frequent. As Paul Mees has 
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described, the frequency of service enables riders to make connections easily between 
modes, and therefore to extend the catchment area of rail transit stations. TTC riders 
reach the subway from many kilometres away by bus, which means that station access is 
not limited either by the walking distance radius of the station or by the availability of 
parking in park-and-ride lots. Because both Metro and BART operate far more limited 
bus service in suburban areas, the number of riders using the bus to access the station is 
also far more limited. At suburban BART stations, like Walnut Creek and Fremont, over 
85% of riders reached the station by car. Even in Glen Park, a station located in a relatively 
urban part of Berkeley, around half of riders drove to the station, 37% walked, and only 
8% rode the bus. Only in central San Francisco did 60% of riders get to and from the 
station on foot.91 By contrast, Toronto’s suburban stations have comparatively minimal 
parking, though they handle far more riders than suburban Metro or BART stations even 
when their transit-oriented development is limited. This is because most of their riders 
arrive by connecting bus. 
The higher ridership per kilometre of Metro, in comparison with BART, can largely 
be explained by its superior approach to transit-oriented development. Cervero is entirely 
correct that the Bay Area did a poor job of implementing transit-oriented development at 
its stations, for various reasons including a lack of regional planning and neighbourhood 
opposition. Instead, it has emphasized park-and-ride as the key means of access to its 
stations. As of 2014, BART had a total of 46,385 parking spaces spread across 33 of its 44 
stations, an average of 1,405 per station with parking.92 Washington Metro has even 
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more: 61,721 at 44 of its 91 stations.93 Toronto transportation planners in the 1960s and 
70s also emphasized the importance of park-and-ride. Metro’s transportation plans 
consistently discussed the need for ample parking at subway stations. In 1963, for 
example, TTC planners went on a trip to Cleveland and Chicago to study the parking 
facilities at their outer terminal stations. They were impressed by Chicago’s plans for 
6,000-space parking garages at outlying subway stations, and strongly suggested use of 
tax money to pay for free subway station parking.94 Despite the talk, however, the TTC 
never implemented park-and-ride facilities on the scale of BART and WMATA (or, for 
that matter, GO Transit in the outlying suburbs of Toronto). Even after the recent subway 
extension to Vaughan, which added significant parking capacity, the TTC still only has 
parking at 17 of its 75 stations, with a total of 13,737 spaces (808 per station with parking). 
The problem for the park-and-ride approach to suburban transit is that even the largest 
parking lots cannot come close to meeting the capacity of a subway system.  
A comparison of typical suburban stations on the three systems illustrates the 
point. Toronto’s York Mills station, for example, is in nearly the least clement 
environment for a rapid transit station imaginable—surrounded as it is by parking lots, a 
golf course, and estate homes—but it nevertheless handles an average of 27,260 riders per 
day in 2010. El Cerrito del Norte, a typical BART station in the East Bay with similarly 
limited transit-oriented development, accommodated only 7,633 passengers per day. The 
reason is because only 2,198 cars can be accommodated in El Cerrito del Norte’s vast 
parking garages, while the capacity of the TTC’s buses to bring riders to York Mills is 
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greatly higher. The 95 York Mills bus route, one of three full-service routes connecting to 
the station, carried 27,500 passengers per day in 2014, of which a large proportion 
boarded or alighted at the station. It is evidently the principal means of access to the 
station. Even an inconceivably large park-and-ride lot would not come close to 
accommodating the ridership of even that single station, which is far from the busiest in 
suburban Toronto. The parking lot of the West Edmonton Mall, with 20,000 spots, is 
noted in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest in the world.95 Finch Station, for 
example, accommodated 99,350 passengers on an average day in 2018.96 
York Mills station is served by bus routes running both east and west on the main 
arterial road (York Mills Road to the east and Wilson Avenue to the west) intersecting 
with Yonge Street at the station. The buses in both directions run twenty-four hours per 
day, seven days per week, and until 1:30am, they run at least every 10 minutes. There is 
an additional route serving a local high-income subdivision of single-family homes, and 
even that route runs half-hourly until 1am. El Cerrito del Norte, by contrast, is served by 
two AC Transit routes. One route operates half-hourly all day, but service stops at about 
8:30pm, even on weekdays, and the last outbound trip from the station leaves at 6:25pm 
on weekends. A late work day could cause a rider to miss the last trip on a weekday; on 
weekends, transit is completely useless for a trip for dinner. Even the busier route, which 
connects the station to Contra Costa College, only operates about every half hour for most 
of the day. 
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Reliance on park-and-ride also greatly diminishes the environmental benefits of 
public transit. According to a 2017 study, over 75% of combined VOC pollutants from 
automobiles are emitted during the first three minutes after a car is started after it has 
been left off for more than 12 hours. Even a short drive to the transit station can result in 
significant pollution, especially in a cold climate.97 
A better approach than park-and-ride for developing ridership at suburban subway 
stations is transit-oriented development, as scholars like Robert Cervero and Michael 
Bernick have long advocated, and for which Greater Washington is a model.98 While many 
writers, including Cervero99, have portrayed Toronto as a model of transit-oriented 
development, and the city has been making efforts to live up to that billing in recent years, 
the environs of many suburban TTC subway stations are quite similar to those of many 
American suburban rapid transit stations. Along the Yonge line, rezoning led to the 
development of apartment and office building clusters around stations in midtown 
Toronto. On newer segments, however, zoning policies, land ownership, and market 
circumstances have led to a situation where many stations are surrounded by parkland, 
parking lots, and strip malls despite recent strides to attract more high-density 
development.  
The Greater Washington region has, if anything, significantly surpassed Toronto 
in the realm of transit-oriented development, especially in Arlington County, Virginia and 
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Montgomery County, Maryland. Through pro-active planning policy, those counties were 
able to generate considerable mixed-use development around a number of suburban 
Metro stations. Despite well-organized community opposition, the farsighted planners 
and county leaders zoned the area around a number of suburban Metro stations for high 
density, urban-style development, and private developers gradually brought the plans to 
fruition. They were aided by the federal government, by far the area’s largest employer, 
which actively sought to locate its offices at Metro stations. Though the development areas 
were little more than villages, farm fields, or automobile-oriented shopping malls in the 
1950s, a person walking around Silver Spring, Bethesda, or Ballston today would feel that 
they were in the distinctly vibrant downtown of a mid-size city. With the partial exception 
of North York Centre—the planned downtown of the former City of North York, which 
includes many new condominium developments—Toronto largely lacks the walkable, 
mixed-use suburban communities that are spread around suburban Washington. Yet the 
ridership at Toronto’s suburban subway stations—even those with poor transit-oriented 
development—is consistently higher. 100 
Take Bethesda, for example, which Schrag describes as Montgomery County’s 
“showpiece” of transit-oriented development. While it is undeniably successful and a 
significant proportion of its workers and residents use transit, its 19,062 riders per day101 
is still considerably lower than York Mills’ 27,500, though the latter’s transit-oriented 
development is dismal by comparison. Many other suburban Toronto stations, including 
those with equally limited transit-oriented development, are even busier.  
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Figure 21: Bethesda Metro Station Environs102 
 
Figure 22: York Mills Subway Station Environs103 
 
This is not to say that transit-oriented development is not a highly desirable goal. 
It will, however, never be possible to build rapid transit within walking distance of all or 
even most residents of a major metropolitan area. This is especially true given the existing 
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low-density built form of much of suburban North America. No matter how many 
condominium towers or office buildings are built around stations, this will continue to be 
the case. It is therefore necessary to find means by which residents beyond walking and 
cycling distance can access stations. There are only two means by which this is possible: 
park-and ride, or connecting bus. As we have seen, park-and-ride has significant 
limitations, both in terms of its practical capacity and its environmental effects.  But 
feeder buses are only useful if they are frequent enough that a missed transfer does not 
create serious hardship. 
The comparison of Toronto, Greater Washington, and the Bay Area makes clear 
that the key to maximizing the value of rail infrastructure investment is to embed it within 
a network of frequent local service. Park-and-ride lots or adjacent development will never 
be sufficient to fill a high-capacity rail service, and it is impossible to build a rail transit 
network that is in walking distance of all, or even a significant proportion, of a region’s 
residents. The only way to make transit useful for most of a region’s popuation is to 
emulate the Toronto model: provide seamless, fare-integrated transfers at rail stations to 
a local bus service that runs frequently enough to minimize the problems caused by a 
missed connection.  
Too often, American regions—and, increasingly, Ontario—have put the cart before 
the horse, spending large sums on major capital projects intended to attract people to 
transit (as well as to encourage real estate development)104 that are built into a wasteland 
of local transit service. Governments build LRT routes in areas where buses run once an 
hour, or where the last trip of the night runs at 7pm. It is therefore entirely unsurprising 
 
104 King and Fischer, “Streetcar Projects as Spatial Planning.” 
257 
 
that many American LRT systems, costing billions to build in many cases, carry fewer 
riders than some suburban Toronto local bus routes.105 The availability of federal capital 
funding has facilitated large investments in transit infrastructure for decades, but federal 
operating funding has been largely eliminated. This policy has produced a backwards 
approach to transit, in which basic local service is starved for funds while billion-dollar 
megaprojects are built across the country. In city after city, large and expensive light rail 
networks are useful only to a tiny proportion of the region’s population, since the buses 
that connect to them run far too infrequently for connecting trips to be viable. Lack of 
integration compounds the problem—in some cases, rail and bus service are not even on 
the same fare structure. Some agencies, like the Detroit Department of Transportation, 
even run bus routes that parallel rail service, with ridership often segregated by race and 
class.106 
Despite massive investments in infrastructure in several American regions, 
including Greater Washington and the San Francisco Bay Area, transit never fully 
achieved its promise of liberating residents from the need to rely on the automobile. 
Though there may have been many miles of new rapid transit, most people in the region 
still needed to drive to reach the station. As Schaeffer and Sclar have stated, this reliance 
on the automobile, while it has enhanced mobility for many, has actually hindered access 
to the opportunities available in their city for the substantial proportion of the population 
that are unable to drive. The American transit planners, despite their seeming ambition 
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in pursuing vast projects like BART and Metro, remained mired in the path dependence 
of automobility. The TTC, by contrast, had struck off on a new path before automobility 
was fully entrenched. 107 
 
 
107 Schaeffer and Sclar, Access for All; Sclar, Lönnroth, and Wolmar, Urban Access for the 21st Century, 11–18. 
259 
 
Chapter 8: The New Suburban Majority 
The subway finally pushed beyond the boundaries of the City of Toronto in 1968, 
as French students hurled paving stones at the police and Trudeaumania gripped 
normally conservative Toronto. A staider crowd, with men still wearing hats, celebrated 
as twin extensions on the eastern and western ends of the Bloor-Danforth subway to 
Warden in Scarborough and Islington in Etobicoke opened on May 10th of that year. They 
watched Scarborough Mayor Albert Campbell and Etobicoke Mayor Edward Horton as 
the magistrates exultantly drove the first trains on their boroughs’ respective extensions—
Horton hyperbolized that the day would be remembered “in song and verse.”1  
The projects had been approved in 1964, immediately after Metro assumed much 
of the TTC’s existing subway-related debt and increased its share of the Bloor-Danforth 
costs. They were expected to add $77 million to the original budget, bringing the total cost 
of the subway project to $280 million. The OMB approved the borrowing despite an 
appeal by Goodhead, who was concerned about the project’s effects on capital spending 
for other projects in North York, and who was no doubt unhappy that the first suburban 
subway extensions would go to the second- and third-most-populous boroughs rather 
than to his own.2 The extensions were supported by both the Planning Board and the TTC, 
in both cases partly to solidify suburban political support for transit. "We took the 
position that subways serve a political purpose," Eli Comay said in a 1982 interview with 
Frances Frisken.3 
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Figure 23: Bloor-Danforth Etobicoke Extension Opening, May 10, 1968.4 
 
The gambit was successful. In addition to the enhanced Metro support for funding 
the TTC’s capital expenses, the Province agreed, for the first time, to directly subsidize as 
well. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Metro, aided by the backroom lobbying of Gardiner and 
Frost, was able to persuade the province to fund one third of the roadbed of the new Bloor-
Danforth subway line through its highway funding program, beginning in 1964.5 The 
roadbed, meaning the tunnels and rights-of-way as opposed to the stations, tracks, and 
vehicles, was deemed to be equivalent to a highway; there was an established funding 
formula by which highways received one-third funding. The province also agreed to 
purchase Metro’s debentures, so that the municipality could borrow at a much lower rate. 
Even the Federal government, rarely involved in directly funding municipal projects, 
approved a $29.5 million low-interest loan for the project, with 25% of that amount 
 
4 City of Toronto Archives. 
5 “Financing of Public Transit in Toronto,” 4. 
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convertible into a grant.6 The financial support for transit from upper levels of 
government would never have been achieved if its sole political constituency was the City 
of Toronto, which was declining in relative political importance with every year of 
meteoric suburban growth. 
By the late 1960s, the TTC had built a strong political constituency throughout 
Metro, including many suburban politicians and the powerful real estate industry. The 
latter had been a key driver of the meteoric expansion of the New York City subway system 
in the early decades of the 20th century. Private transit companies built new subway and 
elevated lines into empty fields, and waves of apartment houses soon spread outward 
from their stations—many of them built by associates of the transit companies’ owners. 
After the Second World War, however, subway expansion plans remained limited to the 
already densely developed five boroughs—many projects duplicating existing elevated 
lines that were slated for demolition—while most new development was occurring in the 
counties beyond the city limits. As a result, real estate interests—once the most 
enthusiastic supporters of subway construction—began to oppose subway expansion due 
to the upward pressure its cost placed on real estate taxation.7  
In Toronto, the position of the real estate industry was very different. As the areas 
around new subway stations were re-zoned for high density, developers quickly profited 
by replacing houses with new office and apartment towers. Suburban developers equally 
benefited from new extensions, which served the fastest-growing parts of Metro both 
directly and through connecting buses.  
 
6 “Loan of $29,482,000 For Subway Extension Approved by Ottawa,” The Globe and Mail, March 6, 1964, 29. 
7 Hood, 722 Miles, 243–44. 
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G. Warren Heenan, a real estate industry executive and past president of the 
Toronto Real Estate Board, was emblematic as he toured the North American conference 
circuit extolling the virtues of subway construction. “Balanced transportation, featuring 
Rapid Transit as the main component, is the key to phenomenal urban growth,” he told 
the 1,200 delegates of the 1969 annual meeting of the American Transit Association in 
Montreal. This was because automobile congestion was “strangling the growth of many 
of North America’s great cities.” He considered an ongoing operating subsidy for transit 
to be “good business,” and went so far as to declare that transit should be as free as 
highways. This enthusiastic support is unsurprising, considering his claim that the Yonge 
subway sparked $10 billion in development—of a total $15 billion in development over 
the preceding year metro-wide. “Properties along the subway route doubled and tripled 
and sometimes increased as much as tenfold in value,” Heenan boasted.8 The TTC 
occasionally pursued air-rights development over its cut-and-cover subway lines and 
stations—going so far as to produce a glossy brochure outlining the opportunities for 
developers—but they never pursued the type of systematic value capture through 
development that became a significant revenue source in places like Hong Kong.9 
 
8 G. Warren Heenan, “Realty Values and Rapid Transit” (88th Annual Meeting of the American Transit Association, 
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(September 1, 2009): 2019–43; Lin Li, Chao He Rong, and Hong Feng Zhu, “Suggestions on Comprehensive Metro 
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The twin subway extensions and improvements to connecting buses resulted in a 
7.7% increase in subway ridership in 1968 over the previous year.10 Among the key goals 
of the extension were, as the 1964 Transportation Plan put it, to bring the subway to 
suburban locations with space for facilities for numerous feeder buses and for ample 
commuter parking.11 Indeed, the terminals were equipped with lavish bus terminals, with 
waiting areas complete with shops above platforms, and flashing signs indicating when a 
bus was ready for boarding. The bus routes flooding into the new terminals had already 
been operating for years—many since 1963—and they provided a strong established base 
of ridership for the new subway. Sixteen of the existing routes were re-designed to connect 
with the subway, and twelve new routes were started. It meant another 2.9 million 
vehicle-miles of suburban service added in 1968.12 
Instead of pacifying suburban demands for flat fares, however, the subway 
extension only heightened them by highlighting the arbitrariness of the fare boundary. 
The new subway segments outside the City of Toronto passed through Zone 2, but the 
subway fare collection technology remained token-based. This meant that the new 
subway was considered to be part of Zone 1, but all of the connecting surface routes 
remained in Zone 2. While, as Chair Allen privately noted, this “eliminated resentment” 
among subway passengers who would otherwise be forced to pay a second fare to ride 1 
or 2 extra stations, and would encourage use of park and ride lots at the new suburban 
stations, it forced riders transferring between bus and subway—one of the key strengths 
 
10 “1968 Annual Report to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto” (Toronto Transit Commission, 1968). 
11 “Report on the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan,” 60–61. 
12 “1968 Annual Report to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.” 
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of the TTC system—to pay a punitive double fare.13 Unsurprisingly, the arrangement 
suppressed ridership. Simpson and Ong—long sceptical of a single fare—nevertheless 
projected that while a single fare would cost $3,344,000 in lost revenues in the first year, 
it would win more than 2,000,000 additional passengers.14 
Though some consideration was given to the use of magnetic stripe card 
technology, which would track riders as they entered and left the system to enable fare-
by-distance, as was being planned for the San Francisco BART system at that time, 
implementation was dismissed as impractical. That was not least because the close 
integration between bus and subway—not present in the Bay Area—would require a much 
more complex electronic fare collection system that incorporated buses and streetcars as 
well. In London, a second operator on buses was required to handle fare collection for 
their fare-by-distance system.15 
Throughout the 1960s, suburban Metro councillors continued to relentlessly 
pressure the TTC to eliminate the zone fare system. In 1964, New Toronto passed a 
resolution calling on the TTC to introduce a single fare system, given the contribution of 
all Metro municipalities to paying for subway construction.16 Controller Irv Paisley of 
North York wrote in his newsletter that “The citizens of North York are a long-suffering 
lot when it comes to transportation,” lamenting that they were afflicted with a levy “to 
provide a subway for downtown residents, which doesn’t even reach [their] own 
 
13 William R. Allen, “Notes,” 1966, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto Archive. 
14 “An Unfair Load.” 
15 J.H. Kearns, “Memorandum on Public Transit Fares,” September 27, 1965, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto 
Archive; P. Pickett, “Report to the Members of the Transportation Committee,” September 8, 1967, Series 11, File 
603, City of Toronto Archive; William R. Allen to E. Meyers, April 21, 1969, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto 
Archives. 
16 Councillor G.M. Baycroft, “Resolution No. 25” (1964). 
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community,” and were subsidizing the TTC “by being forced to pay a double fair [sic]” to 
go downtown. This “barrier” at Lawrence Avenue was “an expensive menace,” he argued, 
“for it acts as a psychological shield to prevent Metro’s rich and flourishing ‘northern half’ 
from visiting the downtown areas of culture, business and entertainment.17  
They were reflecting the views of their constituents. The Oak-Vaughan Ratepayers 
Association in the Borough of York, for example, wrote to York Mayor Jack Mould—the 
borough’s representative on the Metro Executive—to inform him of their own resolution 
calling for a uniform flat fare, at least within the area directly served by the subway. In 
their letter, they described the situation as “ridiculous” since some people travelling a 
relatively short distance within their borough were forced to pay a double fare if they had 
to transfer between bus and subway, while riders could travel right across the City of 
Toronto on a single fare.18 
The suburbanites had the support of the powerful Star, which wrote in a March 
1963 editorial that “The case for a single fare grows morally and politically stronger as 
Metro gets more deeply involved in TTC financing,” particularly the new subway projects. 
“Suburban as well as city taxpayers provide these funds. The suburbs see a single fare as 
their just reward.”19 Increasingly, flat fares were justified as a means of getting people out 
of their cars—marking a key shift in justification for transit from an and in itself to a 
means of road congestion relief and even environmental improvement. 
 
17 “Newsletter of Controller Irv Paisley,” 1965, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto Archive. 
18 E.S. Ryan, “Letter to Mayor Jack Mould from Oak-Vaughan Ratepayers’ Association,” October 23, 1968, Series 
11, File 603, City of Toronto Archives. 
19 “An Unfair Load.” 
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The suburban bloc was irate as much at the perceived unfairness as at the actual 
cost for their constituents. The problem for the suburbanites was that if the TTC were to 
remain self-sustaining, a Metro-wide flat fare would have to be financed by a fare increase 
on single-zone riders—mostly those in the old City of Toronto. As of 1964, that would 
mean a fare increase on 88% of riders to pay for a fare reduction on only 12% of riders—
a politically dubious proposition if there ever was one. A different solution for financing 
would need to be found.20 
Metro Council repeatedly voted to urge the Executive Committee and the TTC to 
unify the fare system. On August 5, 1965, Metro Council amended a report to request that 
the Executive Committee recommend the inclusion of a single fare in the 1966 budget 
estimates.21 The Executive Committee demurred, but again in 1967, the Borough of York 
pressed the Executive Committee to adopt a single fare.22 Members of the Metro 
Transportation Committee met with the TTC commissioners in September of that year, 
where the TTC still argued that a single fare was impossible given that the commission 
was expected to operate on a self-sustaining basis.23 
The implication was that if the TTC were to eliminate zone fares, the cost would 
need to be covered by the government and the “self-sustaining” mantra would need to be 
ended once and for all. This remained contentious within the TTC, where independence 
from council remained paramount to many officials.24 The Commission had thus far 
 
20 H.E. Pettett General Secretary, TTC to W.W. Gardhouse, Metropolitan Clerk, February 19, 1964, Series 11, File 
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managed to have it both ways by limiting sustained subsidy to capital expenses and 
retaining full independence in the operating budget. Though they had dangled the 
possibility of flat fares in exchange for Metro’s assumption of all capital costs, the prospect 
of full abolition of the fare zones was not welcomed by the TTC.25 Assistant General 
Manager for Operations J.H. Kearns argued that it is inequitable to charge a single fare 
in a large city, as riders travelling a short distance would pay the same amount as riders 
travelling a very long distance. He recognized that it was equally inequitable to force 
riders to pay a double fare when they cross an arbitrary zone boundary, but instead 
favoured a fare-by-distance system, ideally using new fare collection technology.26 The 
TTC’s management was fighting against an inexorably rising political tide. 
Outside the TTC’s staff, it was increasingly seen as inevitable that the fare system 
would be unified. C.C. Downey, a TTC commissioner and prominent Toronto lawyer, 
wrote confidentially to Metro Chairman Allen saying that he was “of course in favour of a 
‘single fare’ if the loss in revenue can be financed—and I think it should be by the 
taxpayer—for this public service.”27  
Downey even contacted officials in Winnipeg, a city that also had a metropolitan 
government and that had abolished transit zone fares.  Winnipeg’s Commissioner of 
Streets and Transit replied that he had been opposed to a single fare while their transit 
system was supposed to be self-supporting, but that his opposition evaporated when 
Metro Council indicated that they would fund the policy change rather than financing it 
 
25 Alden Baker, “TTC Holds Out Single Fare As Bait for Subway Help,” The Globe and Mail, June 8, 1963. 
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through a fare increase. Furthermore, he noted that the cost of the change was less than 
expected, and that increased ridership made up, in part, for the lower overall fare.28 
Allen, though publicly supportive, remained hesitant. He wrote privately to 
Controller Paisley to remark that “the dilemma posed by a single fare zone structure 
remains in that the realty taxpayer is called upon to compensate for the savings enjoyed 
by the public transportation user.”29  
The suburban councillors were further empowered following a large-scale re-
organization of Metro in response to the Goldenberg Report, which was released in 
1965.30 The TTC cannot have been displeased with its recommendation that the TTC not 
be abolished and its functions transferred to a Metro department, owing to “its record of 
efficient administration.” Nevertheless, Goldenberg recommended that there be more 
formal coordination between Metro and the TTC, including an ex officio seat for the Metro 
chair on the commission, and in particular between the TTC and the Planning Board.31 
More consternation at the TTC came from the province’s response in 1966 to the 
report’s recommendations on restructuring Metro and Metro Council. Gardiner had 
urged the retention of voting parity on Metro Council between Toronto and the suburbs.32 
Goldenberg recommended merging the 13 municipalities into four, maintaining the City 
at close to half the Metro population by merging York and East York with Toronto, but 
the province baulked, instead opting for six municipalities. This meant that the City of 
 
28 D.I. MacDonald to C.C. Downey, Q.C., December 7, 1964, Series 11, File 603, City of Toronto Archive. 
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Toronto would comprise only a minority of Metro’s population (682,000 of 1,747,000 in 
1967), and the restructured Metro Council reflected the demographics. The new 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, passed in 1967, established a decisive 
suburban majority of 20 seats on Metro Council to the City’s 12. The chair— invariably a 
suburbanite after Allen retired in 1969 and was replaced by Scarborough Mayor Albert 
Campbell—made up the final vote. The change recognized the increasing suburban 
majority in the population. Though the executive committee remained evenly divided 
between city and suburbs for the moment, a unified suburban bloc would inevitably 
prevail on Metro Council in any dispute. 
More fundamentally, however, the role of the City of Toronto within the Metro 
federation had changed. The wealth of the City in the early years had financed the 
enormous infrastructure needs of the rapidly developing suburban boroughs. By the late 
1960s, however, the situation had reversed: the suburbs were now populous and wealthy, 
while the City’s aging physical infrastructure was in serious need of repair and it retained 
a disproportionate burden of social services.33 The suburbanites increasingly held the 
upper hand demographically, politically, and economically within Metro. The TTC’s 
reluctant assent to suburban service expansion, and the success of the expansion 
program, came just in time. Despite TTC staff’s fears, it is likely that the expansion saved, 
rather than destroyed the TTC’s independence for many more years. 
It is therefore unsurprising that when the suburban subway extensions opened a 
year after Metro Council was reformed, the TTC supported them with another enormous 
expansion of suburban bus service. Miles of suburban passenger service provided 
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increased in 1968 by 2.86 million (12.6%) to 19.82 million. As with earlier expansions, 
riders quickly flocked to the new services: annual suburban ridership increased by 5.4 
million (7.4%) to a total of 78.7 million. The commission’s financial state, however, was 
not so favourable as it slipped into a deficit of $1.2 million, owing partly to the cost of the 
new services, which did not perform quite as well financially in their early days as the 
extraordinarily successful previous round of expansion.  
The TTC attributed most of the increase in expenses, however, to an increase in its 
labour costs. The Commission closely averted a strike by agreeing to “the highest wage 
and fringe benefit settlement in Commission history,” though it noted that the increase 
was in line with other settlements in the city, amid a booming economy and growing 
inflation.34 Since the TTC had consistently rejected operating subsidy, it responded, still 
claiming the need for self-sustaining operation, with a substantial increase in the basic 
one-zone fare from 20 to 25 cents. The upshot in the following year was the first annual 
ridership decline—of 0.4%—since the suburban expansion in 1962.35 
The fare increase was announced only a few days before its imposition, ostensibly 
to prevent hoarding of tokens, highlighting the absence of political accountability at the 
TTC.36 Frustration with the TTC was widely aired during that fall’s municipal election 
campaign.37 In response to the fare hike, Metro Councillors agitated for and ultimately 
agreed to subsidize a half-fare arrangement for low-income seniors, over persistent 
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obstruction by the TTC.38 On May 5, 1970, Metro Council voted 13-10 to ask the province 
for permission to upgrade the chair of the Metro Transportation Committee from a non-
voting to a voting member of the TTC. The dispute did not divide on traditional city-
suburban lines. The move was proposed by North York Controller Irving Paisley, and was 
supported by several City members like Tony O’Donohue, who viewed the all-appointed 
commission as an “undemocratic” way for Metro Council to place a buffer between itself 
and the citizenry. The Globe and Mail’s editorial writers agreed, criticizing the TTC’s 
reluctance to meet with community groups and the press. Metro Chairman Campbell of 
Scarborough was opposed, as were Toronto Mayor William Dennison and North York 
Controller Mel Lastman—a flamboyant furniture dealer who was later North York’s long-
time mayor and then the first mayor of the new City of Toronto following Metro’s 
amalgamation into a single city in 1998—who “believed the TTC is administering the 
utility on a businesslike basis and to appoint politicians to it would destroy this.”39   
The province went even further than asked, empowering Metro Council to appoint 
as many of its own members as it liked, and shortening the TTC commissioners’ terms 
from three years to one.40 Darcy McKeough, the provincial minister of municipal affairs 
and housing, explained in the legislature that it would be “Metro’s decision” whether it 
wanted to abolish the TTC’s independence. Though independent public authorities 
remained in vogue elsewhere—New York State had created the Metropolitan 
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Transportation Authority a few years earlier—the Ontario government was less enthralled 
with the concept, at least in the case of the TTC. It was the government’s “general 
philosophy,” McKeough explained, that agencies like the TTC should be run 
“politically.”41 Campbell was nevertheless able to prevent Metro Council from taking up 
the provincial offer, and they opted to follow their original plan of appointing a single 
council member.42 
It is clear that the success of the 1963 expansion firmly established the idea that 
suburban transit expansion could be successful, and equally that Metro Council would 
need to embrace at least modest subsidy to make it happen. The TTC was promoting its 
ridership success as a result of service improvements, and the Toronto Star was beating 
the drum for the need to extend service to the suburbs to ensure that they did not develop 
entirely around the automobile. Clearly inspired by the success of the recent 
improvements, the 1964 Report on the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan noted 
“the decisive importance of surface transit in the system.” Even in the plan’s scenarios 
with a very extensive subway system of almost 90 miles, passenger-miles on the surface 
transit network exceeded those on subways, and in most other scenarios they exceeded 
by over 50%. It also noted that the “frequent and extended surface transit service” 
included in the plan “is likely to require operating subsidies, and this is one of the main 
conclusions implicit in the recommended transportation plan.”43 
However, surface transit remained only a marginal element of the report, and of 
the transit debate as a whole. Most of the study was dedicated to large capital 
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improvements, like expressways and subways. Likewise, political discussion and media 
coverage centred on large-scale infrastructure expansion, with the surface transit system 
playing only a marginal role. The steady improvement of the suburban transit system 
would come largely as a result of political negotiations on Metro Council and the internal 
processes of the TTC that sought to balance service with growing suburban demand 




Chapter 9: Navigating Through Troubled Waters 
June 3, 1971 was a day immortalized in verse and song. As poet Dennis Lee wrote,  
“The people paused to touch the air/And breathe the green renewal there/As though the 
headline was a prayer/The day we stopped Spadina.”1  It was a great day for activists in 
downtown Toronto’s Annex neighbourhood, a tree-lined district of beautiful old houses 
adjacent to the University of Toronto, populated with a bohemian assortment of residents 
befitting such a location. It was also a harbinger of a much bigger and broader urban 
reform movement that would soon take over the City of Toronto’s government. It was a 
movement that questioned the modernist approach favoured by Metro since its genesis—
a movement that opposed sacrificing the historic neighbourhoods of the old city on the 
altar of progress. 
The 1970s were a challenging time for the TTC—a time in which its expenses 
skyrocketed at the same time that it faced continuing pressures for more services and flat 
fares. With hindsight, it seems almost shocking that it did not descend into the spiral of 
rising costs, service cuts, and ridership declines that shattered American systems a decade 
earlier. Instead, the TTC benefited from a provincial government that was, more than any 
government before or, arguably, since, profoundly attached to progressive urban ideals. 
The decade began with the province’s cancellation of a destructive urban highway 
project—a tangible and symbolic change. As part of its new urban-minded philosophy, the 
province instead provided both operating and capital funding for transit. The anger 
among suburbanites at the highway cancellation was partly assuaged by the provincial 
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operating funding enabling the achievement of what they had long sought: the 
elimination of the double fare. The subsidies were extremely timely, arriving just as the 
world faced a deluge of inflation. It allowed the TTC to stabilize and, eventually, grow its 
service. Few of the capital projects featured in the ambitious comprehensive plans of the 
era came to fruition, but Toronto’s transit ridership remained strong thanks to the stable 
operating funding sustaining a dependable and comprehensive local service across Metro. 
The Annex was hardly the type of place one would expect to meekly accept a new 
expressway in a ditch cutting a swathe through the middle of their community.  Perhaps 
its most famous homeowner was none other than Jane Jacobs, fresh from another 
successful highway revolt against the Lower Manhattan Expressway in her former home 
of Greenwich Village.2 Activists David and Nadine Nowlan’s manifesto against the project  
The Bad Trip—its title captured the counterculture spirit of the movement—sat on the 
coffee tables of the city’s cultural elite. In its foreword, celebrated philosopher and media 
theorist Marshall McLuhan said “Toronto will commit suicide if it plunges the Spadina 
Expressway into its heart.” He called Metro’s planners “19th-century men with a naïve 
faith in an obsolete technology,” and warned that “Their failure to learn from the mistakes 
of American cities will be ours too.”3 
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The battle had been going on for years.4 The expressway’s approval was one of 
Gardiner’s final victories as Metro Chair in 1962. A few years later, construction began on 
a northern section in North York, along with an enormous interchange at Highway 401. 
The next phase was further south, where the affected neighbourhoods were more 
established, better organized, and more densely populated. By 1969, the expressway was 
a key issue in the City of Toronto election, and while NDP-affiliated but increasingly 
conservative and expressway-sympathetic Mayor William Dennison was re-elected, a 
large number of incumbent councillors were defeated by new progressive “reformers.”5 
Many of them were academics and activists, and they were members of all three main 
political parties.  
Toronto was changing, its culture increasingly enriched by a flood of new arrivals. 
There were Americans escaping the Vietnam War, immigrants arriving from around the 
world as a result of Prime Minister Lester Pearson’s colour-blind immigration policy, and, 
after 1976, much of Montreal’s Anglophone elite fleeing language laws and the threat of 
Quebec separation. Spadina had become a shibboleth that defined the two political tribes 
that would battle for dominance in Metropolitan Toronto: the urban, anti-development, 
anti-highway “reformers” concentrated in the City of Toronto, and the pro-business, pro-
development, pro-highway faction that predominated in the suburbs.  
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Figure 24: Spadina Expressway in the Annex6 
Both descriptions were caricatures to some extent, and when the two factions 
battled over the TTC, their positions were complex and there was substantial common 
ground. While some suburban politicians opposed public spending on transit, others 
fought hard for transit subsidy so that their constituents could enjoy better service and a 
 




flat fare. The City crowd was strongly supportive of transit and wanted fares kept low, 
though many preferred spending to be concentrated in the denser prewar 
neighbourhoods rather than in newer areas. These were differences that could be bridged. 
With Spadina, however, the city-suburb divide deepened into a chasm as wide as the 
proposed expressway ditch. 
 
Figure 25: Spadina Expressway in the Annex7 
Toronto’s highway revolt was part of a growing movement across North America 
and Europe that rejected the physical destruction and cultural decay associated with 
rebuilding the city for the automobile.8 Affluent residents of Georgetown in Washington, 
D.C. had forced the quiet shelving of an expressway project as early as the 1950s, and 
Metro’s planners never had much confidence about getting approval to build the 
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Crosstown Expressway through Rosedale, home to the city’s business elite.9 As early as 
1956, the Ontario Property Owners Association passed a resolution that criticized 
expressways as an “unnecessary extravagance,” since they simply shift “traffic bottlenecks 
from one place to another.”10  
By the late 1960s, movements against destructive urban highway projects had 
spread beyond the realm of quiet but stern dissuasion of politicians by the urban gentry 
when they were to be directly affected. A waterfront expressway through New Orleans’ 
Vieux Carré was defeated by activists in 1969. 1971 proved to be the year the urban 
expressway ceased to be politically tenable. As Torontonians beat back Spadina, the 
mighty Robert Moses was forced to abandon his project for the Lower Manhattan 
Expressway and Boston’s Inner Belt Expressway was cancelled after a determined activist 
campaign.  
The seemingly intractable battle over Spadina was not to be won by the suburban 
majority on Metro Council, thanks to a deus ex machina in the form of the new premier, 
Bill Davis. As the flowers were beginning to bloom on that late spring day, he stood in the 
provincial legislature and declared: “If we are building a transportation system to serve 
the automobile, the Spadina Expressway would be a good place to start. But if we are 
building a transportation system to serve people, the Spadina Expressway is a good place 
to stop.”  
Only three months into his fourteen-year tenure in office, Davis had already made 
one of the marks that would define his premiership. The forty-one-year-old had been 
 
9 Blumenfeld, Life Begins at 65, 248. 
10 “Resolution Adopted at the Annual Meeting of the Property Owners Association of Toronto and Endorsed by the 
Ontario Property Owners Coalition,” May 9, 1956, RG19-43, Archives of Ontario. 
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widely considered Robarts’ heir apparent following a long stretch as Minister of 
Education in an era when that ministry was responsible for 40% of total provincial 
spending. He came from the progressive Red Tory wing of his party, comfortable with an 
expansive role for government. His ministerial record bears witness: he created the 
province's community college system, five new universities, and the TVOntario 
educational network.11 Though he never ceased reminding voters of his small-town roots 
in Brampton, just outside Metro and soon to grow tenfold into a major suburb, he was a 
more urban-minded premier than Robarts and certainly than Frost.  
His Spadina decision no doubt had political dimensions. An election was coming 
up in a few months, and several of the affected downtown Toronto ridings were 
represented by powerful cabinet ministers. The social-democratic New Democratic Party 
had a charismatic new leader in Stephen Lewis, with keen hopes to pick up some of those 
seats. Both Davis’ biographer Steve Paikin and his most powerful minister, Darcy 
McKeough, agreed that the Spadina decision took the wind out of the NDP’s sails.12 Shorn 
of their most effective Toronto issue, the NDP made no gains in the election that October 
as Davis romped to an increased majority despite Lewis’ unquestioned abilities as a 
politician. 
Still, the decision received far from universal approbation. Suburbanites were 
outraged, both at the loss of the highway and at the perceived intrusion into Metro 
Council’s jurisdiction.13 Metro’s planners were irritated—in his memoirs, Hans 
 
11 Steve Paikin, Bill Davis: Nation Builder, and Not So Bland After All (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016), 69–98. 
12 Steve Paikin, interview by author, December 17, 2019; Darcy McKeough, interview by author, January 23, 2020. 
13 Dennis Braithwaite, “Come on, Bill Davis, Admit You Were Wrong,” The Toronto Star, November 10, 1971. See 
also the statements in the Ontario Legislature of Vern Singer, Liberal MPP for Downsview in North York.  
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Blumenthal called Davis’ famous statement “demagogic,” since “no car ever moves 
without a human behind the wheel.”14 An October poll showed that only 28 percent of 
Metro residents supported the cancellation, while 51 percent were opposed.15 Many of the 
prominent members of Davis’ party were on the other side of the issue, including the 
powerful treasurer and recent leadership kingmaker Darcy McKeough.16 Even Toronto’s 
mayor Dennison was furious, later declaring that "We are sick to death with Premier Davis 
because he has not seen the foolishness of his terrible rash and unnecessary pre-election 
pledge that the city is for people."17 For years thereafter, many suburbanites lamented the 
premier’s decision.18 Though in the end suburban Tory Toronto held firm electorally, 
Davis clearly took a political risk based on a genuine belief in a less car-dominated city. 
As Davis announced the cancellation of Spadina, he also indicated that 
considerably greater provincial support for transit would be forthcoming to achieve his 
professed goal of building “cities for people.” Since the first provincial subsidies for 
subway roadbed construction, provincial funding had gradually crept up from $5.8 
million in 1964 to $8.6 million in 1970.19 Metropolitan Toronto, even before the Spadina 
cancellation made their case far more urgent, had made a lengthy presentation to the 
Minister of Highways and Transport titled “The Need for Provincial Financial Assistance 
for Public Transit.” It blamed the 75% decline in American transit ridership from the 
 
14 Blumenfeld, Life Begins at 65, 249. 
15 Paikin, Bill Davis: Nation Builder, and Not So Bland After All, 114–15. 
16 Darcy McKeough, interview. 
17 Douglas Glynn, “Dennison Shocked by Decision,” The Globe and Mail, June 4, 1971; “‘Sick to Death’ of Davis 
over Spadina: Mayor,” The Globe and Mail, October 12, 1972. 
18 Paul Godfrey, interview. 
19 Mark W. Frankena, Urban Transportation Financing: Theory and Policy in Ontario, Ontario Economic Council 
Research Studies 26 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 122. 
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Second World War to 1970 on fare increases needed to balance budgets, and warned that 
Toronto’s record high ridership would be imperiled without subsidy. The report 
recommended assumption of the full cost of capital expansion, along with a per-rider 
subsidy in the longer term. It discouraged direct subsidy based on a percentage of the 
operating deficit, claiming that such a policy would discourage efficient operation, though 
perhaps also because a per-rider grant would enable Metro to reduce its own funding.20 
The requests followed Metro Council’s consultation with the TTC a few months 
earlier. The TTC continued to maintain its very conservative policy and its efforts to retain 
as much independence as possible. The TTC remained wary of dedicated operating 
funding, fearing political interference in day-to-day operations. “It is believed that capital 
grants are preferable to subsidies to meet operating deficits,” the general manager wrote, 
“since they would leave the transit authority with the incentive to operate efficiently and 
live within its budget.” The ideal of self-sustainability died hard.21 
The Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, representing the province’s many 
smaller municipalities, had simultaneously been mounting a campaign for operating 
funding for transit. Their bus-based systems had less need for capital funding than 
Toronto’s subways, but they also struggled to fund adequate transit service from the 
 
20 “The Need for Provincial Financial Assistance for Public Transit” (The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 
March 4, 1971), Series 11, File 968, City of Toronto Archives. 
21 H.E. Pettett General Secretary, TTC to G.M. Foster, Metropolitan Toronto Clerk, November 23, 1970, Series 11, 
File 969, City of Toronto Archives; General Manager of Operations, “Assistance Required by Toronto Transit 




farebox and their small municipal tax bases.22 Robarts had already indicated his sympathy 
for their campaign, though the details were left to his successor.23 
On June 28, a few weeks after the Spadina bombshell, Davis followed through with 
the announcement of radically expanded provincial support for transit. Refining his 
memorable line from the Spadina cancellation announcement, he said that his policy 
would deliver a transportation system that “is more sensitive to people as people, not just 
people as owners of automobiles.”  In a symbolic gesture, the Highway Improvement Act 
would be renamed the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.  
Substantively, the new act would expand capital funding from “roadbed” to all 
aspects of subway construction, as well as other types of capital programs such as the 
acquisition of new buses and associated infrastructure. It eliminated all bias in favour of 
road transportation and provided for a 50% provincial contribution.  
Even more significantly, it introduced provincial support for transit operations. 
Contrary to what Metro had requested, Queen’s Park would also cover 50% of transit 
agencies’ annual deficits, up to a cap determined by a formula based on $0.50 per capita 
for the first 10,000 in population, plus $1.50 per capita for the remaining population, plus 
$0.01 per revenue passenger.24 The caps were motivated by the fear—shared by the TTC 
itself—that subsidy from the effectively bottomless provincial treasury would lead to the 
abandonment of efforts to pursue efficiency and to demands for large wage increases. 
 
22 “Submission to the Honourable G. E. Gomme, Minister of Highways by the Association of Ontario Mayors and 
Reeves on the Subject of Provincial Subsidy for Municipal Transit,” December 1970, Series 11, File 969, City of 
Toronto Archives; Melvin L. Swart to Mayor William Dennison, October 9, 1970, Series 11, File 608, City of 
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23 “Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves Submission on Provincial Subsidy for Municipal Transit”; Swart to 
Mayor William Dennison, October 9, 1970. 
24 Frankena, Urban Transportation Financing, 120–21. 
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Inevitably, opposition politicians were unimpressed. Liberal MPP Murray Gaunt 
of the rural constituency of Huron-Bruce lamented that “The 50 per cent is still not 
adequate. We are engaged in a sort of rearguard action here; we are catching up […] I 
think it should be 75 per cent.”25 A year later, Davis took Gaunt’s advice and increased the 
subsidy to 75% for transit capital expenditures. While the amounts were subject to caps 
based on population and ridership, the caps were generally disregarded throughout the 
1970s. The provincial cabinet continued to tweak the funding formula, overall to the TTC’s 
benefit: caps were eliminated in 1974, then restored at 75% of the operating deficit in 1977, 
but with a funding floor at 13.75% of the total operating budget. The sums grew from $6.6 
million in 1972 to $30.4 million in 1978.26 
The provincial decision to subsidize operating deficits was the final nail in the 
coffin for TTC’s vision of self-sustaining operation. The TTC’s staff could grumble, but it 
was increasingly apparent that the TTC had no hope of meeting its growing expenses at 
the farebox. 
The other twin pillar of the TTC’s conservative operation fell early in 1973 with the 
appointment of new commissioner Paul Godfrey. He was an ambitious, Spadina-
supporting, 34-year-old Metro Council member from North York, whose mother had been 
a prominent political activist and professional campaign manager for Progressive 
Conservative candidates. He replaced the long-time TTC chair Ralph Day as 
commissioner and saw an opening to dramatically change the TTC’s long-held policies, 
and an opportunity to make his mark as an emerging politician. He would prove to 
 
25 Murray Gaunt, Ontario Legislative Assembly, Hansard, July 14, 1971, 3959. 
26  TTC Annual Reports. 
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become one of the city’s most powerful figures over the following half-century in a varied 
political, sports management, and media career.27  
The suburban campaign for a single fare had gained new impetus from the 
provincial subsidy announcement. On January 14, 1972, Metro Council voted 22-4 for a 
motion moved by Godfrey to endorse a single fare. Still, the Metro Executive Committee, 
which retained 50% City representation, repeatedly deferred the matter. The TTC 
commission itself also remained opposed as ever to the idea, though the margin had 
become much thinner.28 
 
Godfrey’s appointment tipped the commission’s balance for the first time away 
from the “administrators,” as Kaplan had defined them, and toward the “politicos.” The 
new arrivals eroded the TTC’s remote image—“ivory tower,” as its new chair Franklin 
Young described it. They were determined to shake up an institution where decisions were 
generally arrived at unanimously in private meetings over lunch and free cigars. Just as 
notably, Godfrey, along with commissioner Karl Mallette, the outspoken former 
Scarborough controller, and Gordon Hurlburt, a former North York councillor, comprised 
a suburban majority on the commission.29 
The new majority wasted no time in introducing a motion to abolish the zone fare 
on January 16th, at Godfrey’s first meeting. As Godfrey recalled, he had worked to line up 
 
27 Paul Godfrey, interview. 
28 “Minutes of Meeting of Metropolitan Council” (Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, January 11, 1972); 
“Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee” (Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, April 25, 1972); “Minutes of 
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29 “Single-Fare Plan Has High Priority, Mallette Tells TTC,” The Globe and Mail, January 11, 1973; Thomas 
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December 27, 1972; Thomas Coleman, “New Day for TTC: A Lot of Dust Was Raised When Karl Mallette Swept 
In,” The Globe and Mail, July 6, 1972. 
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support for a decisive move as soon as he was appointed.30 They won the vote by a margin 
of one, and the new policy would go into effect only six days later.31 The commissioners 
had been emboldened by the availability of operating subsidies, as the TTC’s own 1977 
review of transit revenue policy acknowledged.32  
The decision was met with a mixed reception. One of the remaining opponents on 
the commission, D. Crawford Smyth, denounced the move as “Irresponsible.” He 
reflected the views of the TTC’s staff, who had long stated that they “[do] not believe in 
the philosophy of a single fare for such a large area as Metropolitan Toronto.” They feared 
the impact on fares for short-distance trips, and therefore continued to dream of fare-by-
distance schemes modelled on San Francisco’s new BART system, despite the 
impossibility of its implementation on the extensive bus and streetcar network with then-
available technology.33  
The Globe and Mail’s editorial board was also sceptical, while some suburbanites 
like Etobicoke Mayor Dennis Flynn were anxious about the cost. The ailing Metro Chair 
Albert Campbell—soon to be replaced by Godfrey after worsening cancer forced his 
retirement—was irate and claimed to have been blindsided by the vote. Backed by Metro’s 
Executive Committee, he immediately wrote to the Commission requesting that they 
postpone their decision.34 
 
30 Paul Godfrey, interview. 
31 Peter Mosher, “More TTC Riders, but Was It Single Fare or the Rain?,” The Globe and Mail, January 23, 1973. 
32 Juri Pill, Transit Revenue Policy Study (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 1977). 
33 “Information for Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Committee” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 
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The province expressed its displeasure, since they were bound by their new policy 
to cover half the cost. Transportation Minister Gordon Carton mused ominously about a 
possible revision to the province’s subsidy program, as provincial officials had implied in 
an earlier meeting with the Metro Executive Committee.35  It proved to be an idle threat—
Davis’ government had no desire to further antagonize Metro’s suburban voters after the 
Spadina decision.  
Curiously, while some of the suburbanites were concerned, Toronto’s new mayor 
David Crombie, elected on a reformist wave after the Spadina activist success, was more 
sympathetic. In an interview shortly following his election, he said that he would support 
a single fare if a fare-by-distance scheme were not possible, and he promoted his own 
plans for heavily discounted off-peak fares or even free transit.36 Crombie maintained that 
province could pay the cost. "As soon as the provincial government came into 
transportation in this city in a heavy way," he said, "the door locked after them."37  He 
sensed the political winds and backed away from the City’s long-held opposition to flat 
fares, as the province and sceptical suburban politicians soon would as well.  
A letter to the editor to the Globe and Mail demonstrated the popularity of the 
move: “It is not often that one gets a pleasant surprise on opening one’s paper in the 
morning,” North York resident Brigitta Sagmeister wrote about the new fare structure. 
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“That’s too bad, if it angers [Metro Executive members,] who probably haven’t used a bus 
in the last 10 years. But for the people out here it is great news. […] It has been the 
mistaken belief for years that the people in the suburbs are rich. It’s about time that this 
myth were abandoned. We have just as many senior citizens, children, teenagers, 
students, disabled persons, and low-wage earners as the inner city. Many of us didn’t 
move out here because we particularly wanted to, but because we had to, following the 
availability of housing.” She said that the new single fare would make Metro “alive” for 
suburbanites.38 
Instead of clawing back its subsidy following the zone fare decision, the province 
ramped it up. Its 1974 budget eliminated the ceilings on operating subsidies—conditional 
on municipalities freezing fares. As Treasurer John White explained in his budget speech, 
“Rising costs of running transit services are now creating financing problems with 
municipalities. Without additional financing support from the Province, transit fares 
would have to increase.”39 
Suburbanites made the change irreversible by voting with their feet: ridership 
exploded as soon as the zone fare was removed. The increase of over 36 million annual 
riders (12.3%) was by far the biggest one-year increase since the creation of Metro—far in 
excess of the 14 million additional riders that the TTC had projected.40 It was helped along 
by a strong economy and the opening of a two-stop suburban subway extension, along 
with a massive improvement to service across the system—especially in the suburban 
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areas.41 The unexpected ridership success also led to an unexpectedly small financial 
burden. The TTC had projected that the elimination of zone fares would result in a $26.5 
million budget deficit for 1973, but in the end the deficit was only $17.7 million—about 
what the TTC had projected without the fare reform.42 
The provincial operating subsidies arrived fortuitously, as they would prove to be 
desperately needed. Throughout the 1960s, the TTC was able to operate on a more-or-less 
break-even basis, with only occasional modest assistance from Metro. This came despite 
a nearly 50% increase in vehicle-miles operated. In 1971, however, the TTC once again 
dipped into deficit, despite substantial growth in ridership. The $2.9 million fiscal gap 
was modest, but the TTC warned in its annual report that renegotiating the next year's 
expiring labour contract would exacerbate the problem. The early 1970s were a time of 
elevated inflation, though the rates paled in comparison to what was coming. While 
vehicle-miles operated increased by 1.96% from 1970 to 1971, total expenses increased by 
8.39%. The figures for 1972 were similar. The TTC, however, by then enjoyed the promise 
of a provincial backstop as it faced growing red ink.  
That fortuitous timing has, however, led to significant criticism of the deleterious 
effects of provincial subsidy on the TTC’s operations. The elimination of zone fares has 
long been criticized by many transit activists in the city. John Sewell described it as a 
“financial disaster” for the TTC. He claimed that the increased suburban ridership 
following the elimination of the zone fare increased the cost of operation relative to 
 
41 “TTC Operating Budget for the Year Ending December 31, 1974” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 
February 5, 1974). 
42 “Estimated Annual Expenditures by the Metropolitan Corporation in Respect of Public Transportation” (Toronto: 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, n.d.), Series 11, File 602, City of Toronto Archives; “1973 Annual Report to 
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.” 
290 
 
ridership.43 However, in the three years following the elimination of zone fares, the 
number of passengers per vehicle mile actually rose to 3.959 from 3.866 in the three 
preceding years. Even over the longer term, the number of riders per vehicle mile only 
declined modestly to an average of 3.706 over the period from 1973 to 1988—hardly a 
calamitous effect on the system’s efficiency. 
Transit systems across North America eliminated zone fare systems as subsidies 
rose in the 1970s. Planning scholar Martin Wachs criticized such moves as favouring high-
income suburbanites and those making long commute trips at the expense of low-income 
urban riders taking shorter trips.44 Economist Mark Frankena also suggested, without 
figures, that the elimination of zone fares in Toronto would be regressive since the benefit 
would accrue disproportionately to higher-income suburban commuters, though it would 
be considerably less regressive if it were funded through the tax system rather than 
through fare increases on inner city riders.45  
It is correct that average incomes were higher in the suburbs than in Toronto at the 
time. However, since Fred Gardiner, affordable housing had been extensively built in 
Toronto suburbs, and the construction of relatively low-cost apartments in suburban 
areas had been enabled by Toronto’s frequent and relatively affordable transit. 
Conversely, much of the region’s wealthy still lived in the leafy midtown neighbourhoods 
of the City of Toronto. By the 1980s, suburban Metro was home to large concentrations 
of public and affordable rental housing, in areas like Lawrence Heights, Jane and Finch, 
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and Malvern. Even by the early 80s, the suburbs were no longer a middle-class 
monoculture. According to the 1981 census, 12.9% of economic families and 31.9% of 
unattached individuals in North York were below the low-income cut-off, compared with 
17.2% and 34.3%, respectively, in Toronto.  Furthermore, commutes by City of Toronto 
residents to the growing number of jobs in suburban areas, accessible by frequent bus 
service, were also made more affordable. 
Regardless of its distributional effects, the elimination of the zone fare established 
and sustained a near-unanimous base of support for transit that ranged across the 
political spectrum, from left-wing urbanites like John Sewell and David Crombie, to 
conservative suburbanites like Paul Godfrey. Though they disagreed on the details, all 
agreed that the TTC was a vital public service.  
The elimination of zone fares was not the financial calamity that has long been 
lamented. The TTC’s revenues in 1973 declined only by 1.58%; the significant decline in 
revenue per rider was almost entirely made up by the dramatic increase in total ridership. 
Expenses, however, rose by 11.2%. In part, it was from new service—the TTC 
accommodated the new hordes with a 7.3% boost in vehicle miles. Wage expenses, 
however, rose by 13.87%, and the cost per vehicle-mile climbed from $1.24 to $1.29.  
The year of the zone fares’ elimination points to a different catalyst for the deficits. 
1973 marked the beginning of the energy crisis, which caused an unprecedented spike in 
inflation across the industrialized world. The Arab oil embargo caught Canadian 
politicians unawares at least as much as it had a Watergate-plagued Nixon 
Administration, so there is no way that it could have been realistically planned for.  
Though Ontario had been obligated to purchase oil for above the world price from 
Alberta for many years, in order to develop the domestic oil industry, that long-term 
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subsidy counted for little with Albertans following the quadrupling of the world price in 
the wake of the Arab oil embargo. They pushed for rapid oil price hikes to bring prices 
paid by Canadians closer to the world price, an effect that hit the TTC with major increases 
in the cost of diesel fuel for its buses. From 1973 to 1975, fuel cost per vehicle mile rose by 
46.43%. By 1979, Canadian domestic oil cost $12.75, up from $3.00 before the crisis and 
not far from the OPEC world price of $14.75.46 All told, the two energy crises of the decade 
produced a 308.32% increase in fuel costs per vehicle mile for the TTC from 1973 to 
1982.47 
Inflation was already running at a rapid pace in the early 1970s, exacerbated by 
U.S. President Nixon’s pressure for on Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns for a loose 
monetary policy leading up to the 1972 American presidential election.48 The energy crisis 
added oil to an already raging fire.49 The petroleum price increases affected the cost of 
virtually every product, many of which were imported, and the TTC’s workers demanded 
wage increases commensurate with their spiralling cost of living. They went out on a 23-
day strike in August 1974, asking for a 40% wage increase over two years. The TTC 
countered with a 19% increase. The strike was eventually ended by provincial legislation, 
which brought the parties to binding arbitration. The arbitrator—Carl Goldenberg, once 
again playing an important role in Toronto municipal politics—split the difference and 
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awarded a 31% increase, along with several work rule changes around split shifts and 
vacation time that were favourable to the union.50 
As big as it was, the 1975 deal was only the beginning. While the TTC’s revenue 
rose by $182.4 million from 1973 to 1982, expenses rose by $223.4 million. Fares climbed 
150% from 25 to 62.5 cents in the same period, slightly outpacing consumer price inflation 
of 131%.51 Over the period, hourly wages rose by 155.2% from $6.07 to $15.49, while 
overall expenses per vehicle mile rose by 128.5%. 
While the TTC’s wage increases were enormous to the eye of a 2020s observer, they 
were hardly atypical at the time. The TTC employees received a 32% wage increase over 
two years, but in that same two-year period, the consumer price index rose by 22.67%. 
The TTC was furthermore still struggling to attract sufficient operators to maintain and 
expand their service.52  
The provincial government, concerned at the rapid rise in subsidy, did modify the 
formula in 1977 to a fixed percentage of operating costs that varied based on population. 
Transportation minister James Snow wrote that “Those transit systems that have 
obtained a high revenue to cost ratio in the past and can maintain or improve this ratio in 
the future will benefit by their efficiency.” The fare recovery target was to be 72.5%, a 
figure that the TTC generally maintained with little difficulty throughout the period.53 
There have been many critics who continue to maintain the TTC’s traditional 
scepticism about operating subsidy’s negative effects on its operating discipline. Notably 
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astute journalist and transit writer Stephen Wickens suggests that the subsidies were 
unaffordable in the long-term, and led to reckless spending, including Goldenberg’s 
generous arbitration settlement, and to an increasingly lackadaisical attitude to the 
management of the commission’s real estate assets.54 His arguments about the TTC’s 
financial management are persuasive, if difficult to falsify, and the TTC’s performance in 
developing its air-rights was dismal after the 1970s. The subsidies, however, were entirely 
affordable by the province—a fact demonstrated by them having been sustained for over 
two decades. The TTC’s fare recovery never dropped below 70% in the period—well above 
any peer system—and the provincial subsidies always remained well under $100 million. 
In 1984, for example, the province contributed $61 million to the TTC, a figure that 
amounted to only 0.2% of provincial spending in the 1984-85 fiscal year.55  
Examining the United States, Pucher et al make a similar argument to Wickens: 
the increase in subsidy led more to an increase in operating costs, particularly through 
wage increases and productivity decreases, than to improvement of service. In the United 
States, operating subsidies to transit also skyrocketed over the same period. From 1970 
to 1980, they grew fourteen-fold from $318 million to $4,378 million; federal subsidy rose 
from nothing to $1,324 million. Over that time, the operating cost per vehicle mile 
increased by 205%—almost double the TTC’s increase of 111%. Fare recovery in the United 
States declined from 99% in 1965, to 86% in 1970, to only 42% in 1980. Throughout the 
period, the TTC’s fare recovery stayed above 70%.56  
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As Pucher et al argue, part of the reason was that the formula for federal subsidies 
was based primarily on population and population density, not on ridership. In Ontario, 
the subsidy was based on actual transit spending. The subsidy of the TTC was effective 
because it drove a genuine increase in service. In the United States, after the introduction 
of modest federal operating subsidy, vehicle-miles only increased by 11% over the decade 
from 1970 to 1980. U.S. ridership increased commensurately—only 7%.57 By contrast, the 
TTC increased the vehicle-miles that it operated by 40.8% over the same period, and 
ridership increased by 32.5%. The ratio of ridership increase to service increase is 
strikingly similar for both. 
In part, the lack of service expansion in the United States occurred because 
American transit authorities simply were not persuaded that transit service was viable, 
since there was no precedent for high transit use in postwar automobile-oriented 
suburbia. In Toronto, the success of frequent suburban transit had been evident since the 
early 1960s, and provincial funding simply allowed for more of the same. While Pucher et 
al persuasively demonstrate that subsidies were largely consumed by increased costs in 
the United States, that was not inevitable, as demonstrated by Toronto, where they paid 
for considerable improvements in service.  
 Despite the corrosive effect it may have had on the TTC’s operational discipline, 
the provincial subsidies were the only solution to keeping the TTC on a path of growth. 
There was no hope of funding ballooning costs in the inflationary 1970s from the farebox. 
As affordable as the subsidies were for the province with its unlimited taxing and 
borrowing power, there was no hope of funding them from Metro’s far more limited 
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property tax base. From a $17.9 million operating deficit in 1973, the TTC needed a $53.2 
million subsidy by 1980, during the second energy crisis. The serious early 1980s 
recession pushed the TTC further into the hole, forcing a $92.9 million subvention in 
1982. $55.9 million, or 60%, of that total came from Queen’s Park.  
Even in 1976, the province’s contribution of $17.6 million to the TTC’s operating 
expenses was equivalent to Metro’s total expenditure on roads and traffic, or on the 
sewage system. It is inconceivable that Metro could have found those sums—let alone the 
far larger sums needed during the recession early in the following decade. Most 
importantly, while the province could run a Keynesian countercyclical deficit in a 
recession, Metro was forced to run a balanced budget. The only alternative would have 
been the spiral of fare hikes and service cuts that Gardiner had warned about and that 
had plagued so many American transit systems in the postwar years.58  
Instead, thanks to the provincial support—secured by the strong political base for 
transit in the populous suburban portion of Metro—the TTC was able to expand its service 
and dramatically build its ridership. Fares were kept close to consumer price inflation, 
while vehicle-miles of service provided rose 41.6% from 80.1 million in 1973 to 113.4 
million in 1982. As usual, the riders soon followed the service increases: the TTC carried 
329 million riders in 1973, a figure that had risen to 401.2 million (+22%) in 1982, despite 
the serious recession. Through it all, fare recovery remained within the 70-80% range—
far higher than any North American transit system maintains today, aside from the TTC. 
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A year after the subsidies were announced, economist Herbert Mohring—then a 
professor at the University of Minnesota and York University in Toronto as well as a 
visiting professor at the University of Toronto—produced his seminal paper, which 
effectively made the case for transit subsidy.59 Though he did not make specific reference 
to Toronto in his article, he must have noticed the increasing number of buses rolling past 
the suburban York University campus, and the growing crowds of riders aboard, as 
subsidies had enabled increasing suburban service over the preceding decade. Mohring 
provided considerable theoretical support for the subsidy program then taking place in 
Toronto, which significantly increased service and simultaneously increased demand. 
The process of subsidy and determination of fares was entirely ad hoc and 
politically motivated, as Metro’s planners acknowledged in the 1971 transportation plan 
review, but regardless, it was enormously successful.60 Rather than being a disaster that 
doomed the TTC, the provincial decision to subsidize, which was secured by a political 
desire to appease suburban voters, was a timely godsend for the commission. Without 
provincial support, Metro could never have carried the TTC through the inflationary 
1970s and the recessionary early 1980s. The only solution would have been the 
combination of service cuts and fare hikes that Gardiner had warned about so many 
decades ago, and that had doomed transit providers across the United States. 
From the first expansion of suburban service in 1963, Metro and the TTC had 
created a positive feedback loop for transit that endured for over a quarter-century. The 
expansion of service was early enough that transit retained a positive reputation as a 
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service that suburbanites wanted in their communities. With the agreement to add 
service, the TTC grew that base of support, opening the door for Metro to begin 
subsidizing transit so that a single down year would not result in severe fare hikes and 
service cuts. 
As the political power of suburbanites grew, and as the service expansions 
generated far more ridership than expected, the provincial government of Bill Davis 
agreed to generous provincial subsidies of both capital and operating costs. These 
subsidies arrived just in time to enable the TTC to survive the highly inflationary 1970s, 
when its wage and fuel costs caused deficits to balloon.  
Ridership figures tell the tale. The TTC made up for lost time in 1975, following the 
strike of 1974. Thanks to the new provincial subsidy, it was able to provide 94.3 million 
vehicle-miles of service—18% more than in 1973—despite the increased cost of operations 
following Goldenberg’s arbitration decision. Much of the new service fed the two-stop 
suburban extension to the Yonge subway that opened in 1974. Ridership climbed by 9%, 
despite an economic recession and the after-effects of the strike. 
The remainder of the decade saw relative stagnation of service overall, as a 
continuing weak economy, rapid inflation with ensuing fare hikes, and provincial 
spending restraint precluded major additions of service. The weak economy meant that 
the employment rate remained stagnant, and the employment rate has been shown to 
have a statistically significant relationship with transit ridership.61  
Treasurer Darcy McKeough stood in the legislature and said, "The first element in 
my 1976 fiscal plan is control of spending." It was therefore unsurprising that the province 
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tightened somewhat its approach to transit operating subsidy, shifting from basing 
funding on ballooning deficits to a flat 13.75% of total operating spending.62 Though some 
new suburban bus service was added, downtown streetcar service suffered somewhat—
part of a troublesome long-term trend that ignored the TTC’s path to success by producing 
a miniature spiral of service cuts and ridership declines on the streetcars. As a result of 
the cuts, TTC ridership stagnated from 1976 to 1979. It was also affected by another strike 
in 1978, which lasted four days and resulted in another substantial increase in wages. 
Stagnation, however, was a minor miracle since expenses per vehicle-mile of service 
skyrocketed from $1.11 in 1970 to $2.14 in 1979, and $2.94 in 1982. 
Still, the TTC became alarmed at the stagnation, fearing the spiral that it had 
successfully avoided since 1963. In 1979, it released a report titled “Transit in Metro: 
Some Tough Choices.” It described the growing cost pressures, and explained that 
additional government funding would be needed in order to maintain, let alone expand, 
transit service.63 Their alarm may have been premature. A recovering economy, an 
effective transit advertising campaign, and the opening of a subway in the Spadina 
expressway corridor in the previous year led to an uptick in ridership in 1979, despite a 
16.7% fare hike.64 
Shortly thereafter, a comprehensive review of the TTC’s operations involving its 
staff and Metro officials resulted in a report with recommendations for a slight increase 
 
62 Hon. Darcy McKeough, “Ontario Budget 1976,” 
http://www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/historical_documents_project/72-76/ONTARIO_1976_BUDGET.pdf; “1976 
Annual Report.” 
63 “Transit in Metro: Some Tough Choices” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 1979). 




in subsidy from 30% to 32% and the introduction of a monthly Metropass.65 The new pass 
was a success and, along with the abrupt increase in the cost of driving during the second 
energy crisis, resulted in a return to the rapid growth of the early 1970s despite a grave 
economic recession. As the TTC proudly boasted, by 1981 it had surpassed Chicago to 
become the second-largest transit system on the continent after New York, and in terms 
of ridership per capita, Toronto was comfortably in first place.66   
The TTC continued its tradition, begun with the 1963 service expansion, of inviting 
submissions from local municipalities for increased service. In 1982, for example, they 
received 70 requests. In that year, the TTC's growing confidence led them to unveil a long-
range plan, including a resurrection of the old plan for a downtown east-west subway, by 
then dubbed the "downtown relief line," a 30-year "long range concept" of a rapid transit 
ring across the north of Metro, the implementation of transit priority measures and other 
technological innovations, and even consideration of a possible transit union with the 
province's GO Transit commuter rail service and municipal operators  in the fast-growing 
suburbs outside Metro. Indeed, that was where the growth was to come in future: the TTC 
projected that Metro would grow by only 50,000 people over the following decade.67  
When Bill Davis announced his transit funding package after the cancellation of 
Spadina, he promised funding for both operating and capital expenses. He could hardly 
have anticipated the effect on finances that the tumultuous 1970s brought. By the 1980s, 
the TTC was receiving about 16% of its total operating expenses from the provincial 
treasury. The sums climbed ever year, amounting to $84 million in 1988. With other 
 
65 Juri Pill, “Transit in the 1980’s: A New Direction” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, 1979). 
66 “Annual Report for the Year 1981” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, July 20, 1982). 
67 “Annual Report for the Year 1982” (Toronto: Toronto Transit Commission, n.d.). 
301 
 
programs like health and education equally placing ever-greater demand on the 
province’s budget, transit funding was not unlimited. 
The province, without stating it explicitly, made the choice to sustain the 
operations of the TTC’s service and to avoid severe fare hikes at the expense of capital 
growth projects. When the Spadina subway opened in 1978, it was the last significant 
expansion of the subway in the 20th century. Still, the rising cost of operating subsidies 
was not the only reason for the abandonment of many capital projects in the decades to 
follow. In a retrospective article, engineer Ed Levy lamented the days when the Bloor-
Danforth-University subway could be approved without any significant commitment of 
provincial funding, but transit activist Steve Munro correctly pointed out that the cost of 
transit infrastructure has risen far faster than inflation—the $200 million cost of the 
subway when it was built in the 1960s would have amounted to only $1.710 billion in 
2020, which is a small fraction of the 2020 cost of a subway project that size.68 
The province made the correct, though difficult, choice. By focusing on operating 
funding, the TTC was able to maintain a stable and consistent level of service across the 
metropolitan region. Though its rapid transit route map remains far less impressive than 
that of many American cities, its ridership per capita and mode share are both far higher 
than any comparable city. The relatively young system also remained in good physical 
condition, as spending on maintenance remained adequate for the moment. If the 
province had chosen to continue paying for subway construction while the TTC was forced 
to slash its local service, the TTC would have been forced into the same spiral that 
decimated transit in the United States. Despite the lack of new rapid transit, the TTC’s 
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ridership grew dramatically in the 1980s. In the 1990s, when the province chose the 
opposite approach of funding subway construction while abandoning operating funding, 
just as the city was hit by a serious recession, the TTC was sent into a spiral from which it 
has never entirely recovered. 
The nearly two decades from the cancellation of Spadina to the economic calamity 
of the early 1990s could be considered to be Toronto’s golden age. That was doubly true 
for the TTC, which adroitly navigated the treacherous waters of the 1970s and became a 
widely acknowledged model for transit systems across North America by the 1980s. 
Toronto was far from a transit nirvana: buses, streetcars, and subways suffered from 
overcrowding; a plan to provide dedicated lanes for busy bus routes was short-lived; 
budget shortfalls were all-too-often made up by cuts to the very frequent downtown 
streetcar routes, whose ridership suffered as the rest of the system boomed; and, most 
importantly, the TTC’s successful model was not extended as the urban area grew beyond 
the boundaries of Metro. In part, the gains of the 1980s likely owed to the fare and service 
improvements of the previous two decades; Currie and Wallis’ metanalysis suggests that 
over the longer term (over five to ten years), the effect of fare and service improvements 
on ridership are almost double short run (six to twelve months) impacts.69 Still, the TTC 
was emblematic of Toronto’s reputation as a shining urban light at a dark time for North 
American cities. 
In American cities, the dominant discourse in the postwar era was one of decline. 
As planning historian Robert Beauregard writes, “The proclaimed decline of cities has 
framed the lives of those who came of age in the United States in the last half of [the 
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twentieth century].” This real and perceived decline was politicized and actively 
propagated, and it manifested itself in numerous ways, ranging from outmigration, 
deteriorating infrastructure, and diminishing political clout. “Even people who moved to 
the suburbs,” Beauregard writes, “watched stories of arson and crime on the nightly news, 
debated whether to shop downtown during the holidays, and drove through physically 
devastated neighbourhoods on the way to their offices in the city.”70  
In Toronto, the story was entirely different. The postwar years were a time of 
optimism, of excitement, and of renewal. The anxieties that animated the urban reformers 
of the 1970s were too much development, not too little. In a 1985 interview with Cinema 
Canada, Actor Peter Ustinov described Toronto, in a phrase that many Torontonians are 
eager to remember, as “New York run by the Swiss.”71 He was referring, no doubt, to its 
relative lack of crime, well-swept streets, and well-maintained buildings, but no doubt 
also to its clean and busy subway filled with middle- and upper-middle-class people 
making their way to work and play from their homes in both the city and the suburbs. 
Brigitta Sagmeister, in her 1973 letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail praising 
the abolition of the zone fare, wrote that she and her fellow suburbanites “want to be part 
of this City of Toronto. That’s why we want a modern and efficient transit system. Even if 
we live in North York we are still Torontonians and want to take pride in our city, and 
that’s why we don’t abandon it but travel back downtown again and again.”72 It is highly 
improbable that such a letter could have been written by an American suburbanite at that 
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time, when white flight was at its height and transit in their communities was actively 
opposed by suburbanites keen to maintain racial segregation.73 
Transit planning in most American cities embraced the idea, to borrow a Canadian 
term, of two solitudes: city and suburban—code, in all too many cases, for Black and 
white. Racial prejudice was at the root of the growing urban-suburban divide. African-
Americans were trapped in a central city that was denied reinvestment by “redlining” of 
prewar neighbourhoods. Even if they could afford to move to the suburbs, they were 
almost always prevented by a variety of overt and implicit means of discrimination, up to 
and including violence.74 The lack of transit service—sometimes a deliberate policy to 
reinforce segregation—made most of the territory beyond the historic city limits entirely 
inaccessible for those who could not own a car. 
In Toronto, these racist policies did not exist for a very simple reason. While it now 
loudly boasts of being one of the most multicultural cities in the world, with a civic motto 
of “Diversity Our Strength,” Toronto at that time was overwhelmingly white. Though 
prejudice unquestionably existed—against Catholics, immigrants, and the poor 
generally—the inescapable element of race was not a factor in the same way as it was in 
postwar urban America.  
Still, it is transit that enabled the metro area to be tied together. It enabled poor 
people to move to the suburbs, preventing the type of egregious segregation that is all-
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too-common in American metropolitan areas. It enabled a downtown to continue thriving 
the population became increasingly suburban. It meant a politics where the main fear of 
civic activists and urban reformers was demolition of the downtown for commercial 
development, rather than vacancy and abandonment as with so many of Toronto’s peers 
on the Great Lakes. By ensuring that Toronto’s transit system encompassed both 
urbanites and suburbanites, Metro and the provincial government made Toronto a more 








The 1980s were a halcyon period for the TTC. Backstopped by the provincial and 
Metro subsidy, the TTC was able to resume service improvements, which in turn grew 
ridership dramatically. From 1978 to 1988, the TTC increased vehicle-miles of service 
provided by 22%, while ridership grew by 37%. The TTC had built out a comprehensive 
network of frequent bus service covering the entire Metro area, serving local trips and 
feeding into a fast and high capacity subway system for long-haul trips. As the economy 
and population grew through the 1980s, riders filled out the system, stabilizing its fare 
recovery with the help of slowing inflation, and justifying further service improvements—
a virtuous cycle in contrast with the vicious cycles that plagued North American transit 
systems in the 1950s and 60s.  
Take the evolution of one bus route as an example. Lawrence Avenue East is a long 
east-west arterial road that passes through Don Mills and the heart of Scarborough. The 
latter borough was portrayed by its native Mike Myers (though transplanted to an 
American setting to satisfy Hollywood marketers) as the quintessential white-bread 
suburb in the 1992 film Wayne’s World. Today, it is home to an extraordinarily diverse 
population that has migrated to Toronto from all over the world, but especially from East 
and South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. For much of its length, Lawrence 
Avenue is flanked by an endless procession of interchangeable strip malls fronted by 
parking lots, with a few small apartment buildings interspersed. Behind them is an 
endless warren of meandering cul-de-sacs lined with single-family homes, each with its 
accompanying driveway and garage. It typifies Toronto 1950s and 1960s suburbia. It is 
quite indistinguishable from American suburbs like Aurora, Illinois—Scarborough’s 
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American substitute in Wayne’s World—excepting Aurora’s historic downtown and 
Scarborough’s more recent apartment towers. 
Where Lawrence East couldn’t be more different from those American locations, 
however, is its bus service. The 54 Lawrence East was created as part of the 1963 service 
expansion. Already in 1964, as houses were still sprouting from farm fields and 
apartments were nearly nonexistent, a bus rolled past the strip malls every 7.5 minutes in 
rush hour, every fifteen minutes in the midday, and every thirty minutes in the evening.75 
The service only got better thereafter. By 1991, headways had shrunk to every three-and-
a-half minutes in the peak, eight minutes forty seconds mid-day, and eleven minutes in 
the evening. Forty buses were needed to operate the evening peak service. Even on 
weekends, headways were never worse than every fifteen minutes, late into the evening. 
Even overnight, a bus still came every half-hour.76 Service in the 2010s is similar, though 
weekend headways are now a maximum of ten minutes.77 By the late 1970s, the route was 
already serving nearly 25,000 riders per day, a figure that grew to 35,000 by the late 
1980s (similar to where it remains in the 2010s).78  
Though Scarborough and Aurora, Illinois may look similar, they differ in one 
fundamental way: their transit service. Despite its population of nearly 200,000, Aurora 
has only a handful of bus routes. Even its best-served route only offers service every half-
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hour on weekdays, ending entirely at 8pm. On Sunday, there is no bus service at all. Even 
though there is commuter rail service to Chicago from Aurora on Sundays and at 11pm on 
weekdays, there are no buses to meet it.79 
Though transfers—the “scourge of suburban transit,” as Cervero described 
them80—are always an inconvenience, the high frequency of the TTC’s suburban grid 
network made connections comparatively easy. Waiting five minutes for a transfer on a 
suburban street corner is far more palatable than waiting forty-five minutes. 
A further lesson can be drawn from the TTC’s suburban transit success: even if 
average speeds are low and travel times are long, transit can attract considerable ridership 
as long as it is available with a minimal wait at all hours of the day and night. This is true 
even in low density areas with high car ownership, like the catchment area of the 
Lawrence East bus. The Lawrence East bus has an average speed of only 18.5 km/h in the 
weekday midday, which is very slow for a route that many people are riding for 
considerable distances. Nevertheless, its ridership of 36,500 on an average weekday is 
higher than all but two bus routes in New York City. And it is far from the busiest 
suburban bus route in Toronto (see Table 1; for comparison, the busiest route in New York 
City [M15 Lcl/SBS on First and Second Avenues] carries 46,08781).  
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Finch East 57,000 
Wilson/Weston North 53,000 
Finch West 47,300 
Don Mills 44,700 
Jane 44,200 
Lawrence West 43,900 
Dufferin 42,100 
Sheppard East 40,600 
Morningside/Scarborough 38,700 
Eglinton West 38,500 
Lawrence East 36,500 
Steeles West 33,100 
Eglinton East 32,500 
Markham Road 31,300 
York Mills 29,900 
 
This observation is of particularly critical importance to transportation policy 
debates, where large capital projects dominate popular and political discussions. This 
remains the case even though such megaprojects have high budgets, lengthy development 
 




times, and are frequently vulnerable to cost overruns.83 This is not to negate the value of 
large transit capital projects, but it is striking that a slow, mixed-traffic bus in a relatively 
low-density neighbourhood like Lawrence East has comparable ridership to that of the 
entire 74 km St. Louis MetroLink light rail system, for example.  
Toronto sometimes seems almost willful in its rejection of even the most basic 
improvements to its already successful bus routes. Reserved bus lanes have long been 
discussed in the city, but only two suburban routes enjoy limited priority in bus and 
carpool lanes as of 2020. As early as 1974, Toronto began a one-year pilot project for 
providing priority lanes on four of its busiest corridors. Though they did not improve 
travel times, the priority attracted a significant number of additional riders. Public 
opposition prevented the continuation of the lanes beyond the single year, and periodic 
revivals of discussion bore minimal fruit.84  
 Currie and Wallis, in their metanalysis of determinants of bus ridership, estimated 
that poor reliability—as is often the case with the TTC’s mixed-traffic bus routes—can 
depress ridership by 10-20%. This is well supported by the TTC’s recent experience. In 
2017, the TTC revived the concept on the busiest downtown streetcar route, with a pilot 
project that was eventually made permanent. This demonstrates the ridership potential 
of even modest priority, particularly when the change is well-publicized. Though the 
actual effects on travel time and reliability were quite limited (the number of severe delays 
were reduced, a few minutes were saved on end-to-end timings in the afternoon peak, 
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while there was no change in the morning peak), ridership on the long-established line 
grew by 16% virtually overnight, from 72,000 to 84,000 riders per day.85 
 Small measures like transit priority can have outsized effects when there is already 
a strong base of transit ridership, as has been achieved on many of Toronto’s suburban 
routes. Such measures are long overdue. Still, the already-strong base on mixed-traffic 
routes demonstrates that frequency and span of service, more than even speed and 
reliability, are the key to attracting tens of thousands of riders per day. 
Even without the large up-front investment in physical infrastructure of LRT, high-
order BRT, or even reserved bus lanes, the example of the TTC demonstrates that it is 
possible to generate unprecedented suburban transit ridership and revenue simply by 
improving the frequency and span of existing mixed-traffic bus service. This service 
improvement has to be dramatic, however, when made from the base of the hourly 
frequency, early evening last trips, and limited weekend service that is all too typical in 
American suburbs—and also in the Toronto suburbs outside the City of Toronto. 
In the United States, by contrast, this approach of radically improving local 
suburban service has never been tried. With the inflation of the 1970s, megaprojects like 
Washington’s Metro faced considerable cost overruns, which heightened public 
opposition. Don Pickrell’s heavily cited 1990 study of rail transit projects, produced for 
the UMTA itself, argued that ridership projections on many projects were overly 
optimistic.86 Yet Toronto’s ridership projections throughout the period consistently 
underestimated transit ridership, especially after local service improvements. Most 
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gravely, as historic city centres began to be associated with marginalized minority 
communities, public transit connecting suburbs with downtowns—especially transit that 
was useful for more than unidirectional peak period commute trips—became increasingly 
stigmatized. Some suburban counties, most infamously in Atlanta, rejected rapid transit 
projects on more-or-less explicitly racist grounds.87  
Fundamentally, public transit investment got caught up in the broader 
disillusionment with government programs in the wake of the perceived failures of the 
Great Society. As scholars ranging from disaffected liberals like Nathan Glazer to 
combative free-marketeers like Milton Friedman achieved increasing prominence with 
their criticisms of generous social programs and the Keynesian consensus, public opinion 
began to shift against many forms of government intervention—especially in cities. 
Transit was certainly not excluded. Ronald Reagan was emblematic of this view, and his 
administration fought a scorched-earth battle in opposition to transit funding, pitted 
against the more sympathetic Democrat-controlled Congress and its support-base in 
major cities. Transit had, with exceptions mainly among services oriented to affluent 
suburban commuters, been cemented in the public imagination as a mode for those who 
have no other option. This was especially true for local bus services. Mumford’s claim 
from the 1950s that transit was unpopular because it had been allowed to decay remained 
equally true a half-century later. 
Metropolitan Toronto followed a different path. Certainly, it was fortunate in not 
being faced with white flight from the city centre, or with opposition to transit in order to 
further racial segregation, but it also succeeded in making transit a public service that 
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enjoys support across the political, ideological, and geographic spectrum. It did it by 
providing a local service that is sufficiently attractive that it is used nearly as much by 
residents of low-density postwar suburbs as by residents of the condominium towers and 
prewar townhouses of the downtown core. 
Toronto’s transit success is a story of good timing, good political choices, and good 
planning. Without all three, it is unlikely that Toronto would have emerged from the age 
of the automobile with a transit system that is the choice of so many members of its 
suburban middle class.  
The provincial decision to create a metropolitan government, and to give that 
metropolitan government control of the TTC, made it possible—and even politically 
necessary—to expand high-quality urban transit service to new suburbs right as they were 
built, rather than waiting decades for demand to somehow spontaneously materialize 
despite very poor service. Frederick Gardiner as a singular figure was essential to bridging 
the urban-suburban divide at a critical time, recognizing, long before most politicians of 
his type, that the automobile could not be a transportation panacea in a large and growing 
city, and that it was essential to provide the subsidy needed to prevent the transit system 
from slipping into a spiral of fare hikes, service cuts, and ridership decline. 
The suburban political pressure created by the metropolitan governmental system 
forced the TTC to take action to placate the suburbs. They did so by providing a 
comprehensive grid of bus service. That planning choice enabled anywhere-to-anywhere 
travel by transit, an outcome that would not have been produced by other conceivable 
suburban service options like peak-oriented commuter express buses. The bus grid was 
the spark that ignited Toronto’s dramatic transit revival. 
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The power base for transit that was then established in the fast-growing and 
politically influential suburbs drew the provincial government into active support for 
transit. When Premier Davis angered suburbanites by cancelling the Spadina Expressway, 
he was able to mollify them by radically increasing transit funding because they were 
already riding transit and considered it an asset to their communities. This provincial 
support was also strikingly fortuitous in its timing, because it allowed the TTC to survive 
the surging inflation of the tumultuous 1970s and the recessionary early 1980s.  
The story of Toronto-area transit after the 1980s, however, has been one of the 
unlearning of the lessons of its success. When Metro was created in 1953, it included vast 
swathes of farmland around the city, and the Planning Board’s authority extended still 
further. The intention was that the entire region would enjoy unified services, including 
transit, and comprehensive planning. Gradually, however, the inexorable spread of 
suburbia filled Metro’s seemingly capacious boundaries, and then began to surpass them. 
There was endless discussion of extending Metro to include the new suburbs, and some 
suburbs like Vaughan and Markham even lobbied for it. Davis’ government, however, did 
not have the appetite that Frost’s government had to force an expanded Metropolitan 
government. Drawing from comprehensive regional planning efforts since the Robarts 
era, they had become increasingly drawn to decentralization.  
Darcy McKeough, Minister of Municipal Affairs, in opposition to expansion of 
Metro, argued that “the experience of the great urban centres on the North American 
continent clearly reveals that no adequate system of government has yet been discovered 
that is capable of managing such vast and complex urban communities.”88 There may also 
 
88 “The Regional Municipality of York: Address by the Honourable W. Darcy McKeough, Minister” (Ontario 
Department of Municipal Affairs, May 6, 1970); Darcy McKeough, interview. 
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have been more political considerations pointing to a preference for separate regional 
governments to counterbalance the power of Metro, rather than the creation of an 
expanded Metro that was so large that it could rival the provincial government. 
The province created separate “mini-metros” out of the surrounding counties of 
Peel, York, and Ontario (adopting the name Durham as it was merged with Durham 
County to the east). Like Metro, they were responsible for services like water, sewage, 
policing, and major roads. Transit, however, was largely left to languish; it rated not a 
mention in the ministerial statements that announced plans for the establishment of the 
Regional Municipality of York and of regional government in Peel and Halton.89 When 
the original Metro was created, the TTC was, by contrast, its crown jewel and a focus of 
discussion. 
Unlike in 1954, when the TTC was expanded to serve the entire urban region, the 
lower-tier towns and cities contained within the regional municipalities slowly built out 
their own small transit systems, in many cases adding service long after subdivisions were 
built. Invariably, service was far more limited than was available in Metro’s suburbs. 
Riders crossing municipal boundaries were also forced to pay punitive double fares, 
further suppressing ridership. To this day, transit mode share is far lower in the suburbs 




89 “The Regional Municipality of York: Address by the Honourable W. Darcy McKeough, Minister”; “A Tentative 
Proposal for Regional Government in Peel-Halton: Address by the Honourable W. Darcy McKeough,” January 22, 
1969. 
90 Jonathan English, “The Effect of Transit Service on Demand: Natural Experiments in Greater Toronto” 





Figure 26: Toronto and Suburbs Transit Mode Share to Work by Census Tract, 2011. 
 
In effect, Toronto-area suburbs outside Metropolitan Toronto pursued a much 
more American approach to suburban public transit provision, and their outcomes closely 
match those in similar American suburbs. This, in effect, provides a natural experiment 
within the Toronto region, enabling comparison of the effects of different transit service 
policies in neighbouring jurisdictions with a shared socio-economic structure and 
political system. This is an important avenue for future research. 
The province’s GO Transit commuter rail service has been responsible for nearly 
all of the growth in transit capacity to the downtown core since the Spadina subway 
opened in 1978. Using existing rail corridors allows for the addition of new routes far more 
cheaply than through construction of underground or elevated rapid transit. But its 
approach to operations also ignores the successful TTC model. Instead of aiming to 
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provide an all-day, anywhere-to-anywhere service, as had resulted in such evident success 
for the TTC, GO followed the traditional North American commuter rail model in focusing 
almost entirely on unidirectional peak period commuting to the downtown business 
district.  Rather than closely integrating its rail service with local bus services, which is 
the key to high ridership on the TTC subway, GO has focused largely on park-and-ride. 
Many of its stations have spacious garages, like BART, while there is no fare or service 
integration whatsoever between GO and TTC’s buses and subways.  
The Toronto model offers tremendous promise for regional rail: while reliance on 
walk-in traffic forces a rapid transit route to be located close to major trip generators, 
often necessitating expensive tunneling, there is much greater leeway for the location of 
a rapid transit route that relies primarily on feeder bus traffic. It can therefore be 
reasonable to build rapid transit along existing rail corridors, greatly minimizing cost and 
community disruption, rather than needing to develop an underground or elevated route. 
A park-and-ride-oriented commuter service will have little traffic after its parking lots fill 
up in the morning, leaving its infrastructure essentially useless until the evening peak. A 
commuter rail route fed by a TTC-style feeder bus network can carry enough passengers 
all day long to justify far more than simply peak period commuter service. 
The TTC is a clear example of a transit system that has managed to achieve 
ridership that is well beyond typical expectations in the low-density suburban areas that 
make up much of its service area. This Toronto model, however, has largely been forgotten 
in North America—even in Toronto itself. Understanding how it succeeded, as well as its 
failings, will enable its lessons to be applied both in its own backyard and in communities 
across the continent. The Toronto model offers the genuine possibility of reducing 
automobile dependence without needing to completely rebuild the suburbs—perhaps the 
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only way to achieve that necessary goal on the timeline needed to avert catastrophic 
climate change. If we choose to remember them, the lessons offered by decisions made 
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